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
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The
Journal
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Vol CXXIX

April-June 1999

No. 536

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 250.00. Subscription should be
sent to the Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution.

Articles, correspondence and books for review should be sent
to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space
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EDITORIAL

Our efforts at developing friendly relations with Pakistan ever since Independence have not met with the desired degree of success. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee took Pakistani declarations at face value and embarked on the bus diplomacy to Lahore, even, as revealed later, Pakistan was preparing for invasion in Kargil. However, this is not the first time that Pakistan has done such a thing. In June 1965, with Lal Bahadur Shastri a similar thing happened. As the Indian and Pakistani envoys were signing the agreement on submitting the Rann of Kutch dispute for arbitration, General Ayub Khan of Pakistan was preparing to unleash the infiltration force on Kashmir by launching 'Operation Gibraltar.' Consequent to the 1971 Indo-Pak war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto prevailed upon Indira Gandhi to release over 90,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War, promising to work for conversion of the LOC in the state of Jammu and Kashmir into an international boundary and later let her down. General Zia-ul-Haq talked of a no-war pact even as he was supporting Khalistani terrorists and proceeding with his country's nuclear weapons programme. Ms Benazir Bhutto spoke to Rajiv Gandhi about greater understanding even as the ISI of Pakistan was triggering insurgency in the Kashmir Valley.

The LOC in the state of Jammu and Kashmir was delineated 27 years back. Pakistan has committed an aggression in the Kargil sector. The Kargil developments have different dimensions. The lead article in this issue of the Journal by Shri B Raman deals with the Kargil issue in a comprehensive manner. The author is of the opinion that we should be wiser by the post-Lahore events and exercise caution while dealing with Pakistan. Rather than reacting, India should pursue a proactive policy. There is a need to see through the game plan of our adversary and keep a couple of steps ahead. To safeguard our national security, India must maintain a robust military capability and political 'will' to deter Pakistan.

Kargil : In Perspective

B RAMAN

Introduction

The Kargil developments have three dimensions - military, diplomatic and political. Militarily, it is a joint counter-insurgency operation in our territory by the Army and the Air Force. At the same time, it is also the most technically complex and professionally difficult counter-insurgency operation ever undertaken anywhere in the world due to the following reasons:

(a) Our forces are confronted with not indigenous insurgents, but an invading force of well trained, well armed and experienced mercenaries-cum-terrorists of Afghan War vintage and buttressed by Pakistani Army regulars. It is invasion across the legally sanctified Line of Control (LOC) under the cover of insurgency.

(b) The difficult terrain in this area with 15,000 feet plus high ridges gives the initial advantage to the breaker of international law and treaties. Since the enemy's encampments are located on high ridges and not at ground level and at a distance of about six kms from Pakistani territory, aircraft manoeuvrability is restricted lest inadvertent violations of Pakistani air space lead to unwise escalation and diplomatic incidents.

(c) It is not a counter-insurgency operation with no holds barred, but one carried out in carefully measured pace with voluntarily-assumed do's and don'ts to avoid a wider conflagration.

MILITARY DIMENSIONS

Information about the Enemy

Reports available so far have identified the composition of the

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

invading forces as consisting of the following:

- (a) Pakistani Army regulars.
- (b) Mercenaries of the *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* (HUM), which was declared an international terrorist organisation by the US in October 1997.
- (c) Mercenaries of the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, the militant wing of the *Markaz Dawa Al Irshad*.
- (d) Mercenaries of the *Al Badr*, which consists of many Afghans.
- (e) Members of bin Laden's *Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami*, also known as *Tehrik-e-Jihad* as well as *Al Qaeda* (The Base).
- (f) These organisations are all members of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the US and Israel formed by Osama bin Laden in 1998 and their leaders had signed the *fatwa* issued by bin Laden in February last year calling for terrorist strikes against the US and Israel.

The Army Operations

The Army operations have four objectives as under:-

- (a) To protect the civilian population.
- (b) To prevent any further ingress by the invaders.
- (c) To frustrate the invader's attempts to disrupt communications on the vital Srinagar-Leh road.
- (d) Ultimately, to clear the infiltrators from the ridges occupied by them, end the occupation of Indian territory and restore the sanctity of the LOC. ...

The Air Operations

The Indian Air Force operations have two main objectives:

- (a) To soften the encampments as a prelude to ground operations by the Army.
- (b) To monitor the activities in the encampments through aerial surveillance before and during the Army operations.

Operational Constraints and Difficulties:

The difficulties faced are as follows :

- (a) The location of the encampments at high altitudes reduces the distance between the encampments and the aircraft, thereby making evasive action more difficult.
- (b) Transfer by Pakistan to the invading force of *Stinger* shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles and other sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, which the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had received earlier from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for use against Soviet aircraft during the Afghan War. The reported use of a *Stinger* against an IAF helicopter by the invaders has discredited past US assurances that this weapon cannot be used by insurgents and terrorists in Kashmir because of the limited life period of their batteries and the non-supply (as claimed by the US) of any fresh batteries to the ISI after 1988.
- (c) The high ridges occupied by the invaders make the Army's advance slow and costly in terms of human casualties.
- (d) The Army's advance is also made more difficult by the continuous heavy artillery support provided by the Pakistan Army to the invaders, which renders dangerous the transport of troops to the higher ridges by helicopters.
- (e) The continuous reinforcement of the encampments by the Pakistani Army and ISI rear bases located in Pakistani-controlled territory. To avoid an unwise escalation, the Indian Army and the Air Force have to forego the legitimate right to hit at these rear bases.

Time Frame for Restoring Sanctity of the LOC

In view of the difficulties faced by the Army and the Air Force and the care and caution required of them to avoid a wider conflagration, it would not be reasonable to expect quick results. The ultimate vacation of the aggression on our territory and the restoration of the sanctity of the LOC and the time and tactics required for these objectives have to be left to the Army and the Air Force and their professionalism. All that the rest of the population need do is to stand united behind them and let them know that the nation's prayers, good wishes and admiration are with them.

DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

Pakistan's Likely Objective

Diplomatically, the Pakistani objective was to bring the Kashmir issue back in the media headlines and on the international agenda. Its next step was to manoeuvre its diplomatic moves in such a way as to have its violation of the sanctity of the LOC and occupation of Indian territory legitimised through international intervention. This has not succeeded so far. Though the issue is back in the media headlines, it is for reasons that are detrimental to Pakistan. Since 1995, India has been saying that the Kashmir insurgency was no longer being waged by indigenous Kashmiris but by mercenaries of various Pakistan and Afghanistan-based terrorist organisations instigated, trained and armed by the ISI. The international community only exhibited misgivings about the validity of this Indian contention.

Osama bin Laden Factor

Western intelligence organisations, through their own independent inquiries, have identified the invading force in the Kargil sector as consisting of Pakistan-backed mercenaries of Afghan War vintage and with close links to bin Laden. Most Western analysts have concluded as follows:

- (a) There has been a violation of the LOC by a Pakistani-backed invasion force.

(b) The operation has all the hallmarks of an ISI operation and could not have been undertaken without the knowledge of the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

In this connection, it would be worthwhile to quote from the New Delhi-dated lined despatch of Julian West of the *Electronic Telegraph* of the UK (May 30):

Western intelligence believes that many (of the invaders) are Afghan, Pakistani and even international Muslim militants backed by Pakistan's ISI. Principal among these is *Al Badr*, a terrorist group linked to Osama bin-Laden. An intelligence source, who believes about 3,000 to 5,000 militants are currently being trained in various camps run by the Pakistani intelligence in Pakistan and possibly Afghanistan, said: "This current operation has all the hallmarks of the ISI..... It could not have been launched without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif".

Discussing the likely Pakistani motives, he then adds:

What puzzles many observers, however, is why Mr. Sharif - who only three months ago signed a declaration of entente with India - should instigate what amounts to a virtual declaration of war. The answer may lie in Pakistan's long-standing wish to internationalise the Kashmir issue, as well as a desire to tie up Indian troops and embarrass India's caretaker Government. Western intelligence sources also believe that the ISI is simply pursuing its customary agenda of fomenting instability within the territories bordering Pakistan.

Shujaat Bukhari, the Srinagar correspondent of *The Hindu* of Chennai, reported (June 4) from Kargil that "In Batalik, 80 per cent of the intruders are stated to be Afghan and Taliban militiamen with a significant number from the Osama bin Laden camp." How did these people come to the Kargil-Dras-Batalik area? To answer this question, one has to go back to the first week of February, when Mr. Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State, visited Islamabad for talks on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He was

accompanied by Mr. Karl Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State, General Joseph Ralston, Vice-Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a team of CIA and FBI officers handling the operation for the capture and extradition of bin Laden.

On 1 February 1999, Maulvi Jalil Akhund, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan, was flown from Kandahar to Islamabad in a special ISI plane. Initially, he met Nawaz Sharif and his Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. Thereafter, Inderfurth met Maulvi Akhund at Aziz's house. Inderfurth then went to Peshawar and met the moderate, anti-Taliban, Mujahideen leaders based there and sought their co-operation in tracing bin Laden and his accomplices wanted by the FBI. During their meetings, Talbott and Inderfurth reportedly made it clear to their Pakistani and Afghan interlocutors that the US was determined to capture bin Laden, *with their co-operation if possible, and without it if necessary.*

Rattled by these warnings, Sharif held discussions at the ISI headquarters with General Pervez Musharraf, his Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), and with Lt Gen Ziauddin, the new ISI Director-General, on what to do with bin Laden and his 1,000 followers - about 300 belonging to his *Hakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami* and the remaining 700 from the HUM, the *Lashkar* and the *Al Badr*, who were camping in Afghan territory adjoining the Pakistan border. No announcement was made about what was decided. On 13 February, Mohammad Tayyab, a Taliban spokesman, told a press conference at Kandahar that "bin Laden has disappeared. We didn't ask him to leave. We don't know where he is."

On 2 March, Zafar Iqbal of the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* told a press conference at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir that his organisation has invited bin Laden to join the "freedom struggle" in Kashmir. He added: "Osama is our erstwhile colleague. We had fought jointly against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan." The US refused to accept the Taliban's claim that bin Laden, his lieutenants and their force of about 1,000 had left Afghanistan and intensified satellite surveillance of the area to locate them. The US Congressional committees dealing with national security held frequent meetings at which Inderfurth was required to report progress in tracing bin Laden and his group.

The satellite surveillance was reported to have indicated that during March, the Pakistan Army and the ISI transported this entire group to the Skardu region of the Northern Areas (NA) and then helped them in creating new sanctuaries for themselves on the ridges in the Kargil area. While the individual presence of bin Laden and his lieutenants in the Kargil area has not yet been established, there is no doubt about the presence of their followers in this area.

Thus, the US and other Western powers have their own independent evidence regarding Pakistan's use of bin Laden's mercenary force from Afghanistan in an attempt to change the LOC in this sector through occupation of Indian territory. It is this, which explains their strong support for the Indian version of the recent developments and their action in spurning Pakistan's attempt to have the issue internationalised in order to secure post-facto legitimisation of its proxy invasion. At the same time, despite the independent, authentic evidence available with them, the US and other Western powers are not prepared to go to the extent of condemning Pakistan, declaring it a State sponsor of International Terrorism, suspending the execution of the IMF's rescue package for the Pakistani economy and re-imposing the other economic sanctions which were lifted or eased by the Clinton Administration last year.

Functional Relationship Between the ISI and the CIA

The Nawaz Sharif Government seems to be reasonably confident that while the US might exercise political and moral pressure on it, which it could withstand, Washington would not go to the extent of taking any punitive action against it. This confidence arises from the ISI's role in Kosovo. It is not widely known that the working relationship between the ISI and the CIA continues to be strong, though possibly not as strong as during the Afghan war. During Benazir Bhutto's second tenure as Prime Minister from 1993 to 1996, the CIA had used the ISI for training the Bosnian Muslims and for acting as a conduit for the supply of arms and ammunition to them. The supplies were made from the surplus stocks of the Afghan War left with the ISI. Many retired ISI officers, including Lt Gen Hamid Gul, DG of the ISI in the late 1980s, were deputed to

Bosnia to act as advisers to the Bosnian Muslims. The US did not look upon the HUM and the *Lashkar-e-Toiba* as terrorist organisations at that time and had encouraged them to go to Bosnia to assist the local Muslims against the Serbs.

Similarly, the ISI has been closely involved since the beginning of this year in the training of the Kosovo Liberation Army and in the supply of arms and ammunition to them. By using the ISI as the intermediary, the CIA is able to maintain its deniability of any role in training and arming the KLA. Shabaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz Sharif, and the Chief Minister of Punjab, has been co-ordinating this operation for the training of the KLA. He made a low-profile visit to Washington at the beginning of the NATO air strikes to hold discussions with officials of the CIA and the State and Defence Departments on this issue.

In view of this, it may not be realistic on our part to expect the US to go to the extent of taking any punitive action against Pakistan unless and until the Indian forces are able to get the smoking gun in the form of capturing, alive or dead, bin Laden and/or any of his lieutenants figuring in the FBI's wanted list. Even if we get the smoking gun, the US might still wriggle out of taking any punitive action against Pakistan by saying that there is no evidence that the Pakistan Government was aware of the presence of bin Laden and/or his associates in the Kargil area.

The US used a similar excuse during the Mumbai blasts of 1993. The Indian investigative agencies captured hand-grenades of Austrian design from the perpetrators of the blasts and obtained a certificate from the Austrian factory that sold the design to Pakistan stating that the grenades had been manufactured with the machinery supplied by it to Pakistan. They also recovered chemical explosive timers of US ordnance manufacture, which had been supplied by the CIA to the ISI. Despite this, officials of the Clinton Administration took the stand that this evidence, though proving that the explosive material and the hand-grenades used in Mumbai had come from Pakistan Government stocks, did not necessarily prove that the Nawaz Sharif Government was aware of it. However, this should not make us relent in our efforts to collect and collate all evidence having a bearing on this subject and present it to the international community.

POLITICAL DIMENSION

This political dimension relates to the questions of whether it was wise to have started a comprehensive and composite dialogue process with Pakistan at Lahore and whether we should resume even a limited dialogue with Pakistan till the *status quo ante* is restored. As two nuclear powers with a common land border, there is no alternative to a dialogue and to keeping the lines of communications open in the best as well as in the worst of times. India's trust in the words of Nawaz Sharif has been belied and we have been stabbed in the back. One should condemn the stabber and not the stabbed for not looking over his shoulder all the time. At the same time, there is a valid case for avoiding over expectations from any dialogue with Pakistan because of the mindset of its leaders and the byzantine nature of the society and its power structure. While continuing to maintain a dialogue with Pakistan, we should keep in view the fact that in the history books for Pakistani children, it is not Akbar, but Aurangzeb, who is projected as an ideal ruler to be emulated. We should be wiser by the post-Lahore events and avoid walking into another trap.

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Sino-Indian Relations

ZHOU GANG

Introduction

I feel very pleased to have this opportunity to talk about China's policy towards South Asia and the Sino-Indian relations. Its relationship with the South Asian countries including India is an important component of China's foreign policy of good-neighbourliness. In order to help you understand China's policy towards South Asia and India in its comprehensive perspective, I will give you a brief account of our views on the current international situation and China's domestic and foreign policies.

International Situation

At present, the international situation is undergoing profound and complicated major changes. Peace and development remain the two main themes of the world today. Safeguarding peace, seeking cooperation and promoting development have become irresistible historical trends. The world has witnessed further development of the trend towards political multipolarity and economic globalisation and the ongoing changes in state-to-state relations, especially in relations among major powers. Various partnerships characterised by non-confrontation, non-alignment and non-targeting against third countries have been established one after another. However, there will be ups and downs for the new setup to take shape in the long run. Economic globalisation has made countries more and more interdependent, and the issues of economic security and national sovereignty are growing conspicuous. The impact of the Asian financial crisis spread to the rest of the world, sending strong shock waves throughout the world economy. Safeguarding economic security has become an urgent task for many countries,

Excerpted from a talk given by His Excellency Zhou Gang, Ambassador of People's Republic of China in India at the USI, New Delhi on 24 March 1999.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

especially the developing countries. With their enhanced consciousness of unity and self-improvement, developing countries are playing an active role in the international arena.

The international situation is on the whole moving towards relaxation, but the world is far from peaceful and tranquil. Hegemonism and power politics still exist, sometimes in salient forms; they have remained the root causes for threatening peace and security of the world. The unjust and unreasonable old international political and economic order is still undermining the interests of the developing countries. Conflicts related to races, religions, territorial disputes and natural resources erupt one after another and crises arise frequently. Such transnational issues as international crime, terrorism, drug-smuggling and environmental deterioration have posed new challenges. All this has brought about serious impact on world peace and development. Mankind is about to herald in the 21st Century. A major task confronting the people of the world is how to further achieve lasting peace and create common prosperity in the new century.

China's Domestic and Foreign Policies

China has given top priority to economic construction according to its national conditions. Over the past 50 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, earthshaking changes have taken place in China. Especially since 1978 when China began to carry out reforms and opening-up policy, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Deng Xiaoping's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, it has scored great achievements in its socialist modernisation drive, which have attracted world attention. Over the past two decades, its national economy has witnessed sustained, rapid and healthy development, and the average growth rate of GNP increased by 9.8 per cent annually. As a result, China's national strength has been remarkably enhanced and its international status unprecedentedly raised. Its total economic strength has leaped to the seventh place in the world line-up. The output of some of the main industrial and agricultural products of China has come to the fore. China ranks second both in terms of foreign exchange reserves and attracting foreign

investment. Rapid progress has been made in its cultural, educational, medical and health fields and people's living standards have been markedly improved. It is not easy for China to still score 7.8 per cent growth rate of GNP in 1998 when it succeeded in withstanding the shock of the Asian financial crisis and subduing the most severe floods.

We are fully aware that China is still a developing country with a per capita income of only over US\$ 700. It faces the arduous tasks of eliminating poverty for 50 million people and further developing science, technology, education and culture. It will need the unremitting efforts and hard struggle of several, and even over a dozen generations, to realise the goal of China's modernisation. Therefore, China needs a long-term stable international environment of peace and a friendly, peripheral environment of good-neighbourliness.

China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, resolutely safeguards its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national dignity, opposes hegemonism and contributes towards maintenance of world peace. It is the objective of China's diplomatic work to strength and consolidate unity and cooperation with the vast number of developing countries. China's foreign policy is sustained by the following three pillars: to persist in independence and keep the initiative, to safeguard world peace, and to seek common development. We always put our state sovereignty and national security in the first place. At the same time, we respect the sovereignty of other countries and vigorously support their efforts - the developing countries in particular - to defend their state sovereignty. In handling international relations, China sticks to non-alignment and does not go in for military blocs and arms races nor engage in military expansion. China has all along stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It is China's consistent view that while countries safeguard their own interests, they should also respect those of others. It is essential to completely reject the cold-war mentality, advocate a new security concept and resolve international and regional security issues through consensus and participation on an equal footing. We in China stand for the equality of all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor.

No country should impose its own will on others. State-to-state relations should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. China consistently pursues the policy of opening-up to the outside world and is ready to develop cooperation and exchanges with all countries in trade and economic, scientific and technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

China firmly pursues a national defence policy that is defensive in nature. China's state interests, social system, foreign policy and historical and cultural traditions postulate that China will inevitably adopt such a national defence policy. China's defence policy has mainly the following aspects:

- (a) Consolidating national defence, resisting aggression, curbing armed subversion, and defending the state's sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security.
- (b) Subordinating national defence work to, and placing it in the service of the nation's overall economic construction, and achieving the coordinated development of these two kinds of work.
- (c) Implementing the military strategy of active defence.
- (d) Streamlining the Army in the Chinese way.
- (e) Safeguarding world peace, and opposing aggression and expansion.

China's economic development, social progress, its independent foreign policy of peace and a defensive defence policy have won widespread admiration from the international community. Practice has shown that China's development and progress mean the growth of the forces of peace. China is a peace-loving and responsible developing country as well as a staunch force for maintaining world peace and regional stability. The so-called "China threat theory" is entirely unfounded and fabricated with ulterior motives. China is ready to work with the international community to promote the establishment of a just and equitable new international political and economic order and make its due contributions to the lofty cause of peace and development of mankind.

China's Policy Towards South Asia

The South Asian countries are friendly neighbours of China. Profound traditional friendship has long existed between the Chinese people and people of these countries. Both China and the South Asian countries are developing countries, and share extensive common interests in opposing hegemonism, safeguarding world peace and promoting common development. There exists a huge potential for cooperation. President Jiang Zemin expounded comprehensively and systematically China's South Asia policy during his visit to this region at the end of 1996, and summed it up as expanding exchanges of visits and strengthening traditional friendships; respecting each other and cementing friendly relations from generation to generation; pursuing reciprocity and mutual benefit and promoting common development; seeking common ground while resolving differences and settling disputes in a proper way; consolidating unity and cooperation and working hard together for a better future. China sincerely hopes that all the South Asian countries would become its good neighbours, good friends and good partners. Promoting friendly relations between China and the South Asian countries is conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia, and conforms to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and people of these countries as well. Development of friendly relations between China and any other country is not directed against any third country.

China not only wants to develop with the South Asian countries long-standing good-neighbourliness and friendship into the 21st Century, but also hopes that they will enjoy political stability and economic prosperity, and treat one another on an equal footing, live in harmony, develop friendly relations and cooperation, and settle their differences and disputes through peaceful means, and that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) will keep making progress

China's Policy Towards India

India is China's important neighbour, and the two countries share a 2000-kilometre-long common border. As the two largest developing countries in the world, China and India exert important

influence in the affairs of South Asia and Asia as a whole. Sino-Indian relationship is an important component of China's foreign policy of good-neighbourliness. In the past 50 years or so since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India, the Chinese leaders of three generations have all along upheld developing good-neighbourly and friendly relations with India on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. In accordance with this spirit, China has taken a series of positive initiatives and constructive actions to improve and develop its relations with India. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 started a momentum of comprehensive resumption and development of Sino-Indian relations, and President Jiang Zemin's visit to India in 1996 brought it to a new high. President Jiang Zemin and the Indian leaders agreed to establish a future-oriented cooperative and constructive partnership between China and India on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and drew up bright prospects for the bilateral relations. Actually, China and India should be able to take a friendly, stable and healthy Sino-Indian relationship into the 21st Century because there exists broad similarities between our two countries and a good basis for cooperation.

- * Both China and India are ancient civilisations with a splendid history and have made indelible contributions towards mankind.
- * There exists a profound traditional friendship between the people of the two countries. China and India sympathised with and supported each other during their struggles for national independence and against foreign aggression in the modern times. Sino-Indian friendship is the common aspiration of the 2.2 billion people of the two countries.
- * In the mid-50s, the two countries jointly initiated the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which have now become the universally recognised norms governing state-to-state relations. As the initiators, China and India should take the lead and make themselves an example for others to follow.
- * At present, both China and India are facing the common tasks of developing the economy, eliminating poverty and improving the quality of people's life. The two countries share similar or

identical views on many major issues, such as economic development, human rights, environmental protection, combating drug-trafficking and crimes and population control. Therefore, they should strengthen coordination and consultation between them, conduct mutually-beneficial cooperation and promote common development.

Needless to say, differences do exist on some issues between China and India due to disparities in historical background, cultural tradition, social system and religious belief. The differences are nothing abnormal. The key, however, lies in what kind of attitude to take towards them. The outstanding issue between China and India is nothing more than the boundary dispute. Fundamentally speaking, this is a legacy of history when India was ruled by the colonialists. China is the victim. The Chinese Government has always stood for a peaceful, fair and equitable solution of the boundary issue on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, in accordance with the principle of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and through friendly talks, while taking into account the historical background, the present reality and the national feelings of the people of the two countries. Pending the solution of the boundary issue, peace and tranquillity should be maintained along the Line of Actual Control in the border areas. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government has maintained that while positively seeking a solution to the boundary issue, the two sides should work hard to develop bilateral relations in various fields so as to create a favourable atmosphere for the final solution of the boundary issue. China's stance on this is consistent, constructive and positive.

It is also inevitable that there exist some concerns between the two big neighbours. As long as both sides proceed within the ambit of overall interests of the bilateral friendly relations and handle these concerns on the basis of mutual trust, with a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and in a truth-seeking and forward-looking spirit, the differences will be narrowed gradually and problems resolved instead of coming in the way of the normal development of bilateral relations.

Since April and May last year, some new problems that have cropped up in the Sino-Indian relations, are what the Chinese side

would not like to see. Proceeding from the overall interests of the Sino-Indian relations, China showed considerable restraint. However, the Chinese side was compelled to refute the groundless charges against China by certain personalities and make clear its principled position so as to not only clarify right from wrong but also bring the Sino-Indian relations back onto the track of healthy development at an early date. Only if established on a healthy basis, can the Sino-Indian relations witness a sustained development. This basis means that with regard to the bilateral relations, China and India must abide by the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and should not view the other as a threat. We have noted that the Indian side has recently expressed its willingness to attach importance to its relations with China, make efforts to resume and develop the bilateral relations and not to view China as its enemy. All this is welcome. In late February, the officials of the foreign ministries of China and India held a useful meeting in Beijing which provides a new starting point for the improvement and development of the bilateral relations. We believe that as long as the two sides trust each other, do not view the other side as a threat to itself, treat each other with sincerity and strictly adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in practice, the Sino-Indian relations will be gradually resumed and developed and a cooperative and constructive partnership into the future between China and India will come true. We hope the Indian side will make concrete efforts in this respect.

At the turn of this century, and the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India, our two countries shoulder both responsibilities and obligations to take Sino-Indian relations of friendly cooperation and development into the new century. This is not only in conformity with the fundamental interests of the people of the two countries, but also conducive to peace, stability and development in Asia and the world at large. China is sincere and confident in developing its relations with India. I believe that it is also the aspiration of the Indian people.

Dealing With China in the Twenty First Century

PART II

MAJOR GENERAL VINOD SAIGHAL, VSM (RETD)

THE TAIWAN QUESTION AND ITS EFFECT ON GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

On the face of it there are only three countries of the world directly involved in the China-Taiwan standoff, i.e., China, USA and Taiwan itself. Delving deeper, one realises that any sudden absorption of Taiwan by China would be a cataclysmic event whose import might not have been appreciated to the same extent in India as it would have been in the USA and Japan. The countries most affected by the ramifications of a sudden change would prefer the transition to be a gradual one, spread over several decades; even a century or beyond. Hence, the importance being given to the Taiwan question. The aspect will be looked at in several dimensions.

China's Military Capability to Physically overrun Taiwan at the Present Time

Should China decide to militarily subjugate Taiwan any time in the near future, the USA would almost certainly intervene. It would assist in the destruction of the Chinese armada, taking care at no stage to touch the Chinese mainland and thereby not giving China any excuse to hit the Continental USA with nuclear-tipped missiles. The Chinese are realists. Regardless of pronouncements they would not be foolish enough to start a nuclear exchange with the USA. The adverse ratio against China in any exchange with the USA - whatever the nature of the exchange - is simply too large. Japan would tacitly provide much more than logistics backup to the USA. Therefore, one takes it that were China to mount a physical invasion

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999

of Taiwan the US response would be limited to naval and air support from aircraft based in Japan. Going by current estimates of China's amphibious capability, this level of support would be sufficient to spoil China's invasion ambitions.

The next scenario to be considered would be to gauge the chances of success of a physical invasion of Taiwan from mainland China without any outside interference. The chances of success of the invasion are still rated low. There are several reasons for this:-

- ★ The weather in the South China Sea is highly unpredictable. Very strong winds or typhoon like conditions prevail in the Formosa Straits for nearly two hundred days in a year.
- ★ Taiwan has been preparing for the eventuality for nearly half a century since the Communists took power on the mainland. They would be quite capable of neutralising the Chinese naval armada irrespective of any preparatory bombardment carried out by China. The (residual) force actually making a landing would be quickly destroyed by Taiwanese counterattack elements.
- ★ A small nation fighting with its back to the wall does have a few aces up its sleeve as in the case of Israel. Therefore, it would not be too far-fetched to assume that Taiwan may have created a small nuclear stockpile to take care of its minimum deterrence needs. The Chinese themselves being great proliferators should know that if one side does not respect mutually agreed upon restraints the other party - the more vulnerable person - would be foolhardy not to cater for adequate safeguards. Hence, in a do or die situation, the back-to-the-wall Taiwanese would ensure that they destroy Shanghai and a few other industrial hubs by whatever means. (It is very likely that Japan too would be just a screw driver turn away from a minimum nuclear deterrent of its own).

Therefore, it would be in the best interest of all concerned to preserve the status quo while respecting China's claims for an eventual reunification of Taiwan with PRC. Taiwan would, in turn, have to ensure that it does not make a unilateral declaration of

independence, thereby pushing China towards the extreme step. China would have, or should have, calculated that the physical destruction that would accompany a military invasion of Taiwan - even if eventually successful - would be so great as to push back by twenty, thirty or fifty years China's dream of global greatness at par with the USA.

Global Effects of a Sudden Merger with Taiwan

Before leaving the question of Taiwan and going on to other matters it would be worth looking at, *en passant*, the effects of a peaceful merger between China and Taiwan in the near future. The effects will be immediately felt throughout the world. Briefly, these could be:-

- ★ China would, overnight, become one of the largest and most powerful economies of the world.
- ★ With such economic clout China would be able to single-handedly displace the economic centres of gravity of the world from Washington, New York, Tokyo, London, Zurich and Frankfurt to Beijing and Shanghai. (The cliché "shanghaied" would then have assumed a literal meaning).
- ★ The World Bank and IMF would stand diminished unless they accommodated China on its own terms. The same would apply to WTO.
- ★ The European Union would loosen its bonds with USA and look more in the direction of China.
- ★ Russia would become militarily more insecure, having to contend with the Eastward expansion of NATO and the Northwards expansionist urge of China.
- ★ Japan, at some stage, would have to loosen its military bonds with USA and reach accommodation with China. (Japan's position would become untenable with 80 per cent of its energy supplies having to pass through the South China Sea).

- * Most of South East Asia would follow suit.
- * China would become the legatee of the concept mooted by the Japanese in a different era of the Asian Co-Property Sphere.
- * Australia would be economically crippled if it did not reach suitable accommodation with China and obliged to sever its links with the USA.
- * India?

What has been mentioned above is one possible set of outcomes of a 'rapid' (peaceful) incorporation of Taiwan by China. In spite of a number of imponderables - and an even greater number of variables - the core hypothesis would, in all probability, remain the same. The question mark in front of India should be read the way it is meant to be read, i.e., a question mark. It connotes a whole range of interesting possibilities whose consideration is outside the scope of this discussion.

The Perception of 'Threat Perception'

In the most simplistic derivation of the 'perception' of 'threat perception', any country which is larger and more powerful constitutes a potential threat to its neighbours. Whether that threat manifests itself in a military form or in any other form becomes a matter of detail. There have been neighbours who have co-existed peacefully for generations on end and there have been neighbours who have fought with each other a number of times in almost every century. Whatever be the case, history is replete with examples of countries losing their freedom per se or their freedom of action whenever they failed to take adequate measures to safeguard their security against more powerful neighbours. The present century and the post-colonial period have been no exceptions to this historical phenomenon, the frequency of whose occurrence makes it a historical verity.

In the light of what has been stated it becomes obvious that, in a manner of speaking, China constitutes a threat to India. Even

if it had not been a permanent Security Council member with veto power - whose formidable nuclear and military might keeps increasing rapidly - China would still have constituted a threat to India in keeping with the historical truism just elaborated. Possibly, the reverse proposition would also hold true for a person examining the same hypothesis from the point of view of China. Therefore, going strictly by (elementary) logic, China would constitute a "potential" threat to India no matter how one looks at the matter. Hence, China's fierce reaction becomes incomprehensible when the obvious is stated. The US military establishment has been citing China as its principal threat since the end of the Cold War. Nobody in China has taken exception to it. In fact the relations between the two countries have actually been improving since both sides realised that they constitute the biggest threat to each other in the next century. What is the reason for this improvement in relations between these two mighty powers? The reason is that both of them shed hypocrisy in this regard from day one. In the case of India, hypocrisy linked to an inability to face reality, has (generally) been the hallmark of defence planners. Patently false pronouncements for decades on end engendered a feeling of overlordship in the minds of China's leaders to the extent that when the truth - a natural extension of the universal hypothesis just mentioned - was finally articulated for the first time at the highest levels of government, it sounded like a provocative and bellicose statement.

It was nothing of the sort. Nor was it intended to give offence to a giant neighbour. It was a wake up call given to the country's defence establishment. What should have happened in the early 1970s finally took shape after another quarter century had gone by. It is an entirely different matter that the ham-handed manner in which the Government of India justified its momentous decision gave needless offence to the neighbour in question. It demonstrated lack of experience and diplomatic finesse. The Government of China should have realised then - and should certainly keep in mind for the future - that in a democracy - and especially during the phase of coalition governments - individuals holding high office could make statements that show an independent drift. China should appreciate that in a democracy dissent cannot be muzzled. Loose canons cannot be always controlled.

The Nature of Colossi

After slumber and subjugation for several centuries, China is again becoming the great country that it was throughout most of its history. It already looms large on the horizon of its Asian neighbours. At the dawn of the new century it will assume the shape of a colossus. When that happens it will begin to exhibit the 'nature' of a colossus. What exactly is the nature of a colossus. The nature of a colossus is that it begins to develop an appetite for aggrandisement. By making this statement it is not the intention here to attribute any malign intent to China's leadership. The discussion is on historical phenomenon. They closely resemble natural phenomenon. Throughout history colossi have, almost without exception, manifested this urge. Kingdoms that became large grew into empires. Empires, after consolidation, started becoming larger and larger through a process of conquest till they assumed gigantic proportions, i.e., they had become fit enough to burst. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries were no exception. The British Empire grew so large that ultimately it had to give way. The Soviet Empire is a more recent case. The lone super power, unless it shows self-restraint, will come to the bursting point any time in the first half of the next century. This time around, the difference would be that when the explosion occurs it could possibly destroy much of the world as well. It is the reality of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Reverting to China, whether its present leadership wishes it or not, the country will automatically start showing the symptoms of a colossus in the next century. The military build up in Tibet is sufficient, at the present, to enable the mounting of a full-scale offensive against India to threaten the 'entire' North East of the country. As if this were not enough there is no let up in the pace of augmentation of this capability, regardless of the so-called tranquility along the border. The countries adjoining China, especially the defence planners of this country, better take heed. Samuel Butler is reported to have said, "man is the only animal that can remain on friendly terms with the victims he intends to eat until he eats them". Once again it is reiterated that nobody is assigning evil intent to China's honourable leaders. The expansionist urge inheres

in the nature of colossi. In the case of China the situation will be exacerbated by growing scarcities in the region in the next century. To cite an example, arable land in China is shrinking at an alarming pace.

The Effect of Globalisation

It is not the intention here to merely repeat what has been oft-repeated, i.e., that globalisation is inevitable and those who do not adapt will go under. Here it is proposed to examine as to what happens to countries like China and India and many other like them when the inevitable does overtake them. Taking the case of China, the first realisation that must have come to the post-Deng Xiaoping leaders, when confronted with the partially-liberalised economic atmosphere, would have been that there is a stiff price tag attached to it. Economic liberalisation must lead, beyond a point, to dilution of the absolute single party monolithic structure that prevailed in China during the second half of the Twentieth Century. The architects of globalisation in the West - again the USA being the chief architect - had planned the invasive globalisation model with a bigger aim. The aim had twin objectives. The first being to maintain a pace whose rapidity would keep the lesser developed countries off balance so that they could never pause to regain their balance and take stock to effect mid-term corrections. Put in another way, the globalisation model launched from the West was specifically designed to maintain a state of disequilibrium in the Third World. Unless the leaders of Third World countries appreciate this fact and get their act together - to plan counter strategies - the Third World will never be able to catch up.

In as far as it pertains to China, the second major objective, riding on the coat tails of globalisation, was to force democracy on China; again at a "pace" at which the transformation from a stable system of government - whatever its ills - to the Western democratic model would create disequilibrium, if not outright anarchy. It should be noted the emphasis here is on the destabilising "rate" of change rather than the question of democracy per se.

India and China have a common interest in ensuring harmony

in Asia so that the long suffering peoples of the de-colonialised nations of this continent are first able to stand firmly on their own feet before they find their place in the sun. For, should the two largest countries on the globe start modernising rapidly as per the American gospel of modernisation the planet would become uninhabitable somewhere before the end of the next century - even without a nuclear holocaust. To elaborate, one need take only an example or two by way of illustration. Should China and India adopt only a few of the consumerist habits of the average US citizen it would mean the adding of such numbers of automobiles as to create a global inferno. The accompanying increase in energy consumption and waste generation would reduce the two countries to environmental graveyards and junkyards. Culturally, they would have become idiot-ised clones of the USA, as many of the Japanese have been induced to become.

The gravity of what is being stated must be comprehended by the leaders and the peoples of these two countries, China and India. They must strain every sinew to maintain their ancient heritage and their cultural identities. They owe it to themselves and to the generations of the human race to follow. To give another example, the Chinese people right up to the eighties were mainly poultry consumers. Many of them have changed their habit to become beef eaters, in the Western mould. It requires one ton of grain to raise a ton of poultry, whereas a ton of beef required eight tons of feed. Already grain shortages are anticipated in China in the coming decades. A *Wall Street Journal* article published in January 1999 had it that by the year 2030 China's grain shortage would assume such proportions that the country would require to mop up all the grain surpluses in the world to meet its grain requirements. Indian economic planners and the burgeoning Indian middle class must take heed before they too are irreversibly mesmerised by the great American dream. A dream whose end result would be the eco-destruction of the Planet. Recent studies carried out by the World Bank have made stunning revelations. When Thailand doubled its GDP its industrial pollution load went up ten times.

The point that is being highlighted is that while globalisation is thrust upon the Third World, these countries will have to take stock

every now and then; so that they are able to sit back and calmly assess for themselves the beneficial and deleterious effects of the rapid change being inflicted upon them. Unless this exercise is expertly undertaken the underdeveloped and developing countries will start ruing their folly, when it would be too late. They will mature only after they have mortgaged the economic freedom of their successor generations in unequal and imperfectly understood global protocols devised by the West. None, if any, of these protocols originated in the Third World. The underdeveloped countries, already reeling under an unsupportable debt burden, have no means to prevent the organised plunder of their remaining assets. This is where China and India can join hands to remove the shackles with which the underdeveloped countries have been subtly bound. China must play the role of a responsible global leader of the 21st Century. It must ensure that it does not desert the world to which it belongs and be enticed into the rich man's club in the manner of Japan.

China, the United Nations and the New World Order

China no doubt is a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto rights. In the second half of this century when the country was in the process of growing to its natural size, it needed the veto right to protect its vital interests against the two superpowers of that time as it could have been thwarted by either of them in its quest for occupying its rightful space in the world. This is no longer the case. One of the erstwhile superpowers is now itself in a vulnerable state. The remaining superpower is no longer in a position to dictate terms to China. China has come a long way, a very long way indeed. It is an unquestioned global power at the close of the Twentieth Century.

The world of the next century has to change. If global destruction is to be avoided then a more equitable world order will have to replace the expansionist and exploitative order of the centuries that followed the industrial revolution in the West. A strong China will no longer find it necessary to take shelter behind its Security Council veto. Hence, it must play a leadership role in seeking a restructuring of the Security Council to make it more representative of the whole world. The next century will not

countenance the victors of the second Great War of the Twentieth Century lording it over the rest of the world, a good fifty years and more after their victory. China has prospered after a long hard struggle. Its people, like most of the people in the Third World, have had to endure great hardships over the centuries. It can only now begin to enjoy the fruits of its labour. Such enjoyment is only possible if the world order is generally in equilibrium. The people of China will find no rewards in a fragmented world order. The present lop-sided world order handsomely benefited the West. It had hardly any attraction for the non-Western world. China, Russia and India have a very big stake in working collectively to bring in long overdue changes in the UN system.

China cannot be oblivious to the grand strategy of the US - UK Axis for the coming decades as it relates to China and India. The outlines of the strategy can be tabulated as follows:

- ★ Force fratricidal war between India and Pakistan.
- ★ Encourage debilitating war between India and China.
- ★ Hem in China from West Asia and from Japan/Taiwan.
- ★ Keep South East Asia outside the influence of both China and India.
- ★ Maintain indefinite military presence in the region.
- ★ Maintain Australia as their Trojan Horse in South East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion

Were China and India to gaze at the global horizon deep into the next century through the same lens, they would realise that they would have far more in common in the future than they had in the troubled Twentieth Century. This would become apparent from the ensuing chart.

Areas of convergence of interest between China and India and time frame in which they start influencing decision-making

| S.No. | Area of Convergence | When Becomes Apparent | Joint Approach |
|-------|---|------------------------------|---|
| 1. | Himalayan Environment | First decade of 21st Century | Joint eco-restoration in border areas and Tibet |
| 2. | Further Eastward or Southward expansion of NATO | First decade of 21st Century | Commonality of interest with Russia |
| 3. | Any further weakening of Russia | Immediate | Several possibilities |
| 4. | Increasing US military presence in Central Asia | Immediate | Commonality of interest with Russia |
| 5. | Asian stability | Immediate | Several Possibilities |
| 6. | Global stability | Any time in the future | In concert with UN |

China is a great country with great potential. At this juncture it still has a conscious choice, before it is irrevocably entrapped in the American model of growth, as have so many other countries. While certain changes are inevitable in countries that have to modernise to survive in the present day world it is to be hoped that China will not completely shed its civilisational values in the process - as Japan seems to have done and India seems to be doing. Should China decide to take a wrong turn then there would hardly be any future worth contemplating for the human race on this planet in the millennia to follow.

An Introduction to the Study of Nuclear War

PART - II

MAJOR GENERAL D K PALIT, VrC

The Validity of Deterrence

Approaches to the nuclear problem which have been discussed so far, that is, preventive war, pre-emptive attack and massive retaliation in its *a posteriori* aspect - were basically military approaches, reflecting ideas compatible with military principles - such as surprise (or seizing the initiative), offensive action and concentration of force. In the days of conventional war, political direction did not normally concern itself with the implications of these military measures, mainly because the violence and destruction implicit in them affected the armed forces themselves and not, to any alarming extent, the nation's economy and population. Even in cases where a military offensive was aimed directly at civilian targets - as, for example, in the strategic bombing offensive against Germany - conventional forces possessed the inherent quality of being able to provide the nation with the necessary defensive cover against conventional threats - in the form of surface defences, anti-aircraft cover or fighter screens.

These operational conditions have now radically changed. Destruction caused by nuclear warfare is no longer limited to the armed forces; it threatens the whole nation with annihilation. At the same time there is no defensive screen that military resources can provide to safeguard the nation from such an attack. In other words, the strike-forces of the nuclear age can cause destruction but are powerless to provide security against it. For these reasons political leaders cannot leave it entirely to the armed forces to execute their military methods, even though in theory an overall strategic policy

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

may have been accepted. Today it is an acknowledged function of politician's responsibility to find ways and means of limiting to tolerable proportions the very processes of war. Nowhere is this conflict in approaches more apparent than in the "strategy of deterrence".

There is nothing new about deterrence being used as an instrument of diplomacy. The threat of armed intervention has always formed an element of political strategy by which one nation tried to deter another from taking an undesirable course of action. The difference between deterrence in the conventional sense and deterrence in the nuclear context, however, lies in their degree of effectiveness. In the past, the threat of armed intervention was never so menacing as to altogether rule out the alternative of war, because even if the venture ended in defeat it did not necessarily jeopardise a nation's survival. Under the deterrent threat of today, so disastrous is the forfeit that nuclear aggression in defiance of an enemy's nuclear response can be undertaken only if there is a hundred per cent chance of a complete first-strike success. Anything less than that means nuclear retaliation which, even in moderate measure, would result in such large-scale devastation of lives and property that subsequent survival would at best be doubtful.

During the earlier years of the nuclear age it may have been feasible to count upon an atomic victory based on a hundred per cent success of a first-strike; but a stage was soon reached when both super powers were known to possess second-strike capability of some magnitude by dispersing and hiding a part of the nuclear forces - for instance submarine-based missiles. Thereafter the risk of first-strike success became measurably less than a hundred per cent. It is from this aspect that the notion of deterrence gains validity - the certainty of unacceptable damage which would result from a first use of nuclear weapons.

Let us see how massive retaliation fits in with the operation of deterrent strategy. The military translation of the policy of massive retaliation is the act (not merely the threat) of a massive hit-back with nuclear forces even if the enemy had not actually used nuclear

weapons first. Political strategy must accept this as a military intention, but since its aim is survival of one's own nation more than destruction of some other, it seeks any alternative (short of surrender) in preference to the actual unleashing of a nuclear exchange. So we arrive at the somewhat unreal situation in which political strategy, while basing its validity on the capability and the intention of the military instrument to hit back, cannot envisage that power actually being used.

Since there can be no reason to believe that the Russians were any more willing than the Americans to see their cities destroyed and their civilisation wiped out, it can reasonably be assumed that whatever their ideological aspirations, their nuclear policies, in the context of the bi-polar balance, followed a similar pattern. It may be said, therefore, that balance of mutual deterrence - so long as they are credible to both sides - was the stabilising factor in the East-West confrontation.

Lest this leads the reader to an illusion of absolute nuclear security, it must be pointed out that it is a *political* and not a military balance that the strategy of deterrence achieved.

From the military point of view, deterrence as a policy is at best relative and at worst sterile - relative because its validity depends more on the degree of nuclear stability at any given stage of weapons development than upon the intrinsic potential of one's own nuclear force; and sterile because it does not make adequate provision for the contingency of its failure. It is by no means inconceivable that if an enemy nuclear power were suddenly to achieve a technological breakthrough in defensive weapons, say in the form of assured anti-missile capability, it could well acquire the necessary confidence to accept the risk of retaliatory destruction and initiate a surprise nuclear attack. Military preparedness for such a contingency finds itself obstructed by the tendencies that are generated by dependence on deterrent strategy. It is for this reason that for a considerable period Service Chiefs in both Russia and America were fundamentally hostile to the politicians' over-reliance on deterrence as an effective nuclear strategy; and it was not until the strategy of "counter-force" was accepted that a balance

between political and military strategies was struck. This has been explained at a subsequent stage in this article.

The basic conflict between military preparedness and the exercise of the deterrent threat arises from the opposing requirements of weapons development. The aim of military strategy, however destructive its methods, is unequivocal and positive - that is, to win the war; and in the nuclear age this means seeking nuclear victory. The military requirement, therefore, demands that priority be accorded to weapons development to increase the offensive first-strike potential rather than to defensive measures ensuring second-strike capability.

Deterrence, on the other hand, does not necessarily depend upon weapons superiority. On the contrary, the accent is on protection of a portion of existing nuclear capability for the purpose of maintaining a credible second-strike deterrent rather than on the extension of offensive potential for a win-the-war capability - in other words, the aim is to keep in being a "minimum deterrent", which would be almost as valid as a major nuclear force, because no nation - however great its national resources or its territorial extent - can accept the fact that, say, ten of its biggest cities are to be obliterated. Thus, the credibility of a "minimum deterrent", as opposed to that of a war-winning potential, derives from a nation's absolute ability to protect a portion of its nuclear strike-force from nuclear attack rather than from the relative strength of that force before the attack.

The expenditure on nuclear weapons is so enormous that not even a nation as materially powerful as the United States can aspire to meet the demands of both requirements - that is, it cannot at the same time continue to produce greater stockpiles of multi-megaton warheads and more sophisticated missile systems as well as allot adequate funds for defensive measures such as anti-missile system, "hardening" of sites, "alert mission" arrangements and submarine launchers. At some stage, priority has to be allotted to one or other course. America's nuclear policy has chosen to place greater emphasis on increasing numbers of missiles and their methods of delivery (although, as things stand at present, it

can claim to possess adequate second-strike capability to make its deterrent policy credible). By the 1980s, the US had built up stockpiles of thousands of warheads.

However, a situation of mutual deterrence between the two super-powers had by then offered an umbrella of strategic stability over Russia, Europe and America - in that, neither side could initiate a nuclear first strike without inviting an unacceptable nuclear retaliation. But though this ruled out total nuclear war between them, it still left unanswered questions about other forms of warfare. Could nuclear stability rule out war altogether? Or are limited forms of war still possible?

The term "limited war" is often loosely used to describe a range of possibilities of conflict in which nuclear weapons are not used; but the strategic use of the term today has a wider application. It is now used to indicate any form of war in which the ultimate all-out counter-value or counter-city nuclear bombardment does not take place. Hence any conflict, nuclear or non-nuclear, which is characterised by the use of power less than the ultimate falls under the category of "limited war".

At the lowest end of the scale of limited war comes "cold war" - infiltration of agents or guerrilla attacks (such as is being carried out by Pakistan's ISI in Kashmir and elsewhere in India). The next higher step is conventional war, in which the whole range of the nation's military and industrial capacity is mobilised - but not nuclear weapons.

Next on the ascending list is "tactical" nuclear war, by which is meant nuclear devices being used on conventional battlefields, but not against strategic targets deep inside the enemy's territory. There is still one more step between the last (tactical nuclear war) and the ultimate counter-value strike; and it is called "Counter-force", the aim of which is a first-strike attack to neutralise the enemy's nuclear forces. Since this implies restraint from using the ultimate counter-value strike, it is in the strictest sense a "limited" form of war, its aim being not absolute destruction but the elimination of the enemy's nuclear capability with precision strikes against his (military) nuclear bases.

It will thus be seen that counter-force is a military strategy, in that it is meant actually to be *used*, unlike deterrence which is a political strategy, valid only if nuclear forces are never used. Furthermore counter-force will be dependent on superiority of nuclear weapons (in order to ensure successful destruction of all the enemy's nuclear bombs) whereas deterrence is a political measure which a "minimum deterrent" can render credible. Another difference between counter-force and counter-city is that counter-force is an offensive strategy (since it can achieve its aim only with a first-strike), whereas counter-city is a defensive strategy because its validity depends upon riposte-capability rather than on a first-strike initiative.

It will be obvious that smaller nuclear powers cannot aspire to the counter-force game; and yet, provided their second strike can be credibly protected, the minimum deterrent of even small nuclear powers can be a sufficient preventive against a counter-force first-strike, especially in the case of a large, under-developed, mainly rural society targeting a highly industrialised and urbanised state such as a Western European country or the USA, which is more vulnerable to nuclear damage.

I have given the reader a brief outline of the developing nuclear dialectic between the USA and the USSR during the period 1945-80, because that was the only setting for a nuclear confrontation that we have so far witnessed. The point at issue, now that other independent nuclear decision-making centres have entered the scene - China, Israel, India, Pakistan - is whether the above academic analysis will have a bearing on actual situations in the future. So long as politics are conducted by human agencies, governments will try to enforce their policies through methods that are flexible enough both to be able to exert a threat and, at the same time, deter an enemy from taking the extreme nuclear step. It is in this light that we must examine future strategic possibilities on this sub-continent.

We saw that in the super power nuclear stand-off they both finally came to the conclusion that a nuclear war was unwinnable and therefore must never be fought. However, that conclusion

applies only in cases such as the US-USSR confrontation during its later stages where both the adversaries possessed large arsenals of nuclear weapons. It does not apply (as it did not in the US-USSR context during its initial phases) either when only one adversary has the bomb (as in 1945 vis-a-vis the US and Japan) or when both adversaries possess only small numbers of low-yield bombs, in which case the damage that they can inflict on each other is mutually regarded as "acceptable", that is to say that they could still exist as viable societies after absorbing a first-strike.

As things stand today, and possibly for a couple of decades to come, the above would apply to the Indo-Pak scenario as well; the bombs each possess now and in the near future are likely to be regarded as usable. Although India has declared that she would not initiate a first-strike it is not a credible assurance; it is either an unthought-out undertaking or merely political equivocation as a sop to the western powers who condemned our nuclear testing. A no-first-use declaration becomes credible only if the nation making it has already acquired assured second-strike capability. Without that a no-first-use policy is nothing but nuclear suicide - unless one's nuclear adversary also makes a similar commitment, which Pakistan pointedly has not. Hence it is now imperative that we initiate strategic discussions within the nation's national-security community to formulate plans towards a "total" strategy incorporating both conventional and nuclear forces.

The first point to be made is that in starting on such an exercise, we will be presented with a whole set of contradictions. The first contradiction that will face one when evolving a "total strategy" for mixed nuclear and conventional forces is that of *command and control*. It is unlikely that the government would in any circumstances delegate the authority of pressing the nuclear button to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. Nor is it feasible that field command of conventional forces would, in order to maintain unity of command, be assumed by the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister or a generalist bureaucrat. The only possible "mix" that can be foreseen is that low-yield tactical nuclear weapons (such as nuclear mines) could at some stage be handed over to the military commander; but in our case even that is doubtful. Our

government having committed itself to a no-first-use policy obviously cannot permit the use of even tactical nuclear weapons to pass into the hands of military commanders. Hence, the evolution of a "total strategy" will from the very start be predicated upon a dual command system for decision-making in war - one for the conventional forces and another for mixed conventional-nuclear forces. It is of course possible that once such a concept is accepted, command functions between government and the military can be evolved and practised as a workable procedure; but for the moment that must remain an assumption.

The next contradiction that faces us is in the contrasting natures and capabilities of nuclear and conventional forces. In a purely nuclear setting, a nuclear force (or weapon) possesses no defensive potential. It can be used only as an offensive weapon. Unlike a conventional force, which can be deployed for all the operations of war - for defence, or launched for an attack, or withdrawal or any other operation, a nuclear force possesses no such multi-role flexibility. It can only be fired for a nuclear attack - and that's all; it has no anti-missile or other anti-nuclear capability. The only occasion when it could possibly be said to be used in a defensive role is in a mixed nuclear-conventional scenario. If the enemy's conventional attack succeeds in penetrating deep into one's own territory and one uses one's nuclear arsenal to bomb the enemy's ground forces *on one's own territory*, perhaps that would count as a defensive measure.

In formulating actual operational plans for one's forces, we are again faced with contradictory alternatives. For instance, in a purely conventional setting it is usual to deploy only outposts and delaying forces on or near the border, while holding the bulk of one's forces in depth areas, concentrated for quick moves forward. However, in mixed nuclear-conventional setting, one would have to take into account the fact that, concentrations of one's own conventional forces are more vulnerable to nuclear attack when they are located in depth areas than when they are at or near the international border - because the enemy would hesitate to use nuclear bombs near its own borders, particularly if their own population centres are located near the borders - as for instance

at the Wagah border between Amritsar and Lahore. Conventional forces in this zone would be comparatively safe from nuclear attack. But since the enemy would probably come to a similar conclusion about the disposal of his forces, are we going to arrive at situations in which opposing forces are deployed adjacent to each other's border eyeball-to-eyeball, so to say? Would not such confrontational deployments make nonsense of defensive tactics and manoeuvres?

In the same way, contradictory requirements would effect the degree of dispersal and concentration of forces. In a conventional setting, one's main forces are kept concentrated for quick movement to battle. This would not do in a mixed strategic setting; the forces would not only be safer from nuclear attack up front, near the border, but also once there, they should be kept widely dispersed in say, platoon-packets offering a nuclear gunner the least "cost-effective" target.

Another problem is the location and deployment of reserves. This consideration also ends up facing contradictory factors. In nuclear war, a second-strike force is not to be regarded a sort of reserve; it is tucked away out of sight - a LOB (left-out-of-battle) element, hidden and undetectable. In conventional war, however a reserve is part of the main force, located in depth but not LOB; it must always be available for quick deployment. However, we have seen that in a depth area it is more likely to be the target for nuclear bombardment than the main force deployed at the border. Will such a contradiction mean the end of the concept of reserves in a mixed nuclear-conventional setting?

A series of such problems will have to be resolved once the process for conventional operations in a nuclear setting are brought to the planning table. We had not given thought to these problems in the past (as far as I am aware) but presumably Training Command is now introducing the subject in our colleges and institutions for advanced studies; and, again presumably, Joint Planning Committees are beginning to formulate strategies and operational procedures in the light of the nuclear factor. Furthermore, the government must also ensure that in order to conduct discussions with the Services higher commanders, to reconcile

the contradictions between the political constraints in the use of nuclear weapons and the professional's requirements for formulating concepts of "total strategy" for the conduct of future warfare, the Ministry of Defence is staffed by senior officers - both military and civilian - who are knowledgeable in nuclear, strategic and tactical war techniques. The day of the generalist in the Defence Ministry is past.

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Towards the 21st Century

BRIG H S SODHI (RETD)

The Indian Army has now ended five decades of existence under independent India. Its transformation from imperial British to a national Army was overnight. The total commitment to the new role and ideology was remarkable - so much so that for a long time its intentions were not above suspicion among some of the political leaders. It was very difficult indeed for such leaders to fathom how such a total and sudden change could take place. This sense of suspicion and doubt was not to be overcome for long, in spite of the sacrifices made by the Army in various fields: laying down their lives in wars of the country; accepting a cut in pay; answering the call of the nation during natural calamities; and also helping to control the situations created by the policies of the government that led to the need for Army help internally. And such commitments continue. But it is a moot thought if the suspicions are totally eradicated even now.

New Age

There are many who talk and write about a new age dawning with the turn of the century. In the West it is dubbed the Aquarian Age. This denotes that there will be peace and amity in the world. There are even more people who would like to believe that this will happen even though they do not understand how it will come about, given the past and current environment in every field of human endeavour which has only led to friction, wars, pestilence, fall in moral values, distrust, corruption, inhuman behaviour even while there have been vast advances in many fields of science and technology.

The hope is of a paradigm shift. It is to be hoped that India, and the sub-continent, will achieve peace and amity to enable the

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

citizens to live in harmony to pursue their lives in a more useful manner. This cannot, of course, be achieved by mere wishful thinking; there have to be positive policies and actions towards this. The normal human failing of wanting others to make the first move has to be shed and a lead given in the right direction.

It is rightly said that those who ignore history live to repeat it. Further, that the past is as good an indication of the future as any. Our past, since Independence, cannot be rated as very bright or setting the right examples. For the sake of garnering votes, every stratagem has been used even if it has gone against the basic needs of the long term interests of the country. The policies followed have led to every segment of our society being at loggerheads with others. The peace and amity that was supposed to be ushered in by Independence has been a mere dream.

A good test of the condition of any country can be the use of the Army. The less it is used externally and internally, the better the state and stability. On this score, India has to be considered to be very near the bottom of the list.

Crystal Ball

The need is of a crystal ball to peer into the likely future; but the ball is murky with thick snow flakes. We, therefore, have to fall back to likely conjecture. The past five decades of Independence have been frustrating and disappointing inspite of obvious advances in many material fields; the present is bedeviled by doubt and lack of clarity of direction; for the future one can only hope.

Many believe that the current process of so many scams and cases of corruption coming to light and political leaders being questioned is one of cleansing, and that this will lead ultimately to a near total change of environment. This may well be true but is still within the realm of mere hope.

Events in any country are influenced by the political leaders. This is not to deny the role of the public which elects them but, in

our context, it has been experienced that once elected, the leaders are prone to go their own individual way, not caring for the mandate given to them; they change loyalties and parties like dirty clothes. From the time of Independence it can be said that we are now in the process of having the fourth generation of leaders from the points of view of chronology and thinking: the idealist Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and his band; rough riding Indira Gandhi and her coterie, ably abetted by Sanjay Gandhi as the extra-constitutional authority; the smooth Rajiv Gandhi and his entourage; and now the state of flux with nondescript leaders currently vying for prominence. The expectations from the only non-congress government so far - under leaders with no Congress background - is not faring any better thanks to pulls and pressures of a hydra-headed coalition and weak leadership. So far there do not seem to be any better calibre of leaders in the wings.

The hope always is for the next generation to produce them. For the time being we have leaders who, even when under clouds of suspicion of wrong doing, try every subterfuge to avoid resigning. The much trumpeted and vaunted Indian moral values have been totally subverted and forgotten. The nexus between politicians and criminals is now well established. And the general public - the lowest common denominator of democracy - is contented with this state of affairs on the thinking that if a leader can not help himself and family, what will he do for others! The official and legal ways may be there for every one, but the public is looking for the unauthorized. This can be one major reason why our known corrupt leaders are repeatedly elected. Only a small segment of the intelligentsia is now vocalizing their doubts and apprehensions about the direction in which the country is headed.

All political pundits and leaders now talk of the era of coalitions. This can only mean a worsening of the situation. Just as democracy is said to be the form of government subscribing to the lowest common denominator of votes, coalition government can only be the lowest common patchwork of policies which are never firm nor consistent and where some constituent of the

coalition would always be at odds. And if such a coalition is at the sufferance of some bigger party outside the government, the conditions are even riper for mischief. There is the other scenario where a minor constituent of the coalition tries to call the shots by threatening to pull out support and negate any constructive thinking and actions.

So far, politicians have been busy and more concerned with safeguarding their chairs; the country, by default, has been largely ruled by the bureaucracy which has now become uncontrollable. There is no limit to the one-upmanship of the IAS. Both the politician and the bureaucrat seem to be on the same thinking trend that their importance only rests on friction among others.

Army's Role

In the five decades of Independence, the Army has had a definite role to play, a very positive role. It is rather unfortunate that almost the entire gambit of this role has been an indication of the lapses and faulty policies of the government in power. The Army has had to undertake roles to salvage the fall outs of the pernicious policies of successive governments which have largely been to the detriment of the country.

It can truly be said that it is the Army that has provided the glue to hold the country together inspite of the actions to the contrary by the political leaders. The Army is the last resort of the country and has had to function as such with increasing frequency, scope and extent, to the point that its own internal functioning is being adversely effected. This is the height of disloyalty to the country by the powers that adopt policies which make this inevitable.

Contentious Issues

It has to be the prime aim of the government - politicians and bureaucrats - that there should be peace and tranquillity to enable the country to prosper and its citizens to lead a comfortable and purposeful life. For this it is essential that

contentious issues, internally and externally, be resolved at the earliest.

External

Externally we face two major issues: Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and China. Both the issues tend to pit us against not only the two countries directly concerned, Pakistan and China respectively, but also others that think they have a stake in the allied issues.

Jammu and Kashmir

The Jammu and Kashmir issue is directly concerned with Pakistan. But this is not the core issue with that country, notwithstanding their claims to the contrary and proclaiming that once J&K issue is settled all will be well between the two countries. Once the J&K issue is out of the way, no matter how, Pakistan will have to find some other issue for confrontation. The very perception of the emergence and existence of Pakistan is thought to be at stake by its leaders vis-a-vis India. Pakistan came into being "for the sake of Muslims as they were a separate nation and could not live with Hindus". But the fact is that there are more Muslims in India even today than in Pakistan. Further, the internal divisive tendencies in the four provinces of Pakistan are so great that the only factor that its leaders can find to keep them together is the anti-India stand without which the provinces would have to tackle each other. This is the main reason for the oft-repeated complaint that India has not accepted the state of Pakistan and would like to break it up even now. It is a different matter that Pakistan may break up due to its own internal pressures. But it is for sure that parts of it would not join India. Too much hatred has been built up and the generation with ties of old between the two countries is fast disappearing. Even sports have become like wars.

The only tenuous continuing links left are the visits, mainly religious, from either side as pilgrimages. Additionally, there is the thin link between educational institutions on either side that attract old students from the other country and in this category are the

Aitchison College, Lahore, with its link with Yadvandira Public School, Patiala and Chandigarh; the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College (now the Rashtriya Indian Military College), Dehra Dun, and a few others. Old students of these institutions visit each other frequently. But here no issue of substance can be discussed - and this breed is fast disappearing.

The J&K issue could have been solved during the 1947-48 war or the 1965 war if the political leadership had not been so fast in accepting cease-fires, referring the matter to the UN and offering a plebiscite - all unasked for! Given the determination, the portion of Kashmir under Pakistan could have been recovered. This option is now denied to both sides with the detonation of nuclear devices by India and Pakistan. Any extension of the turmoil inside J&K will certainly lead to nuclear havoc and Pakistan is most likely to be the one to resort to this first as it has no depth or lasting capacity for conventional war. The targets selected by Pakistan are likely to be civil ones to create panic and adversely effect the will to fight, given the Indian response to the Chinese advance in 1962, which was thought to threaten Tezpur.

While fighting the foreign militants in J&K, the only feasible solution to this running sore is to get the Line of Control accepted as the international boundary. For this, India should take the lead in making the suggestion and simultaneously mount a propaganda blitz towards this with foreign powers, pointing out that Pakistan has already violated the relevant UN resolution by handing over some portions of erstwhile J&K state to China, merging some areas into Pakistan and by not vacating its occupation of the state areas. The proof of local support has to be judged from the reaction of the locals when the Pakistan-led raiders entered the state in 1947 and 1965 in the expectation of large scale local support which was totally lacking.

Making such a suggestion will not be a sign of weakness on the part of India, but rather its strength in being able to offer an alternative to break the current logjam. Pakistan has been asking for some dramatic offer and here is the ideal one. The ball will

then be in Pakistan's court. It needs mention that Pakistan has, so far, succeeded in achieving its aims. It has carried out the ethnic cleansing of the Kashmir Valley and is now in the process of carrying this out in Doda and other areas. By refusing to undertake any meaningful talks, it is trying to get other countries involved in the issue and this will come about unless there is some action to prevent this; mere reiteration that this is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan will not hold true for long.

Currently, India is having to adopt desperate measures to deal with the J&K turmoil. In spite of the plethora of security forces - with the inherent command and control problems - the Army has had to use armour units, by mothballing tanks /APCs, in the Infantry role in J&K. This smacks of a combination of desperation and also foolhardiness. It cannot be the case of anyone that with nuclear devices now available to India and Pakistan, the need for armour has disappeared or even lessened. The adverse effect will be felt during war and there is no knowing when this might flare up; the conditions across the LC are quite ripe for this. Such risks are certainly not calculated. The need for some permanent solution is imperative.

The recent missile strikes by the USA in Afghanistan have provided incontrovertible proof of the active and direct involvement of Pakistan in training militants that are sent to J&K and other areas, and also of the top level leadership and planning help provided to the Taliban. This is also happening in the case of the militancy in J&K, but Pakistani leadership has not yet entered Indian territory. This could well happen in the future, the way the ethnic cleansing is being carried out by the militants as per the Pakistani plan. Once Afghanistan is fully under the Taliban, there will be spare militants to employ in J&K; a disturbing thought indeed. It may be mentioned that the USA, in spite of evidence to the contrary, is yet to accept fully that Pakistan is behind the militancy in J&K. Further, with Pakistan becoming a hard-core fundamentalist Muslim state, the effect on the Muslim population in J&K is bound to be there.

India has always maintained that J&K is an integral part of

the country. This needs to be given content. The continuance of Article 370 is against the very spirit of oneness and must be abrogated (this is one argument that Pakistan cites in support of its stand that Jammu and Kashmir is not part of India). Free movement, purchase of property and settlement must be permitted to all citizens of the country in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, there should be a deliberate policy to settle ex-servicemen, with suitable arms and incentives, in the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir. These elements will automatically act as strong points in the form of village defence forces to thwart the actions of militants who, presently, have an almost free run.

This is one threat that India, and hence the Army, has to be prepared for during the foreseeable future. The world powers are also interested in keeping this tension alive to bolster their powers of acting as "honest brokers" and selling arms and keep both the countries off balance. Only bold and suitable policies of the government can break this tangle.

China

With China we have the issue of the border dispute over which a war was fought and India made to look rather pathetic. Since the British rule in India, the border with China has been very nebulous, shifting at times with a change in British policy. Three alternatives emerged as the suggested border under the British but none of them were accepted or ratified by the then government of China and neither was any effort made, after Independence, to come to any agreement on this till the issue became hot after news of the Chinese road in the Aksai Chin area. The real area of dispute is so isolated from India that we never got to know of its use by the Chinese for a road till well after the road had been constructed and it was in use.

India decided to adopt the alignment from the British times that was furthestmost to the north, along the Kuen Lun Range. And this is where the dispute emerged. The real watershed is along the Karakoram Range which was the southern most line considered by the British. And, in December 1959, the Chinese Prime Minister affirmed an alignment as the border that very

closely followed the Karakoram Range but this was rejected by India. Acceptance of this at that time could have terminated the issue. In the event, by next year the Chinese had changed their minds and projected the border slightly further south.

Maybe due to being a "young" independent country then, India's leaders took the stand on pride, rather than on pragmatic political compulsions, that not an inch of Indian territory will be given up. As a result of the war, we have given up a large chunk while in the initial stages we may have been able to arrive at a better deal. After the lapse of nearly three decades, contacts between the two countries were again on regarding the land dispute and it was to be hoped that some amicable solution would be found but the tough remarks, after the nuclear blasts, painting China as the main cause for this action, has reversed any advances that might have been made.

Our leaders will be fooling themselves and the public if they think that the Chinese are going to give up the area required for their vital road and its safety. Some manoeuvre will have to be found to get over this hurdle. One way could be for India to give up this area on perpetual lease to China; but it is doubtful if this will be acceptable to that country -- thanks to the political leaders having got themselves into a corner by repeated remarks of not giving up an inch of its territory - but India does not have the capacity to take back the area also.

Though the chances of war over this issue are now rather remote, they cannot be said to be totally eliminated. There could be the further irritant in the future of growing and clashing spheres of influence, political and commercial. The threat from this country cannot be ruled out totally.

Nuclear Dimension

Having to adopt the nuclear option was inevitable for India, given the Chinese threat and known Pakistani advances towards nuclearisation. Pakistan, detonating its own nuclear devices within days of India, is a true indication of how far it had advanced in

this field and what threat it posed to India. India must now go in for nuclear weapons and take all the appropriate measures to counter this threat and also be able to undertake effective and prompt counter strikes if needed. The offer of no first strike is of little meaning as Pakistan is most likely to be the first to use nuclear strike if it considers itself threatened. It needs remembering that the time factor is a mere few minutes once a strike is launched and hence effective counter measures are highly improbable.

Internal

The use of the Army internally has been on the increase with each passing year since Independence. There is little point in listing such employment as they are well known. What is pertinent is to see briefly the issues that have led to such increased use.

The use of the Army during natural calamities is valid and need not be belaboured. The aid of the Army has been of immense help during such events. The Army has also helped to conduct prestigious events like the Asiad games.

The most bothersome issue that has produced the maximum unrest, amounting to militancy, has been the failure of the government in meeting the aspirations of various states, regions, religions and organisations regarding the amount and type of autonomy. The Punjab, J&K, Assam and North-East turmoil can be ascribed to this. These issues have been permitted - some would suggest, deliberately - to reach flash points. Only when there is internal trouble can the politicians and other government officials hope to wield undue authority and gain an aura of power. These issues are all political but are permitted to assume security dimensions which are beyond the competence of the other security forces and the Army has to be called in.

But this is not merely a supine policy on the part of the government. Successive governments have been guilty of inciting and abetting divisive tendencies for short term gains which

normally do not come about. The major turmoil areas of the Punjab and the state of Jammu and Kashmir are a proof of this. It would appear that the presence of the Army to tackle the adverse fall outs makes the politicians less pragmatic and prone to take risks for the sake of narrow ends.

To this basic issue must be added the emotive issue of water resources and their distribution. This question has been in a state of controversy since the partition of the old Punjab into Haryana, Himachal and truncated Punjab. Such issues bedevil other states too. The government has still not been able to take a decision whether such resources are to be treated on a national basis or on the principle of riparian law. In the absence of this basic decision, there can be no final solution. And this would seem to suit the government as it has the final say in the matter which can be flaunted either way at different times to suit the narrow political interests of the party in power.

Then there is the religious issue. The question of the future of the old mosques built, as the belief is, on demolished temples nearly five centuries ago. This issue came to the fore in 1949 and should have led to a policy announcement for the entire country which would have taken root by now. Instead, the issue was passed to the courts.

From the very beginning, there has been the tendency in the government to try and shift responsibility to the courts to avoid unpleasant decisions. This is no way of governing. The courts are being given cases that really are political in nature and hence should not be their concern. Because of the lapses of the government in governing, the courts are now taking a more active role in matters that are really the concern of various other agencies of the government and which the government should be keeping an eye on. It has now reached the stage when even the posting of bureaucrats are becoming subject to court jurisdiction!

Our leaders of the Independence vintage, with the western background of education and concepts regarding democracy and allied aspects, forgot the national characteristics of the people and

the conditions of the country. This led to some half-baked ideas of fast justice being administered to long suffering segments of our society. The reservations provision was made in the Constitution renewable after ten years if thought necessary. For the sake of garnering votes, not only have such provisions been extended for the five decades of Independence but the scope and percentage of reservations have increased dramatically. This led to some intense violent agitations. The issue is seemingly quiet for now, but the sense of frustration and discrimination among the remaining segment continues and may even erupt again.

Given the present state of political leadership, there is little hope of these issues being tackled firmly and fairly to bring a semblance of peace in the country. As discussed earlier, it seems unlikely that the changing leadership will be so radical and fast that policies would be any firmer and in the long term interest of the country. It is rather unfortunate that the traditional foundation of our culture has been forgotten in that the interests of the individuals now override the interests of the group and the country.

Conclusion

Bold actions only emanate from the strong. In making overtures of peace, the government will be demonstrating its strength and also concern for the long term welfare of the country and its citizens. Bold actions will, of course, attract flak from opposition parties but this has to be faced. Over a period of time, a government taking bold action to bring about peace will be remembered with gratitude - even if the immediate reaction of voters may be adverse.

Counter Insurgency And Human Rights

CDR A N SONSALE

*"I was far away from home, it was a beautiful land,
I fought a war in innocence,*

*I fought hard but not too well,
And back home I was forgotten, I was taken for dead,*

*I struggled for my pride as my faith slipped away,
And soon I knew, why heroes are born the cruel way,*

*Friends around me died, that wasn't much,
But their memories died too, soon after their deaths,*

*I was friendly to terror, helpful to destruction,
For my ugly innocence never knew fear,*

*Like a God in frenzy, I killed and I maimed,
But it was war and I was proud of it all,*

*I felt like a hero but was wary of gods,
For victory was cruel and there was glory in death,*

*Was I a victor or vanquished I never did judge,
For something about this war made me lose control*

*I survived, then searched for a reason in it all,
but instead discovered only a little of beauty in war."*

-- Ashish Sonal

The feelings of a soldier involved in a low intensity conflict (LIC) have indeed been very aptly described.¹

Edited version of the essay which won the first prize in Group A of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition, 1998. Cdr AN Sonsale is with the Naval Headquarters, New Delhi.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

Since 1956 when troops were inducted for the first time in Nagaland for countering insurgency, the Army has been involved in LIC continuously in different parts of the country. Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and most states in the North East in particular have been long time targets with various other parts being targeted from time to time. From all indications available we shall be living with this menace in the foreseeable future too.

Unlike a regular war, since a LIC takes place amidst the civilian population without any laid down rules of engagement and geographic limitations, such conflicts invariably give rise to reports of human rights violations in the form of kidnapping, torture, rape, custodial deaths and so on, both by the security forces and the insurgents. Though some of the reports are untrue, being a part of media campaigns and psychological warfare tactics to malign the other side, some have essentially an element of truth in them. The reasons for these occurrences are multifarious: from stress of the occasion, physical fatigue, monotony and long separation from families to coercion used for gathering intelligence by security agencies. In case of insurgents again, there are many reasons varying from criminal activities for personal gains to atrocities committed just to gain media attention for their espoused cause.

The subject of human rights violations in the context of counter insurgency operations has been discussed the world over in various forums over the years. Various human rights groups like Amnesty International and Asia Watch have been very active in bringing to light many incidents and issues before the world audience. In this era of increased awareness and instant media accessibility due to communications technology revolution, these events get wide publicity. Whereas any such publicity is helpful to the 'cause' of insurgents, it affects the country's image adversely in the international arena.

Human rights violation in the context of low intensity conflict is a highly complex and sensitive issue having moral, legal, political and social implications.

- (a) What is the definition of human rights in an anti insurgency operation?

- (b) In an environment where if you do not kill you are more likely to get killed, what are your moral rights and responsibilities in terms of human rights of the adversary?
- (c) Whose human rights are more important – those of the citizens or the militants?
- (d) In the existing transparency of functional environment, are the interests of those engaged in combating low intensity conflicts adequately safeguarded? Are the legal provisions supportive in nature or do these become impediments in the functioning of the security forces?
- (e) At what precise point in these operations should the war rules make way for 'rule of law' as we understand it?
- (f) Do the human rights issues need to be tackled differently when the low intensity conflict abetted by an adversary is in fact a proxy war?

These and many related questions need to be answered prior to formulating our response to the human rights issues in the context of counter insurgency operations.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to study and analyse various issues related to the respect for and adherence to human rights in counter insurgency and low intensity conflict scenarios.

This paper has dealt with the following aspects.

- (a) Meaning of human rights when applied to counter insurgency scenario.
- (b) International environment.
- (c) India's track record.
- (d) Factors causing and influencing human rights violations.
- (e) The Indian response, strengths and weaknesses.
- (f) Specific recommendations.

Meaning of Human Rights When Applied to Counter Insurgency Scenario

The United Nations Organisation has provided detailed definitions of human rights as part of various declarations, covenants and conventions. Some of those applicable in the present context are:

(a) Universal Declaration of Human Rights². This declaration comprises 30 articles upholding and recognising the inherent dignity, equal rights for freedom, justice, life, security, movement, nationality, social security and family life, region, participation in governance, free and fair trial in case of an offence committed and so on. Articles of specific relevance to us are:

(i) Article 5 : No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

(ii) Article 9 : No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

(b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.³ This covenant lists out 55 articles elaborating various civil and political rights of individuals. Articles 6 and 7 refer to the inherent right to life and against subjecting individuals to torture or to cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment.

(c) Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.⁴ This convention amplified Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by way of 33 articles.

The above are the declarations governing peace-time environment. In case of a conventional war between nations, provisions of Humanitarian Law⁵, Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention⁶ attempt to quantify the extent to which human rights and civil liberties can be diluted in conflict situations. However, for terrorism and insurgency situations, their provisions are inadequate

and not specific and open to (contradictory) interpretations. As would be brought out subsequently, this is one area which merits debate, dialogue and clearing of minds of all concerned.

International Environment

In the post Cold War environment, Human Rights issues have found vociferous global expression. Certain nations have been able to sanitise themselves from violence and genuinely want to extend the ethos of peace all around. These nations have an uncompromising stance on human rights violations and are single-minded in their purpose, imposing sanctions, withholding aid and gently but firmly applying pressure. Western nations, which are at peace with themselves and the world at large, do not comprehend the problems of nations faced with violence and terrorism. Very few countries, however, have a clean record on the subject.

The United States has always had an uneven approach, which has diminished its image and credibility. During the Cold War period, the US turned a blind eye to all kinds of atrocities and improprieties that took place in certain Central American countries, just because they were right wing in nature. Subsequently too, it has maintained a relative silence on happenings in some friendly West Asian countries like Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Egypt. On the other hand it has continued to intimidate left wing countries like Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada. China's strong economy, military and nuclear power has made the USA maintain the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status for China despite the latter's poor track record on human rights. However, the Oklahoma bombing and the TWA aircraft blast on 17 July 1996 shook the Americans to such an extent that they now talk about death penalty⁷ to terrorists and more stringent anti terrorist laws, which would have earlier seemed violative of human rights.

The UK's track record in Northern Ireland is also far from glorious, with several hundred people killed in disputed circumstances at the hands of British troops year after year. France crushed Algerian terrorism with the utmost ferocity, wiping it out almost

completely. Spain has employed all the brutality at its command against the Basque militants. The pro-West regimes of Egypt and Algeria responded to the tide of fundamentalist terrorism rather strongly and arbitrarily. In several parts of the world insurgency has often been addressed with full military might, including tanks, artillery and mortars and even aerial strafing, resulting in high civilian casualties. Russia and Turkey tried to put down the Chechen rebellion and the Kurdish insurgency, respectively, with an iron hand. Both cases evoked only muted reaction from the western world.

In the immediate neighbourhood, Pakistan has indulged in active participation in the systematic victimisation of its minorities, especially the Ahmediyas. The Muhajirs still feel alien in their present homeland and the Shias, Baluchis, Sindhis and Christians feel far from secure. The Pakistan Human Rights Commission has noted that the country's northern areas (Pakistan occupied Kashmir) has some of the world's worst victims of malnutrition.

All the above analyses is not to quarrel with the 'cause', but only to highlight the complexities involved in dealing with insurgency or terrorism. Most of the governments when faced with this problem have had to compromise on human rights issues.

India's Track Record

Indian security forces have been involved in counter insurgency operations since 1956 mainly in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and the North-East at various points in time. In addition, terrorists have also operated in many other parts of the country – West Bengal, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and very recently Himachal Pradesh. So much so, that counter insurgency operations are considered a regular and routine part of a soldier's career now. There is adequate research literature available that goes into reasons, organisation and history of various insurgent outfits, their deeds and misdeeds and the steps taken at political and military levels to contain terrorism per se. Containing and, if possible, eliminating militancy will always remain the best solution to eliminate the root cause for human rights abuses in the present context. But both history and the present situation indicate,

unfortunately, that the best course may not be feasible. A democratic country like ours with a vast geographical, ethnic, cultural and economic diversity and the political situations and compulsions prevailing in the neighbouring countries may not be able to entirely eliminate militancy or insurgency. On the contrary we may have to live with the present imbroglio for quite some time. Therefore, the present study proposes to concentrate solely on the Human Rights aspects without attempting to touch the issues on the larger canvass related to countering or eliminating insurgency itself.

As part of its multifaceted and undeclared war on India, Pakistan had launched a worldwide campaign about human rights abuses in India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab. We had failed in projecting our efforts and constraints to the international community. We had also taken a false moral position of superiority. We often took refuge behind our national sovereignty to justify our sitting behind closed doors. As a result, even a fabricated charge, like the alleged mass rape of twenty-two young girls in Kunan Poshpora in Kashmir, received wide international publicity. The alleged incident was brought up in the US Congress and the House of Commons. The issue was also raised at the Joint Islamic Conference in 1991. The Indian Army took the initiative of approaching the Press Council of India to conduct an inquiry into the allegation. The Committee of the Press Council comprising BG Verghese and K Vikram Rao, after detailed and through investigation, came to the conclusion that:

The Kunan rape story on close examination turns out to be a massive hoax orchestrated by militant groups and their sympathisers and mentors in Kashmir and abroad as part of a sustained and cleverly contrived strategy of psychological warfare... The loose ends and contradictions in the story expose a tissue of lies by many persons and at many levels... The women of Kunan Poshpora have been tutored or coerced into making statements derogating their own honour and dignity... The Indian Army has broken new ground in taking the bold decision to throw open its human rights record to public scrutiny through the Press Council of India. Few armies in the world would invite

such an inquiry. The Indian Army has cooperated in this task. And it has, all things considered, emerged with honour".⁹

But, by then, considerable damage had already been done to India's image internationally.

Allegations of excesses appearing regularly in newspapers especially in the Punjab, the Jammu and Kashmir and Assam (though quite often false and under pressure from militants) and major incidents such as 'Operation Blue Star' and its aftermath, reports on misuse of TADA, banning of international Human Rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch from visiting terrorist prone areas have consistently shown our human rights record in a bad light internationally. The government's response has been grossly inadequate and slow in projecting the truth and the actions taken in these cases. The massive misinformation campaigns by Pakistan and terrorist outfits has largely gone unchallenged, creating a negative impression.

Causes of Human Rights Violation

Before going into the causes of the human rights violations, let us analyse the various forms that human rights violations take during counter insurgency operations. These are: Criminal, Incidental, Contrived or Positional Terrorism.

(a) Criminal. Acts of a criminal nature such as extortion, rape, looting, etc., become human rights violations when such incidents take the shape of a widespread trend. However, individual and isolated incidents must be treated as criminal acts alone because, firstly, these are invariably carried out by the members of security forces in their individual capacity and secondly, there exist adequate safeguards to prevent such acts and to punish the culprits. Most often, in interaction with the local population, isolated cases of behavioural aberration and lumpen elements taking advantage of the situation are bound to occur. Their existence must be accepted and appropriate action taken to build confidence among the public about the sincerity of the security forces to deal with such elements.

(b) Incidental. Any form of armed conflict entails curtailment of the dignity-of-life rights of the participants. In a Low Intensity Conflict environment the enemy is not well defined for the security forces. 'Who is the enemy' itself becomes an issue. This factor leads to the dilution of human rights of the population in the form of incidental violations. The enemy, i.e., the terrorists or insurgents, come in various shades from hard-core 'black' to 'grey' and 'white' (terms used by security agencies to indicate the degree of involvement of an individual with a terrorist or insurgent movement) sympathisers and supporters to unwilling accomplices. These various shades of adversaries exist among the population and it is near impossible for the security forces to distinguish them from the population and one from the other. As a result, the population ends up becoming a forced participant to the conflict. Since there can be no clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants, the security forces regularly come across hazy situations (and vague intelligence information), where if they use force they risk violating the human rights of innocents, and if they don't then they may lose the 'enemy' (sometimes even risk their safety as a result). Mistaken identities further contribute to such incidental violations, and pressure to produce results makes the security forces reluctant to give the benefit of doubt to the suspects.

(c) Contrived. Incidental human rights violations, disruptions in the daily routine of the locals due to the security forces operations, curtailment of civil liberties and fundamental rights, though deplorable, are understandable since these are the direct result of the 'restoration of law and order' efforts of the State. It is the contrived violation of the dignity of human life of captured or detained terrorists and suspects, and the use of repressive measures on members of the local population that the security forces are likely to adopt during the 'investigative process' that hold a greater potential danger for human rights violations. The heady mixture of the power of the gun, special extraordinary legal powers with the security forces in a LIC environment, individual egos, emotional reactions to the stress of prolonged operations and exposure to danger, all combine together to create

circumstances conducive to contrived violations of human rights, especially the use of milder repressive methods on the local population. Security forces are expected to safeguard human rights, but as combatants the individual securitymen are readily willing to adopt all those means that their adversary adopts.¹²

(d) Positional Terrorism. The Government set-up in a Low Intensity Conflict situation is primarily geared towards crisis management. As a consequence the security forces come to hold a dominant say in the functioning of the complete government infrastructure existing in a LIC environment. The curtailment of civil liberties and fundamental rights, collapse of the normal administrative machinery, the extraordinary legal and incidental powers with the security forces, the general crisis situation and the rigid hierarchical structure of the security forces – these factors lead to the creation of certain positions for the security forces in the government set-up, the occupants of which wield tremendous power. Often, as the only representative of the State, in their area of responsibility, they exercise extraordinary power over the public life of the locals since their ideas, personalities, decisions, whims and fancies affect the functioning of the security forces' elements and the administrative assets they control. From a mere 'Post Commander' to the Director General controlling the overall security forces operations, each one of these comes to wield power and responsibility which is grossly disproportionate to their 'peace time' charter of duties, and with very limited supervision, checks and controls on their functioning. A few fall victim to the 'power-high' which they experience and many are just impatient with legal procedures. Honest but strict officers sometimes adopt ruthless measures viewing counter terrorism or counter-insurgency operations as a personal crusade. The potential danger to human rights in a LIC environment in India does not come from State terrorism but from 'Positional' terrorism originating from such individuals. 'Positional' terrorism is difficult to detect and prevent. It is perpetuated by a person who, by virtue of the position he holds in the security forces or the government administrative set-up, not only exercises control over the feedback going to the higher

authorities but is often the only source of such feedback. Their coercive restrictions can extend to the media and independent observers also. Therefore it becomes easy for him to ensure that detrimental information does not reach higher supervisory authorities. As a result, higher authorities may remain ignorant and become unknowing accomplices to the violations. Because 'positional' terrorism produces visible results - the kind of results that are difficult to achieve otherwise - at times it can become convenient for higher supervisory authorities to overlook the questionable process that went into getting the results. 'Positional' terrorism remains confined to the person's area of responsibility, but 'positional' terrorism originating from a person sufficiently high up in the government or security forces' hierarchy can turn into full-fledged State terrorism against the citizens.¹⁰

Some of the causes for human rights violations may be as under:-

- (a) An analysis of the reasons for excesses by the security agencies would show that they tend to overreact when they suffer casualties following a sudden assault. It is also due to factors like the stress of the occasion, physical fatigue, the monotony and even excessiveness of the duty paramilitary forces have to put in. "Having been taught to think and act as a team, any assault on one means an assault or affront to the whole." Nor can the supervisory officer really be blamed, as his thought processes too would have been conditioned by 'the camaraderie and interdependence of ranks, so necessary at times of battle or action', that he too is often "overcome by the momentary madness".¹⁰
- (b) In the terrorism or insurgency environment, "Human Intelligence" is quite often the only source of information about the terrorists and insurgents, their covert activities and organisation. Recently captured terrorists and insurgents are one of the chief sources of 'actionable intelligence' i.e., the information required to execute specific missions against terrorists and insurgents. An important difference between conventional war and LIC is that during conventional war the actionable intelligence does not get stale very fast as army formations and units take considerable

time to move and adopt new defensive or offensive postures. However, in LIC such information rapidly loses its importance in a matter of minutes to a few hours in most cases, since terrorists or insurgent groups, due to their inherent flexibility and excellent information network, speedily respond to the capture of their members by moving their personnel and assets, and adopting precautionary measures. Innumerable are the instances where terrorists and insurgents slip out of the security forces' dragnet in a matter of minutes. Maximum information is gained if an individual is interrogated immediately after he is apprehended, and still suffering from confusion and anxiety as a result of his capture, and before he has had time to build up his psychological defences. Information gained immediately after apprehension often leads to a series of inter-linked successes in terms of capture of terrorists and insurgents, weapons, equipment and further information. At the moment of capture or immediately afterwards, the security forces' elements involved in a particular operation neither have the time nor the resources to adopt sophisticated and scientific time consuming interrogation techniques. As a result the security forces' elements may resort to threat of force, coercion and actual use of force to 'extract information' from a captured terrorist or insurgent.

(c) Another reason for the prevalence of torture is the absence of trained and professional interrogators in India. We still do not have a school that can teach the basics of interrogation. Even a lie detector is scarcely available with those who should definitely have it.

(d) Human rights abuses also take place if discipline in the security forces is not of a very high order or if training is flawed and not doctrinal enough. In a field unit there are all varieties of men, from washermen and cooks to the highly respected subedar major. The level of discipline, self-control and stress bearing capacity certainly differs with background, training and number of years put in.

The Indian Response – Strengths And Weaknesses

Having come to accept the reality of living with insurgency and

terrorism and associated human rights issues, our national response has often been fluctuating, erratic and slow but generally in the right direction. Essentially, the learning curve has been upward sloping. Over the years certain policies, institutions and conventions have been evolved and actions taken at various levels which have succeeded in improving our human rights record both in actuality and in international perception. A lot still needs to be done and it is hoped that actions would be forthcoming sooner rather than later. The response can be analysed under the headings: Governmental, Non Governmental Organisations, Press and Electronic Media, and the Army.

Government Actions

In the initial years, India's official response to the Pakistan initiated propaganda war on human rights abuses in India was abysmally lacking. We refused independent inquiries, visits of outside observers and representatives of international organisations like Amnesty International or Asia Watch. It was an entirely inappropriate stand that we ourselves will be the judges of our own actions and inactions, particularly where human rights is involved.

At times, the government had to succumb to political pressures. In 1990 when the VP Singh government decided to permit Amnesty International to visit the country, Rajiv Gandhi, as Congress President, urged his party to oppose such a visit. As a result of the controversy, the move to organise the visit was shelved¹¹. Though the government refused to take note of the Amnesty reports on India, these received wide publicity in the country and abroad. It was in 1992 that the Government of India issued its first ever formal response to Amnesty International's report. Even though this response could not be released along with the publication of the report in London (apparently due to some communication gap), even a delayed release to the press in India and abroad did signal the opening of a new chapter on human rights in India.

The Government also addressed the issue of inter-ministry conflicts of interest in 1992 and the nodal responsibility of human rights was placed in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The rules of allocation of business were amended suitably.

As a part of this new thrust, for the first time, a conference of State Chief Ministers on human rights was organised on 14 September 1992. The comprehensive agenda dealt with a large number of subjects, like setting up of a national human rights commission, custodial crimes, training on human rights issues and setting up of a cell at state government level for coordination and monitoring of human rights. Setting up of a national human rights commission received broad endorsement at the conference. However, the chief ministers showed reluctance to proceed further with the proposal for central legislation on custodial crimes.

The Amnesty International team headed by Ian Martin paid a visit to Delhi in November 1992. This was a major step forward in breaking the ice. The free, frank and extensive discussions went a long way in convincing Amnesty International of the genuine concern for human rights at the highest policy making levels.

As a part of the efforts to evolve an early agenda for protection of human rights, another conference of chief ministers was organised in November 1992 to discuss various facets of administration of criminal justice. As a part of the efforts to promote scientific investigative techniques in crime detection and to get away from age-old use of coercion and force, steps were initiated to set up a centre for DNA finger printing and diagnostics at Hyderabad.

The National Human Rights Commission was also set up in 1993. The setting up of NHRC has gone a long way in conveying our sincerity of purpose with respect to human rights internationally. The organisation has brought in a sense of direction in addressing the Human Rights issues right from the day of its inception and has emerged as an effective apparatus. But the Commission by its very nature is a slow and ponderous body whereas a human rights violation, especially by a law-enforcing agency, calls for a quick, visible and effective response. The Commission also does not have an investigative arm of its own and will normally have to depend on the assistance of the state police. Further, the Commission is only a recommendatory body with its recommendations not even binding on the state governments.

The amendments to the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act (TADA) were also causing considerable anxiety during this period. The act had been extended from time to time and was due to expire in May 1993. The available data pointed to its extensive misuse. Internationally also, TADA had been widely criticised by human rights groups. The act was revised and humanised to remove serious defects and deficiencies pointed out in several forums. Provisions like reduced period of detention without trial from 1 year to 6 months, *in camera* trial to be only at the discretion of the court, only Inspectors General of the Police to decide on application of TADA to any case and many others were included in the revised TADA which became applicable from May 1993 for two years. In March 1994, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act, in view of the growing menace of terrorism, but also directed the government to suitably amend it further to eliminate any scope for its misuse. But the government decided to let it lapse on 23 May 1995. This was purely a political decision. A powerful piece of anti terrorist legislation was sacrificed at the altar of vote bank politics, because of the deliberately created impression by some political parties that TADA was anti Muslim.

In its bid to rationalise powers vested in various security agencies with due regard to human rights protection, the government has been carrying out a regular review of various acts in force. In the latest move the Centre is all set to change the controversial Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958, as amended in 1972, which gave unlimited powers to the Armed Forces operating in the insurgency prone North-East.¹⁴ Since the implementation of the bill in 1958, there have been large scale demonstrations against the Act. These demonstrations increased in frequency from the eighties onwards, especially after the controversial operation of the Assam Rifles in July 1987 in Oinam village of Manipur. It was also after this that Amnesty International came out with a report "Operation Blue Bird" wherein it criticised the Act severely.

Non Government Organisations, Press and Electronic Media

In India state sponsored but autonomous bodies such as the National Human Rights Commission, Minorities Commission, Indian arms of some of the international human rights groups and socially conscious individuals have been vigilant watch dogs and have regularly brought to light human rights abuses on either side. However it is the

media, both national and vernacular press and the omnipresent electronic media that has really ensured vigilance. Insurgent organisations from time to time have attempted to muzzle the media for obvious gains but in the overall analysis the media has emerged as the conscience keeper of the nation.

During 1990-91 the Press was coming increasingly under threat from terrorists in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. Punjab terrorists, for example, decreed that the word "terrorist" must be substituted by "militant", laid down norms for the print media as also for the electronic media. To demonstrate how serious they were concerning the enforcement of their norms, the station director of the All India Radio in Chandigarh was shot dead.

A related aspect of this situation was the wide publicity which the activities of the terrorists received in the press. One of the major manifestations of this was the effect on the number of kidnappings by terrorists. The kidnappings had gone up steeply between 1989 and 1991 – from three to 95 in Assam, from two to 256 in Kashmir and from 59 to 304 in Punjab. A number of foreigners too had been kidnapped. Wide publicity given by media to these kidnappings had a spiralling effect since the terrorists were achieving maximum publicity for their cause.

In the insurgency affected areas, the Press often had to operate in a double squeeze. For example during the elections in Punjab in 1991, on one hand the Press was under considerable pressure from militants who had issued do's and don'ts to them. At the same time publication of slanted news items was leading to the creation of a climate against holding free and fair elections. The Government of Punjab, therefore, initiated steps such as seizure of copies of newspapers to counter negative propaganda against the elections.

On its own the media tried to be objective and report the happenings factually, wherever possible. However the government's handling of the media on issues of human rights was seriously lacking. The Government played the propaganda warfare card rather weakly and unprofessionally. The terrorists showed better strategy, winning over the people rather easily and alienating them from mainstream

India, radicalising them, spreading misinformation and giving India a bad name on the question of human rights. The state, with its advantage of free availability of both print and electronic media, came off a poor second. The government, instead of adopting an aggressive proactive approach, even failed, most of the time, to nail misinformation and lies convincingly or to expose militant excesses. Also the militants' nexus with criminals, smugglers and drug traffickers was not effectively exposed. India does not lack media professionals whose talents could have been of immense use in the media war against human rights violations and excesses by militants.

The Press Council of India, in its study report on the role of the media in Kashmir entitled 'Crisis and Credibility'¹³ stated that India lacks a coherent media policy. This created a media vacuum in Kashmir which was naturally filled by Pakistan occupied Kashmir Radio, Pakistan Radio and Pakistan TV who made the most of it. The hasty decision to evacuate both the radio and television news rooms from Srinagar to Jammu, instead of actually strengthening them, also came in for a lot of criticism. As a typical example of lack of good management, the report stated that, at the AIR Jammu station, power failures were endemic and breakdowns were registered at over 20 hours and 20 minutes during November 1990 as the stand-by generator that had been installed awaited commissioning owing to red-tape. So effective has the militant propaganda in Kashmir been that Robin Raphel has gone on record hinting that India instigated and encouraged the migration of the pandits from Kashmir, though this is known to be far from the truth. The decision at one stage to bundle out all foreign and national media persons from the Kashmir valley was as such a blunder. Inevitably rumors began to pass for hard news. Militants gleefully stepped in with their counter strategy issuing press releases, posters, cassettes and rumors, with Pakistan media supplementing their efforts.

India's track record on the management of the local and vernacular press has also not been very credit-worthy. That portion of the media which tried to stand up to the terrorists, comprising the *Hind Samachar* group (in Punjab), the leftist papers and the state owned media, had to pay a heavy price in the shape of assassinations, arson, bomb attacks and kidnappings. Once the authorities got the upper hand over

the terrorists and were able to neutralise their arm-twisting, this section of the media could report freely about terrorist excesses.

The story in Kashmir Valley is similar. The Press Council Committee suggested that broadly, the media could be expected to report freely if it were provided with institutional and area security, and government accommodation in protected areas. It also suggested the need to enhance the credibility of the government media by allowing it some degree of autonomy in disseminating news, information and analyses of events. It felt that if the claims of the militants were allowed to be objectively analysed and refuted, the official media would not find it too difficult to establish a rapport with the viewers and listeners. Similarly, it very rightly suggested that cases of excesses by the security forces should be reported without any effort to pad and tailor them.

The Army

The Indian Army has stood the test of time as regards the human rights issue wherever and whenever deployed for counter insurgency operations. It has rightfully maintained an honourable image of institutional uprightness and concern. It was not the Army's case that its men can do no wrong or commit no excess. Rather, it was that excesses were not routine but rare and that all cases were swiftly investigated and those found guilty promptly punished. The Army has its own Human Rights Cell that maintains a record of all human rights violation cases alleged against the Army and the actions taken in each case.

The Army came out very honourably during impartial third party investigations of the internationally publicised cases of Dudhi killings and Kunan rape case. In the Dudhi incident, the allegation was that the Army massacred seventy-three militants although they could have been arrested as they were willing to surrender. Like the Kunan Poshpora rape case described earlier, here too the allegations were found to be totally without foundation by the Press Council.

These incidences, apart from exonerating the Army, also brought home the importance of transparency while tackling human rights violations. Openness is a democratic act and offers the civil population an outlet to articulate its grievances. Finally, apart from acting as a

restraining influence on possible excesses by the security forces, transparency is often the most effective way of countering misinformation as it creates a climate of truth to come out.

In yet another very typical case, allegations were levelled at an Army unit of having committed rape of nine women in Chak Sidapura village in Shopian during a cordon and search operation on the night of 10-11 October 1992. Investigations revealed that the search was carried out in the presence of male members and no female was taken out of her house. The search party did not spend more than eight to ten minutes in each house in the village. Both the Army and the police investigations came to the conclusion that the allegations of rape and other excesses were trumped up at the instance of militant outfits to malign the reputation of the security forces, and innocent women were used to carry out the vicious propaganda. In instances such as the civilian killings in Bijihehara (Kashmir) in October 1993, prompt inquiries were held and those found guilty of excesses punished. The security forces maintain records of all those taken into custody during the operations, and the screening committees set up at the district and state levels meet regularly to review the cases.

Specific Recommendations

Based on the discussion so far it can be seen that, called by whatever name, the LIC environment in the Indian context today is nothing but a proxy war and it needs to be treated as such on all fronts – not only military but political, legal, social and diplomatic fronts. As in a war, only national interest should govern all actions. Following specific actions need to be instituted on an immediate basis :

- (a) Even though the Indian Army has emerged honourably through many cooked up and exaggerated charges of human rights violation and the guilty, whenever proved so on investigation, have been punished, there is certainly scope for improvement. Perhaps much more indoctrination at the training stage on issues such as, laying more importance to human rights issues by senior Army officers in field units fighting insurgency, maintaining sufficient reserves to ensure rotation of units before the stress, fatigue or 'power-high' syndrome really takes over, may help.

(b) Distinction between human rights in normal peace time, LIC and conventional war be clearly defined and accepted. In view of the special conditions prevailing in an LIC environment, a certain degree of inevitable dilution of the humanitarian concerns and human rights in respect of terrorists and insurgents upto a short period after their capture be accepted at the political and governmental level and given legal sanctity without any hypocrisy. This is essential to carry out field interrogation to obtain information of immediate importance. Accordingly the concept of field interrogation needs to be legalised. Consequently security forces' personnel must be imparted formal training as field interrogators at unit and sub unit levels.

(c) At political and diplomatic levels greater thrust be imparted to counter the militants and Pakistani propaganda against human rights violation by Indian security forces at all international forums in a proactive manner by exposing the excesses committed by insurgents with trans-border support and nexus with criminals.

(d) All political parties must evolve a national consensus to treat the human rights incidents in insurgency prone areas as a national problem above party and vote bank considerations. Towards this end, NHRC must draft a code of conduct and the government must coordinate to bring the political parties on a common platform. The Election Commission must also include appropriate provisions in poll time code of conduct.

(e) An open, transparent and consistent media policy be followed in respect of both the government controlled and private media, including foreign media. A constant dialogue and liaison be maintained between security agencies and the media. Security must be provided to media personnel working in insurgency prone areas. No attempt must be made to hide or doctor the details of excesses committed by our security forces.

(f) More openness to visits and probes by international human rights organisations must be offered. Efforts must be made to induct Indians of high stature into these bodies to ensure that our viewpoints and concerns are adequately

addressed. At the same time at political, diplomatic and up to United Nations level, efforts should be made to ensure that human rights groups as independent and neutral observers do shift their emphasis from mere investigation into particular incidents (aimed at blaming the government agencies) to examining the process of violation and related human factors to identify the causes.

(g) All the militant outfits today have web sites on the Internet to carry out global propaganda. All the human rights related organisations in India, i.e., Ministry of Home Affairs, NHRC and Army Human Rights Cell must monitor the material being put on the Net and counter the cyber propaganda by providing factual and substantiated replies on their own respective web pages in real time.

Conclusion

It is evident that upholding of human rights in a counter insurgency scenario is a very complex and difficult task, which our security agencies have been involved in for protracted periods with no ultimate solution in sight. The plight of a soldier who may never fight a war for which he has been trained and instead is destined through most of his career to fight a war with an unknown, unseen and unidentified enemy for which he has never been trained is an unenviable proposition. Given the trying circumstances, our Army has certainly emerged honourably. But to fight the root cause, the war needs to be extended on all fronts, political, legal, diplomatic, social and media. Greater vigilance needs to be exercised to reduce and contain the instances of human rights violations by those in the field. At the same time a certain essential amount of dilution of human rights must be accepted and legal provisions made. All efforts must be made to counter the enemy propaganda to the world audience through all possible avenues—media, cyber space included. The UN and world wide human rights organisations must be exposed to the correct picture, wooed and cajoled to accept our point of view, our concerns and limitations. Counter insurgency needs to be perceived as a real war at the national level. Then and only then, can the country emerge victorious.

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China's Changing National Security Doctrine

PART I

SWARAN SINGH

Introduction

The success of China's four modernisations, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, western blitzkrieg during the Persian Gulf War and the smooth transition of power to the 'third generation' leadership under President Jiang Zemin have completely changed the context of China's national security thinking and planning. China today is not only projected as the next economic and military global power in-the-making, it has already been accepted as the 'strategic partner' by both Moscow and Washington with whom it had once fought wars. On eight different occasions Washington had considered using nuclear weapons against the Chinese mainland.¹ Now, Washington is more than willing to accept China as the second most important actor in global affairs and an equal partner in Asia. All this, however, has not been one-way exercise. The Chinese have compromised on the essence of Mao's revolution, i.e., its trait of strong 'anti-hegemonism'. Following wide-ranging reforms under the guise of 'Chinese characteristics', China has come to be described as the status quo global power in-the-making.²

The New Strategic Thinking: Integrated Approach to National Defence

The origins of China's current strategic thinking can be traced back to Deng's de-Maoisation, four-modernisations drive and China's loss of face during the war with Vietnam in 1979. It is in this backdrop that new formulations like Su Yu's People's War under Modern Conditions, Active Defence, Comprehensive National

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999

Strength, and Three Dimensional Strategic Boundaries, were thrown up during strategic debates beginning in the early 1980s.³ This was the first time that Beijing enjoyed peaceful ties with both Moscow and Washington and the emphasis shifted from the former doctrine of "early strike, major strike, and nuclear strike" to gradual and long-term reforms in China's force structures. The first official version emerged following the Enlarged Conference of the Party's Central Military Commission (CMC) during May-June 1985 and was contained in a document called "Strategic Changes to the Guiding Thoughts on National Defence Construction and Army Building". At this CMC meeting its Chairman, Deng Xiaoping, had announced that:

There should be a cognitive change in the basic assessment of the international situation for the present and the future; in accordance with this scientific understanding and judgement, there should also be a change in policy; there should also be change in the guiding thought for national defence construction.⁴

The important element of this new strategic thinking was to evolve a new strategy for peacetime defence modernisation as an integral part of China's overall national reconstruction drive. The outcome was the successful conversion of defence industries for producing civilian consumer goods. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) started manufacture of items like televisions, refrigerators and motor-bikes. This was expected to keep them fully functional during peacetime and to obtain them optimal readiness to deal with contingencies of wartime. These efforts were also aimed at generating funds for defence modernisation. Accordingly, the early 1980s witnessed a gradual shift seeking to blend a continued free-flow of foreign technologies with a continued stress on indigenisation and self-reliance.⁵ This is because the Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s had resulted in Chinese technicians being restricted to improving their antiquated Soviet defence inventories. But by the mid-1980s, new strategic thinking enabled them to have access to both Western and Soviet knowhow and technologies.⁶

However, not many had visualised the slow and imperceptible side-effects of this exposure to western technologies. In addition to increasing their stakes in maintaining peace with both Moscow and

Washington, new engagements also necessitated awareness about their operational war-fighting doctrines. Accordingly, China gradually started adopting 'seeking peace' as the central element of its foreign policy. Amongst other things this saw China step-by-step accepting membership of super power sponsored arms control and non-proliferation regimes.⁷ It was following the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991, that the strategic doctrine once again shifted from war-prevention to war-fighting; though 'seeking-peace' has been retained as the number one objective of declared national security policy.

Seeking Peace: From Disarmament to Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Chairman Mao Zedong used to describe all disarmament measures between Moscow, London and Washington as "an indenture" imposed on the non-nuclear weapon states and justify China's strategic weapons development programme as a project in support of the world's "oppressed people". In the 1990s, however, China's leaders are pursuing disarmament by professing the exact opposite i.e., by joining non-proliferation regimes. They now justify these regimes as essential steps towards 'halting the arms race' before carrying out genuine disarmament.⁸ China's decisions like accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, declaration to adhere to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994, security assurances to Ukraine and Kazakhstan in 1995, negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in March 1996 followed by its pro-active approach towards "managing" the Indo-Pak nuclear competition all mark the completion of China's strategic U-turn from its disarmament policies of Mao's years.

Similarly, in terms of nuclear arsenals, while Chairman Mao had first denounced nuclear weapons as "paper tigers" and later conceded to what was interpreted by western scholars as "minimum deterrence" — saying that "A few atomic bombs are enough; six is enough" — the 1980s saw China developing its nuclear triad as also building a whole range of new tactical nuclear weapons. The 1990s have not only witnessed a zeal for modernising their nuclear warheads but also reluctance to disarm and destroy their own nuclear enterprise. If anything, an increasing stress has been laid

on improving both the quality and quantity of China's nuclear arsenals and inducting them into China's war-fighting doctrines. While earlier China had promised to consider reduction in nuclear arsenals once Moscow and Washington reduced their weapons by 50 per cent, during 1992, in view of START I and START II becoming a possibility, Beijing revised its policy and declared that it will not participate in any disarmament until the two super powers had carried out "substantial" reductions, which has been generally interpreted to mean by about 90 per cent of their existing stockpiles. The same is also true of China's No-First-Use (NFU) doctrine, regarded as Beijing's most important contribution to nuclear theology. Despite repeated enunciation by China's leaders, its NFU doctrine — which means pledge for non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons powers and nuclear weapon free zones — has become increasingly unclear, thus raising doubts about its efficacy in actual crises.

War-Prevention: Chinks in China's No-First Use Doctrine

While China has continued to enjoy the high moral stature of having pledged by the NFU doctrine and has urged other nuclear weapon states to follow suit, realisation has been growing amongst China's strategic community on how lack of reciprocity has resulted in making NFU a liability for the Chinese Armed Forces. Relying on its NFU doctrine, the PLA forces have not honed their deterrence capabilities. Demonstration of newer technologies by other global powers has made Chinese uneasy about the survivability and credibility of their existing capabilities. As a result, newer interpretations have resulted in creating chinks in China's long-standing NFU doctrine.⁹

China's military strategists do not consider the use of nuclear weapons in *own territory* as violating their NFU doctrine.¹⁰ The PLA's military exercises involve scenarios of use of tactical nuclear weapons from early 1980s. This leads to the question of what they consider as their own territory? Taiwan has been a case in point. Legally the Kuomintang regime had until the early 1970s represented mainland China at all international forums, and even negotiated and signed the NPT draft as a representative of mainland China. This background, Taiwan's sophisticated nuclear industry and China's

continued policy stance of not giving up its option of using force in effecting unification, provides Taiwan a strong justification for weaponising its capabilities. Here, China's NFU doctrine comes into question on two points: firstly, does China consider Taiwan a non-nuclear weapon state; and secondly, does its NFU doctrine apply to Taiwan, which China considers to be its own territory, a 'renegade province'. Beijing has never bothered to clarify on these uncertainties, thereby further strengthening prevailing skepticism amongst its neighbours.

India represents another case in point. China continues to lay territorial claims over India's provinces of Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. The confusion in this context has become far more intriguing in the backdrop of India's recent nuclear tests following which the current nuclear status of India could obtain China the option to withdraw its NFU pledge in the middle of a given crisis. Moreover, the existence of miniature tactical battlefield munitions with the Chinese may provide temptations for escalation from both sides.

Repeated statements by China's leaders contradicting their NFU doctrine have only further strengthened such skepticism. To give some of the more recent examples, on 27 May 1990, President Yang Shangkun, while receiving overseas Chinese during his visit to Argentina spoke at length reiterating Beijing's non-renunciation of force against Taiwan with a reminder that "We [Beijing] have nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, submarines, many submarines..."¹¹ Can such an important statement from the head of the Chinese republic be ignored as an inadvertent oversight? Also, this was neither the first nor the last such statement made by Chinese authorities. During 1989, Maj Gen Yang Huan, then Deputy Commander of China's Second Artillery (Strategic Nuclear Force), had asserted in an essay that developing nuclear weapons will continue to be the main aspect of China's defence modernisation and outlined the scenario in which the PLA would not hesitate from using its nuclear strike. For him, nuclear weapons could be used "...to safeguard more effectively our national security and territorial integrity and sovereignty..."¹² As late as winter of 1995-96, *China Military Science* carried an article written by a former Dean of China's Anti-Chemical Warfare Academy, Maj Gen Wu Jianguo,

which described how the end of the Cold War had transformed the role of China's nuclear forces. According to him, its future role was no longer to be confined to dealing with China's confrontations with Moscow and Washington alone; instead, in the future high-technology local wars, the struggle between nuclear deterrence and counter-nuclear deterrence will become even more complex.¹³

Going by China's response to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, China's strategic community had again re-opened debates for a possible re-thinking on the efficacy of China's NFU vis-a-vis these two countries. To quote a senior foreign policy expert from a think tank connected to China's Ministry of State Security, Yan Xeutong, "If there [were to be] a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, China will naturally be dragged into it."¹⁴ China's Armed Forces, the PLA, have obviously drawn lessons from these strategic U-turns in China's broad disarmament and war-prevention policies. And this is beginning to effect a fundamental shift in China's operational doctrines and tactics.

War-Fighting I : From Minimum Deterrence to Limited Nuclear Deterrence

Having denounced nuclear weapons as "paper tigers" Mao's China displayed an inhibition to express its thinking on nuclear war-fighting. If ever this subject was discussed it was not 'deterrence' but 'self-defence' or at best, 'minimum retaliation' that remained the preferred terminology during Mao's years.¹⁵ In the absence of a clear expression from the Chinese side, most commentators had to base their conclusions on the nature of China's nuclear stockpiles. These included a small number of single-warhead, relatively inaccurate medium and long-range missiles and antiquated bombers. The only expressed view available in Mao's China was that they had decided to build this nuclear capability singularly to break the American nuclear monopoly and to frustrate nuclear blackmail by the United States.¹⁶ Accordingly, most western analysts concluded that "minimum deterrence" seemed to best characterise China's nuclear doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁷ But, starting from the early 1980s, this doctrine of 'deterrence-by-denial' (of victory) under conditions of People's

War had begun to be undermined following the transfer of power to Deng Xiaoping who declared that "We [must] have, what others have."¹⁸ The first signal of Deng's new emphasis was that while during the first three decades of its atomic research programme China had decided to build only strategic nuclear weapons, China had now begun to develop battlefield tactical nuclear munitions. And here, China's nuclear thinking was also visible in the establishment of a nuclear triad thus making China the third most feared nuclear weapon state in the world. These were obviously not weapons for seeking either peace or war prevention.

The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and later the collapse of the former Soviet Union finally put an end to China's fear of an imminent nuclear war, and provided it both time and space to manoeuvre and think in a long-term perspective. This was also the period when the two nuclear super powers were engaged in negotiating nuclear disarmament, and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty of December 1987 had resulted in abolishing an entire range of nuclear weapons. It was only later that the western blitzkrieg during the Persian Gulf War demonstrated to the Chinese leadership the advantages of advanced weapons and offensive doctrine which obtain both 'control' and 'surprise' thus ensuring a quick and cost-effective victory. It is also important to note that since the early 1990s the evolution of China's nuclear doctrine was no longer driven by its technological and economic breakthroughs or simply goaded by its desire to obtain deterrence against Moscow or Washington but had begun to develop a hue of nuclear warfighting in it.¹⁹ This had important implications because over 96 per cent of China's nuclear warheads could not actually hit beyond its neighbouring countries.

This new doctrinal thinking has already begun to play a decisive role in determining the pace and direction of the PLA's modernisation priorities. Beginning with the nuclear campaign theory research programme of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) in 1987, there has been a proliferation of new writings and terminology on China's nuclear doctrine with "limited nuclear deterrence" gradually emerging as more or less the most acceptable new concept.²⁰ While the Chinese had neither the will nor the wherewithal for evolving a

maximum nuclear deterrence, these writings continued to criticise minimum nuclear deterrence as insufficient for it was regarded as inadequate to deter anything more than a countervalue first strike.²¹ In contrast to both minimum and maximum deterrence, limited nuclear deterrence had begun to be envisioned as far more flexible. This, however, entailed the development of nuclear capabilities that would deter all conventional, theatre and strategic attacks and suppress escalation in case deterrence fails. But unlike most western doctrines of limited war, Chinese 'limited nuclear deterrence' does not stress on one-to-one matching response but merely on a capability that is sufficient to raise the cost of war dramatically to prevent an enemy victory.²² Also, compared to China's arsenals, this doctrine requires a far greater number of smaller, more accurate, survivable, mobile, penetrable, strategic missiles including cruise missiles and tactical and theatre nuclear weapons, space-based early warning and command and control systems and anti-satellite systems to hit enemy satellites, a civil defence infrastructure to reduce the damage and a recognisable commitment to make it all very visible as also credible. Going by China's military modernisation the focus seems to suggest this clearly being their current priority. This also partly explains China's current preoccupation with miniaturisation of its nuclear warheads and with developing more accurate, mobile, solid-fuel, MIRVed missile systems.

(To be concluded)

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Organisation and Culture Issues of India's Defence Technology and Industrial Base

AIR VICE MARSHAL SAMIR K SEN (RETD)

Introduction

India's defence industrialisation is widely acknowledged as an important issue of regional security and has attracted considerable attention of the strategic studies community since the early nineteen sixties. It has, however, never attained the required degree of success as a self-reliant, sustainable enterprise despite all the investments made and her indisputable technological capabilities. This is because of several constraints but largely due to the organisational deficiencies and cultural handicaps that have generally contributed to a lowering of the efficiency of India's defence establishment and particularly plagued her defence technology and industrial base (DTIB). It is interesting to note that neither the industrially developed countries (IDC) nor the new industrially developed countries (NIDC) with large DTIBs had similar problems. This is because India alone had a culture problem in acknowledging defence as a priority area of governance. India, also, carries a burden from her past which inhibits her efforts at exporting arms. And yet India today is committed to improving the efficiency and economic viability of her defence technology base. India cannot achieve these goals unless she corrects her higher defence planning and management structure and overcomes the cultural handicaps to set her priorities right. In other words, India's political leadership has to acknowledge without further loss of time that India cannot eat the cake and have it too.

Apparently, the fact that the British Indian Army which was an instrument of oppression of the Indian people for two centuries of British rule had overnight shed its colonial character and trans-

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

formed itself into a national army at the instant of the transfer of power had failed to make the expected impact on the founding fathers. Evidently, also, all of those leaders, brought up in the traditions of the non-violent freedom movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, were averse to dealing with defence affairs. Not surprisingly, they had little appetite for dealing with the intricacies of higher defence planning and management and took the easiest course by opting for the status quo, namely a defence management structure similar to that of colonial British India, although that two-tier structure was grossly inappropriate for an independent nation and resulted in the exclusion of both the Armed Forces and the arms production agencies from the apex decision-making body, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the staffing of that MOD with only an uninformed and uninvolved section of the civilian bureaucracy. In the process the leadership, also, came to overlook another matter of organisational imperative : the institutionalisation of an integrated management structure for indigenous weapons development and manufacture. During the last five decades both of these failures have been further compounded by the inability of successive generations of India's political leadership to make amends.

The go-ahead given by the political leadership for the creation of a two-tier defence management structure was, probably, the most damaging decision with far-reaching consequences. Both components of the Indian defence establishment, namely the military and the military technology and industrial base which buttresses the military's war-fighting capabilities, have suffered iniquities and inefficiencies as a result of the creation of such an uniquely inappropriate higher management organisation and its inevitable consequence. An attempt has been made in this paper to understand the circumstances and the ramifications of this wrong-doing in India's national security affairs from a historical perspective and then to analyse the important organisational and cultural issues which have resulted from this unprecedented occurrence, insofar as these issues have contributed to the lowering of the efficiency of the Indian defence establishment generally and the Indian DTIB, in particular. Further, since these issues pertain to both components of the defence establishment, namely the military and the

DTIB, the analysis has necessarily, if briefly, touched upon the pertinent problems of the Indian military, too. Lastly, a brief discussion on one important cultural issue of the Indian DTIB which is unrelated to its organisational problems and yet strongly influences its functioning, namely India's inability to strengthen her DTIB by engaging in the export of arms has also been included.

The Decision-Making, Implementation and Ramifications

During the British rule the central government under the British Viceroy had no involvement with higher defence planning and management, the subject having been the sole responsibility of the War Office in London (the British MOD) and, particularly, of one functionary of the British MOD, i.e., the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) who, as the commander-in-chief of the British Army and all other colonial armies of the British empire, was then arguably the most important functionary under the British defence minister. Therefore, during the British rule neither the Government of India under the Viceroy nor the British Indian Army's headquarters in New Delhi under the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) for India (who reported to the CIGS but was also responsible to the Viceroy for matters pertaining to the deployment of troops in aid of civil administration) had any set-up even remotely resembling a MOD.

Thus, on assuming power, the political leadership of newly independent India was faced with the responsibility of putting into place an altogether new structure by way of India's higher defence planning and management organisation and ordered the formation of an unique MOD, presided over by a defence minister of the cabinet rank and manned only by civilians to the exclusion of the armed forces and the imposition of this body on the top of the three armed forces headquarters and the headquarters of the ordnance production and development organisations. The formation of such a MOD which was quite unlike the other ministries of the newly formed government of independent India had no precedent in the world. However, it instantly assumed the powers of command and control over the entire defence establishment of British India, which by then comprised a large British Indian Army with an Army Head-

quarters, a small Royal Indian Navy with a Naval Headquarters, the fledgling Royal Indian Air Force with an Air Headquarters and an ordnance factories organisation with its own headquarters in Calcutta and some twenty ordnance factories. Colocated with some of the ordnance factories were, also, a few Technical Development Establishments (TDE), functionally controlled by a directorate of the Army Headquarters.

Unfortunately for India, the taking of the decision by the political leadership on the formation of such a MOD did not benefit from either the kind of knowledge and conviction which had informed decision-making by the same leadership in other areas of governance or the public awareness of the organisation and methods developed by other war-fighting nations including the British during the Second World War. While apathy bordering on an aversion towards the military partly explains the Indian leadership's deficiencies in this respect, there were other factors which had aided and abetted this process of wrong-doing. For instance, although independent India's defence planning and management were of no particular concern to the departing British, in effect the British had encouraged the formation of a two-tier defence management structure by not rendering the required advice and by lending, instead, British generals, admirals and air marshals to preside over the hierarchical structures of the three separate and subordinate Armed Forces headquarters under the all-civilian MOD of the newly independent country.¹

More importantly, the Indian political leadership's choice of higher defence management structure was ably supported by one unexpected quarter, namely a minuscule but highly influential section of Indians who had no knowledge whatsoever of either the organisation and methods of the military in British India or India's national security but a large stake otherwise in the affairs of the new government and its system of administration.² These were the senior most Indian members of the erstwhile colonial Indian Civil Service (ICS) who, on the eve of independence, were not as senior as the senior most British members but were suddenly elevated by the Indian political leadership to fill the vacuum created by the departing British and consequently found themselves occupying

the top slots of the new government. As the designated principal officers of the departments and ministries of all branches of this government (especially, as the cabinet secretary, home secretary, the defence secretary and the finance secretary), therefore, they assisted and advised the Indian political leaders on all matters of governance during the change-over and found themselves very close to their new masters.

Since during the colonial era the British rulers had taken particular care to select the Indian officers of the ICS and to mould them by imparting training in many areas of colonial administration, the Indian leaders, now in the seats of power, found these bureaucrats dependable and heavily depended on their advice. Not surprisingly, therefore, consultations with these handful of senior Indian members of the erstwhile colonial civil service proved to be as important a source of knowledge and advice for the political leadership as the advice rendered by the departing British on all matters of governance including higher defence planning and management. In contrast, the circumstances and hierarchical positions of the senior most Indian members of the British Indian Army, Navy and Air Force had discouraged the Indian political leadership from getting close to or taking into confidence any Indian member of the erstwhile British Indian Army, Navy or Air Force.

These Indian King's Commissioned Officers (KCO) or King's Commissioned Indian Officers (KCIO) thus remained uninvolved with the Indian political leadership partly due to circumstances and partly by design and were silent spectators to this unbelievably inappropriate decision-making on independent India's higher defence planning and management structure.³ Therefore, while it would be correct to conclude that it is aversion of the Indian political leaders towards military affairs and the consequent failure to come to grips with the nitty gritty of higher defence planning and management which are at the root of most of the ills of India's defence establishment including the Indian DTIB, it must be remembered that many of these failures and the resulting aberrations in the management structure had been compounded by the historic process of lack of consultations by the leadership with the senior Indian members of colonial India's Armed Forces on the one hand

and of full consultation with their ill-informed civilian counterparts of the colonial Indian Civil Service on the other.⁴

Not unexpectedly, both the advice rendered to and the decisions taken by the political leadership on the Indian MOD were largely influenced by the colonial precedent. As stated, British India's Army Headquarters in New Delhi was a subordinate and separate headquarters which was controlled by the British MOD in London, i.e., the apex defence management organisation of Great Britain. Incorporated in the British MOD was the headquarters of the British Army whose chief, the CIGS, exercised control on the C-in-C in India. The fact that this arrangement was made by the British only to suit their colonial purpose and that the British at home had organised their own MOD differently i.e., as an integrated military-civilian MOD was lost sight of by the Indian political leaders. Interestingly, even if the Indian political leadership had failed to see this, the fact is that it was the Whitehall model, (i.e., the structure of the British MOD or, for that matter, the MOD of any other democracy), that would have proved suitable for independent India's higher defence management organisation.⁵

The newly formed Indian MOD (as, indeed, other ministries) had an Indian member of the ICS as the principal officer (i.e., Secretary) under the defence minister and a number of deputies of the same cadre (i.e., the ICS). As mentioned, neither the Secretary nor his deputies had any expertise or experience in defence affairs, and yet no officer of the Armed Forces was posted on the strength of the Indian MOD. Further, the three Armed Forces chiefs were redesignated as the Chiefs of Army, Naval and Air Staff, while the controller of the ordnance factories organisation, renamed the Director General Ordnance Factories (DGOF), was placed directly under the MOD. The TDEs, however, continued to be under the control of the Army Headquarters for some time, and then a major reorganisation removed them from the control of the Army Headquarters. At this stage some comments on the formation of the Indian MOD at the exclusion of both the Armed Forces and the DGOF headquarters and the role of the Secretary of such an unique Indian MOD are in order.

Having adopted the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy and the Whitehall model of ministries and departments for the federal i.e., central government, the Indian political leadership, however, had stopped short of following the British model of administration fully and retained, instead, the administrative structure of colonial India which the British rulers had specially devised to suit their purpose in India and had no precedent in the UK itself. This had meant the retaining of colonial India's system of civil services and administration including the ICS (whose successor service was renamed the Indian Administrative Service, the IAS) and imposing this system on an independent nation. Of the many cadres of colonial India's civil services, the ICS was designed as the pre-eminent service and introduced in the early years of the British rule with only British incumbents and later opened to Indians. This cadre had been utilised by the British rulers in the mainstream of colonial administration and, unlike the other centrally administered civil services, had enjoyed many superior privileges and acted as an all-pervasive instrument for the subjugation of the Indian people. Just as the choice exercised by the Indian political leadership in respect of the higher defence management structure had a profound influence on the performance and development of the Indian defence establishment, the retention by the same leadership of the colonial system of administration and a superior cadre of civil service similar to the ICS of the colonial era (i.e., the IAS) has largely influenced the organisation and culture of independent India's Armed Forces and of the Indian DTIB during all of the five decades of Indian independence.⁶

Although in the beginning the Indian MOD had, under the Defence Minister, only one civil servant of the highest rank, the Defence Secretary, and only a few joint secretaries, it grew rapidly taking advantage of both the expansion at the grass roots of the Armed Forces and the defence production organisations (the ordnance factories and public sector units) and the reorganisation of the TDEs into defence inspection and defence research organisations. The restructuring of the TDEs was the consequence of the creation of a new organisation called the Defence Science Organisation (DSO) which was later renamed the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), with a newly ap-

pointed Scientific Advisor (SA) to the defence minister as its ex-officio Director General. Each TDE shed one part of its establishment to a newly formed inspectorate and transformed the remainder into an unit of the DSO. All such DSO (i.e., DRDO) units were renamed laboratories or development establishments and placed under the SA. Soon the MOD itself was reorganised into two departments; namely the Department of Defence and the Department of Defence Production and Supply, with additions of more members of the same civil service (the IAS) to each department. Thus, the process of creation and expansion of an all-civilian Indian MOD, manned essentially by officers totally unrelated to the Indian defence establishment, was continued and further consolidated.

The SA had initially been given the comparatively junior status of a joint secretary and later that of an additional secretary, when there already were scores of Secretary level officials in the departments and ministries of the government. Also, he had no department of his own and was attached to the Department of Defence Production and Supply of the MOD, and the headquarters of the DSO (DRDO) provided the required scientific support. It is the combination of the conferment of this lower status and this ad hoc administrative arrangement which deprived the SA and the DRDO, at their very inception, of the much-needed financial and administrative powers. More importantly, it clearly reflected the absence of political will to create an effective defence technology base. Unbelievably - and unfortunately for the Indian DTIB - this arrangement continued for nearly two decades thereafter, fostering a climate of despondency, uncertainty and indecisions. Interestingly, in this case, too, the Indian political leadership's perceptions were out of tune with the rest of the world and its decisions largely influenced by advice rendered by the British. In this case a senior British scientist had, apparently, counselled the Indian Prime Minister to opt for only a nominal presence in weapons development. According to some analysts, this largely explains the Indian leadership's historical ambivalence on this issue during the early years and the reason why the government had put defence technology development on the back burner, factors which had virtually stifled India's efforts at developing a self-reliant defence industry for nearly four decades.⁷ As known, this contrasted sharply

with the position that obtained in other countries of the world including similarly placed NIDCs.⁸

After the Chinese aggression in 1962 the pendulum swung to the other side, allowing the Indian military to overcome the political leadership's apathy towards defence and assert its right to arm itself there and then. In the absence, however, of an appropriate Indian MOD organisation and a long term plan for defence industrialisation, this led to the build-up of a military-bureaucratic-political consensus on the arming of the military, without loss of time on indigenous weapon development, which went full-steam ahead, riding on the twin engines of outright import and licensed production. It was only in 1971, with the induction of an eminent scientist as the SA in the rank of the Secretary, that an attempt to make up for the neglect and decline of indigenous development capability was made for the first time. This was a turning point and was followed a decade later by the formal induction of a Department of Defence Research and Development of the Indian MOD. However, the built-in infirmity of the higher defence management organisation and the culture of import-dependence which it had promoted made it difficult for indigenous weapon development to gain ground in the defence procurement process for another two decades or so.

The Organisation Problem

The here-and-now syndrome of the Indian military's arms acquisition process was a natural corollary to the political leadership's failure, in the very beginning, to come to grips with the nitty-gritty of higher defence planning and management and to settle for the appropriate MOD structure. Apart from the fact that it was administratively incorrect to leave the armed forces headquarters (and the controlling headquarters of the defence R & D and ordnance factories) outside the MOD, the two-tier structure has caused functional aberrations in defence planning and management by perpetuating conditions which promote delay in decision-making, inefficiency and worse. There are two major aspects of this organisation problem. We will briefly discuss the one which primarily affects the Armed Forces but has adverse effects on the de-

fence technology base, too. We will then discuss in more detail the second aspect of the problem, which adversely affect the DTIB but is also of concern to the Armed Forces.

One aspect of the problem of non-integration is that the chiefs of India's Army, Navy and Air Force and their headquarters (as, indeed, the DGOF headquarters) cannot directly influence decision-making by the government on defence or foreign policy issues which call for military-operational or defence-industrial expertise or both.⁹ Consequently it prevents the efficient functioning of both components of the Indian defence establishment, i.e., the Armed Forces and the DTIB, and, therefore, of the government itself including its foreign policy-making processes. Even in countries with a dedicated cadre of civil service earmarked for MOD duty, as is the case in the UK and many other countries, the Armed Forces and the defence technology and industrial headquarters remain integrated with the MOD. In the Indian case the IAS incumbents to the MOD's senior appointments find it difficult to make meaningful contributions on the strength of their own knowledge or experience. Equally important and additionally, even after the formation of a national security council it will be necessary to put in place an integrated MOD, to make it possible to reorganise the command and control structures of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force at the highest level to yield a system of unified operational command in the field, a feature which exists in all democracies as an essential component of their defence management organisation.¹⁰ Finally, because of this organisational deficiency and the shortcoming in the functioning of India's MOD a number of opportunities to pursue proposals received from friendly countries for joint exercises or training assistance of various kinds, which are important for national security or otherwise profitable to India have eluded the Indian MOD.¹¹ In fact, the stand-alone status of India's Armed Forces headquarters, which had become evident from the absence of the military on the strength of India's MOD, had invariably surprised visiting delegations from MODs and DODs of other democracies of the world.¹²

The Indian DTIB and Procurement Management

This aspect of the non-integration problem may be described

as the problem of a fractured DTIB management organisation compounded by the absence of structural integrity in the linkage between the DTIB and procurement management. Unlike in the case of IDCs and other NIDCs (where development and manufacture of weapons are undertaken in an integrated manner by corporate manufacturers in the private or the public sector), all weapon development projects in India involve the continuous participation by two sets of mutually independent institutions, the DRDO laboratories and the ordnance factories. Each, however, is answerable to either the SA or the DGOF. Consequently, such projects, even if managed by project managers and high powered steering committees, call for frequent intervention at the highest level by two independent authorities, i.e., the SA and the DGOF (or the Secretary Defence Production). Wherever costly and sophisticated manufacturing facilities, available only at bulk-production centres, have frequently to be used for complex prototype-manufacture, the need for resolving conflicts of priorities between a DRDO laboratory and an ordnance factory could well be a matter of frequent occurrence. This arrangement is patently unsuitable.

While the IDCs and other NIDCs have entrusted the business of development-cum-manufacture of conventional weapons systems to corporate entities with integrated management and while Russia, too, has state-controlled, integrated weapon manufacture-cum-development units, India still lives with the problem. It is evident from the success of her missile development and a few such recent programmes that in the case of major weapons development programmes, at least, the problem has somewhat been contained. However, if, as likely, organisational improvisation based on goodwill has made up for the deficiencies inherent in the present management structure and non-integrated management is apparently doing well for now, the success has been achieved at some cost. But, as India's defence technology development makes a mark and the manufacture of indigenously developed weapons systems expands manifold, the cost will become unbearable by India's DTIB.¹³

There were some parallels in other countries to the India-like situation, since in the past government-owned development estab-

lishments and production units were in existence in those countries, too. Unlike India, however, those countries anticipated the problem, and before long their development and production units were merged and restructured appropriately. In the UK, for instance, the role of the SA in the execution of weapons development projects, as opposed to research activities which remain the SA's responsibility, were redefined soon after the Second World War and restricted to providing guidance to the Armed Forces in the framing of operational requirements (OR) and to presiding over the deliberations of apex OR committees as the sole authority for the approval of ORs for high technology weapons.¹⁴ At the same time Britain's weapons development establishments, earlier with the SA, were either transferred to and integrated with the corresponding ordnance factories which were later privatised or privatised and merged with private-sector manufacturers.

In India such a restructuring will involve a major revision of the way the MOD's R & D and production and supply departments are now manned and operated. The weapons and equipment development laboratories or sections of laboratories partly engaged in such programmes will have to be merged with corresponding groups of ordnance factories (or, in a few cases, with the appropriate public sector corporations) to form integrated development-cum-production units. The integrated units could then be converted into public sector corporations under a restructured department of production and supply manned by technocrats and industry professionals.¹⁵ However, any attempt at configuring, even, one integrated development-cum-manufacturing company on the same or similar lines or at restructuring the departments of defence production and supply and of defence R & D is not likely to succeed, unless the political leadership takes the initiative and determinedly proceeds to overcome the resistance such an initiative is likely to face from pockets of vested interests in the higher echelons of India's defence establishment. In fact, such an idea in relation to one particular DRDO laboratory and a newly formed defence public sector unit was reported to have once been conceived a few decades back, but it was nipped in the bud because of the opposition it met within the scientific-bureaucratic circles and, above all, due to the lack of political will to implement such a plan.¹⁶

In the case of defence procurement the position regarding the management structure is, even, more curious in that each of the three Armed Forces Headquarters continue to process their cases in parallel through the MOD's departments of defence (for import) or the department of production and supply (for indigenously manufactured items). While elsewhere, in other democracies, the streamlining of defence procurement processes and organisations with a view to achieving higher efficiency has been an accepted norm, the Indian government and the MOD have shown no indication yet that they are seized with the problem. The reason why India, despite having undertaken defence procurement in large quantities and for many decades, has not found it incumbent to restructure the defence acquisition management system has mostly to do with the fact that till now, for major weapon systems, the plans and procurement branches of the three Armed Forces (and the corresponding divisions of the MOD's departments) were largely focused on imports and licensed manufacture and, consequently, had no specific mandate to promote indigenous development. This and the relative simplicity of the task of procurement-by-import have continued to ensure that the absence of an unified procurement organisation, vertically integrated with the DTIB management, is not yet felt in a manner that causes anguish.¹⁷

The experience of other countries, e.g., the UK which had earlier practiced procurement in a piecemeal fashion but later integrated her procurement organisations into one centralised agency, i.e., the Procurement Executive (PE) of the British MOD, has clearly indicated that much of the activities that are regarded as essential in an Indian-like situation are, in fact, superfluous and entirely avoidable. It is evident that in the present state where India's Army, Navy and Air Headquarters continue to individually process their demands through the respective channels of the MOD's departments the responsibility is shared by too many individuals and remains diffused. This tends to adversely affect both the transparency and the quality of decision-making. Most importantly, it tends to shroud accountability.¹⁸ Also, in the case of procurement-by-import the MOD remains the key player, and although the senior officials of the departments of defence and defence production and supply lean heavily on the knowledge and expertise of the

specialists of the Armed Forces Headquarters (and the DGOF) they exercise, arguably, much more clout in decision-making.¹⁹

As regards decision-making on make-or-buy (which, in the Indian context, means exercising a choice between indigenous development and import) the absence of an unified, inter-services procurement agency in the MOD often makes it difficult to examine the problem dispassionately and tilts the balance in favour of a 'buy' decision. The long-standing culture within the Indian MOD and the Armed Forces, affected as they were earlier by the easy going ways of procurement by import, have in the past thwarted all attempts at making the procurement process inward-looking.²⁰ Not surprisingly, therefore, the making of long term plans to provide adequate lead time for the indigenous development of weapons systems was traditionally not regarded as a serious business of national security.²¹ As known, the defence procurement programmes in other countries including NIDCs with unified procurement agencies work in tandem with their DTIB management organisations and drive their DTIBs to develop and manufacture indigenous equipment in a planned manner.²²

The Culture Issues

That the build-up of an adequately supported R & D component of the Indian DTIB to match the manufacture component and yield a self-reliant defence industry is a serious business of India's national security was lost sight of by the founding fathers. This points to a lack of awareness, which again is a reflection of the culture that was imbibed by the political leadership during their lifelong association with the mainstream of the Indian freedom movement.²³ Unfortunately for independent India, this absence of awareness in the leaders had permeated the entire structure of both the legislative and the executive branches and contributed also to the failure of the Indian political process to impart to the Indian legislators an awareness of the importance of the nation's defence preparedness. The cultivation of studied indifference towards defence, in general, and the Indian DTIB, in particular, by a majority of the members of the Indian parliament during the early years had, in fact, been constantly aided by the attitude of the

leaders of the dominant party, the Indian National Congress, which had ruled the nation for nearly four decades.²⁴ This and the government's reluctance to provide defence related information have rendered the defence consultative committee of the Indian parliament largely ineffective and discouraged members from taking interest in and making substantive contributions to parliamentary debates on defence issues including defence industrialisation.²⁵

Elsewhere the need to exercise legislative checks and balances to bring about a reasonable degree of transparency in decision-making by the government on defence matters is now universally recognised. Parliamentary conventions need to be developed in India, too, enabling members to seek and receive meaningful information on important issues of public interest and to influence decision-making by the government on such issues. In general, the defence consultative committee hearings and, even, parliamentary debates on defence are few and far between and lackluster events. This needs to be remedied by Indian legislators. Defence industrialisation and weapons development, particularly, receive a lot of attention in the senates and parliaments of the countries which have built excellence into their DTIBs.²⁶ Arguably, India's defence industrialisation will also benefit if Indian legislators take a leaf from the books of those nations.

Very little is known of India's past performance in the area of defence exports, but clearly Indian politicians of all hues have so far been hesitant in their resolve to make the defence industrialisation process economically viable by utilising opportunities for defence exports while catering to the nation's own requirements of weapons and equipment. Apparently India's MOD entertained discrete inquiries from friendly countries from time to time and occasionally went further at cultivating the market and undertaking exports, but there is no indication of India having entered the export market as a serious contender, nor has the value of her defence export earnings ever assumed any significance to the Indian economy.²⁷

While the fact that there have been half-hearted attempts by the Indian MOD at promoting defence exports is a sure sign that

a section of India's political leadership acknowledges the need for drawing sustenance for India's DTIB from defence exports, a conscious effort is yet to be made by India's political leadership and the moulders of public opinion at bringing about the necessary cultural change. Unless their perception of the ethical issues involved in the export of arms takes a turn, the attainment of economic viability and a reasonable degree of self reliance will continue to elude an otherwise capable Indian DTIB, even if the much-awaited organisational changes in higher defence management are finally brought about.²⁸

Notes

1. British generals (and equivalents) continued to fill appointments of the chiefs of India's Armed Forces and of a few principal staff officers for many years after Indian independence.
2. Indian members of the ICS (as indeed Indians elsewhere) were discriminated against during the British rule. They were happier and eager for power and positions in new India.
3. The Indian KCOs, unlike the senior Indian ICS, were away from Delhi, combating communal violence which had engulfed the subcontinent. Also, they were historically alienated from the political leaders. For alienation, see Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power : India and Its Armies*, 1996.
4. ICS officers had no opportunity to deal with defence during British rule, but the senior Indian KCOs had studied higher defence management and would have given correct advice.
5. Apparently the departing Viceroy (an Admiral) and C-in-C India did not put the Indian leaders wise as regards British MOD structure. Later the British chiefs of free India's Armed Forces could have given the same advice, but, with little concern for the future of India, they preferred the two-tier structure which enabled them to preside over their separate fiefdoms.
6. Most chiefs and other seniors of India's Armed Forces (and of DGOF), brought up in the culture of separation of the MOD and the built-in superiority of the IAS in the administrative system, get reconciled with the supervisory and policy-making roles of the IAS of the MOD and have no problem with the two-tier structure. Some, even, believe that it is the right thing.
7. Because of the lack of awareness that establishing indigenous weapon development capability was a priority area of governance, decisions to

import and manufacture weapons of foreign origin under licence were taken with the utmost ease for many decades.

8. NIDCs and IDCs (eg USA, UK, France etc) accorded the highest priority to indigenous weapon development capability and, unlike India, set up top level councils and committees chaired by political leaders for managing this affair. See *SIPRI Arms Procurement Decision Making Project Working Papers* nos. 5 (China), 27 (Israel), 37 (Japan) and 48 (S Korea), (SIPRI : Stockholm, 1996).
9. Although the three Chiefs of India's Army, Navy and Air Force rank higher in protocol than the Defence Secretary, their headquarters remain subordinate to the department of defence of MOD. The DGOF is the same in relation to MOD's department of defence production.
10. India has a Chiefs of Staff Committee and, also, liaison staff of one Service at another's operational headquarters to facilitate coordinated operations in the field. But this system is not adequate. Joint services operational commanders for each region, who report to the defence minister and prime minister through a joint chief of staff in the MOD do not exist.
11. See M D Nalapat, "Cost of Indecision : National Security at Stake," *Times of India*, 21 September 1998, p. 12.
12. Indian newspapers have often reported this, while covering meetings in New Delhi between Indian MOD representatives and visiting US DOD delegations.
13. Of the total value of defence production the share of indigenously developed equipment is yet small. When many other indigenous items are developed and manufactured the need for integration of development and manufacture management will be acutely felt. See Samir K Sen, 'Some Aspects of India's Defence Industrialisation : An Overview', *USI Journal*, April-June 1994, p. 156.
14. The SA controls the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) laboratories. See 'MPs Oppose Private Cash for Defence Research', *Financial Times* (London), 7 July 1998, p.11.
15. The restructured department of defence production and supply has to shed most of its bureaucrats and be manned by professionals from the DGOF and public and private sectors.
16. The merger of DRDL, a missile laboratory, with BDL, a public sector unit for missile production, was suggested in the early 1970s but opposed by some scientists and dropped.

17. For example, the PE of the UK's MOD (like the Direction Generale pour le Armement, the DGA of the French MOD) operates in tandem with the UK's DTIB and decides in each case whether to procure readymade equipment from manufacturers in Europe or the USA or to place development-cum-production orders on a British (or an European) manufacturer.
18. There have been many instances in India of wrong-doing by MOD bureaucrats and politicians, e.g., the Bofors gun case of 1983 where the Defence Secretary and others are suspects but await prosecution. Pinpointing responsibility seems to be posing a problem.
19. For example, a senior MOD civil servant presides over all deliberations on imports but has no knowledge of either the equipment or their essentiality.
20. In the absence of a mechanism to enforce long term planning and the development of equipment on time, neither the procurement officials (i.e., department of defence) nor defence production-cum-R & D can be held responsible for not ensuring timely actions.
21. Missiles and LCA development are some exceptions, but in each case the credit goes to the initiatives taken by the DRDO (and not the national security awareness of agencies responsible for formulation of long term plans and initiation of development of equipment.)
22. All IDCs and NIDCs ensured this early on by putting in place appropriate organisations and methods, but France (which has an ideal organisation, the DGA) is the pioneer and lauded by all. See 'Lesson in Restructuring Defence Industry : The French Experience', US Congress, OTA-BP-ISC-96, Washington, DC, June 1992.
23. Parallel to the mainstream led by Gandhi, India's freedom movement had seen armed struggle. During the Second World War Subhash Chandra Bose, a high profile national leader next to Gandhi, broke away from Gandhi, eluded the British and waged a war against the British by raising a national army outside India. Although he died of a plane crash, his legacy sealed the fate of British rule in India by rousing Indian people and triggering mutinies in British India's Armed Forces. Unlike Nehru, Bose was a keen student of defence affairs and fully aware of its importance in nation building.
24. Having uninterruptedly held parliamentary majority and ruled India, the Congress party had set a style of functioning which was partly feudalistic and partly patronising. While it encouraged its legislators to be active on issues of interest to its leaders, e.g., India's socio-economic development and non-alignment policy, it discouraged their taking interest in defence issues. It thus became unfashionable for legislators to develop expertise in defence.

25. The attitude of successive governments on sharing information on defence issues with India's parliament has discouraged legislators from influencing decision-making by the MOD on matters of public interest, e.g., import versus indigenous development, etc.
26. Compare the Indian record of parliamentary debates and consultative committee hearings on defence issues with the record of debates and committee hearings in senates and parliaments of the French, US, UK or other democracies on defence, including the DTIB.
27. One recent example of cultivation of defence export market by India was a report to the effect that MOD's department of defence production and supply published a catalogue of some items on sale. See 'Prithvi and Other Missiles Available for Export', *Times of India*, 14 January 1996, p.1.
28. In August 1998 the Indian defence minister, George Fernandes, was reported to have stated in response to a press correspondent's query at a missile test site that a study on the restructuring of the Indian MOD was contemplated. This is the first acknowledgment ever by a defence minister of India that a study of this kind is warranted and speaks volumes for the present defence minister's willingness to discharge his responsibility conscientiously.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by self-addressed and stamped envelope.

National Perspective on Information Warfare

PART I

COLONEL NARINDER SINGH

General

'Information Warfare' represents an evolving and, as yet, imprecisely defined field of growing interest for defence planners and policy makers. The source of both the interest and imprecision in this field is the so-called information revolution led by ongoing rapid revolutions in cyberspace, microcomputers and associated information technologies. Many nations are seeking to exploit the evolving global information infrastructure and associated technologies for strategic and military purposes. The end result and implications of these ongoing changes for international and other forms of conflict are highly uncertain.

Microprocessing technology has already resulted in the proliferation of communication and information devices, causing an unparalleled rise in cultural and political consciousness. In short, future actions by nations will unfold before global audiences. Information technologies will give nations the capability to conduct and dominate increasingly sophisticated information operations both at the strategic and tactical levels. This has resulted in analysis and discussions world over on 'Information Warfare'. Terminology aside, if current proponents are right, we are at the cusp of an epochal shift from industrial to an information-based society. History has demonstrated that technological changes are always accompanied by fundamental changes in the way diplomacy, international relations, domestic policy and wars are conducted. The rapid change in information storage, processing, dissemination and the way organisations take advantage of this increased availability of information, would thus have a profound impact on the manner in which conflict is managed.

Edited text of the Essay which won the Second Prize in Group A of the Gold Medal Competition, 1997.

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Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

Will India, with its vast talented scientific population, overcome potential vulnerabilities to gain and sustain tactical and strategic advantages that might be available in Information Warfare? Or will the changes in the management of the conflict spectrum (escalation, control and termination) by the ongoing information revolution be so profound that it would result in a new and grave threat to conventional methods, resulting in fundamental changes in the future character of the conflict? As it appears, future conflicts will never be the same. New sets of goals, principles, and strategy will have to be thought out, in order to capture changes in technology.

What is Information Warfare

The rapid growth of technologies to acquire and store information, and the promise of improved command and control have generated the idea of 'dominance in the field of information'. The ability to see, hear, and understand the enemy's command and control systems, intelligence sources and sensors better than the other way round, has produced a new discipline known as 'Information Warfare'.

In many circles within the broader international defence security communities and defence forces, however, the term 'Information Warfare' is increasingly being used to encompass a broader set of information age "Warfare" concepts. The United States Department of Defence definition as of March 1995 is remarkable for its lack of specificity :

"Information Warfare is action taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting an adversary's information and information systems, while leveraging and protecting our own information and information systems."

Mr Rowe Wayne, in his paper "Information Warfare: A Primer of Navy Personnel", has defined Information Warfare as :

"...actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversaries' information and information systems."

This term does not encompass military *intelligence* but *information* about a potential adversary whereas intelligence is meant to elicit knowledge. Information Warfare, thus, is designed to exploit *information* by defensive and offensive actions. Information Warfare, in fact, is a broad concept that integrates many elements of modern warfare including intelligence.

The United States Air Force has defined Information Warfare as :

"Any action to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy's information and its functions as well as protecting those actions and exploiting friendly information operations."

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have identified two discrete types of Information Warfare : 'Netwar' and 'Cyberwar'. They have defined 'Netwar' as : "...information related conflict at grand level between nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage or modify what target population knows or thinks about itself and the world around it." 'Cyberwar' "refers to conducting and preparing to conduct military operations according to information-related principles ... It means the balance of information and knowledge in one's favour."

In the case of information warfare, greater definitional rigour may be achieved by recognising that what is truly distinctive about the information age "is the emergence of new forms of organization". The functional hierarchy and centralised decision-making may be giving way to the 'shared global and situational awareness' of what might be termed the information technology network. In such an environment, information dominance becomes the area of contest for it means that advantage lies initially for negotiating and then the knowledge about location could prove decisive given the precision and destructive potential of modern weaponry.

Components of Information Warfare

Military technology is never static. For almost a decade,

defence planners had foreseen the impending revolution in military affairs, sometimes described as the military-technical revolution. Beginning in the 1980's, Soviet observers, led by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the then Chief of General Staff, advanced the notion of an imminent technical revolution that would give conventional weapons a level of effectiveness in the field comparable to that of a small tactical nuclear weapon. Armour may find itself detected and attacked by conventional self-guided anti-tank weapons and missiles from a distance. Both the Falklands and Middle East conflicts underscored the fact that electronics have become the keystone to a credible defence since anything that could be seen could be destroyed.

How right was Marshal Ogarkov. Today the world has entered a new era – the Information Age. Information Age societies connect through interlaced communications. Everything is designed with computer assistance or actually has an imbedded brain. Instead of mass production, we find customised production. These changes have affected governments and defence forces. We find smart bombs with focused lethality. Warfare would now rely on communications, access to space, real time decision loops, multispectral sensors, tightly woven command and control networks of combined arms. Although the Tofflers in their book *War and Anti War* have expounded the origins of this type of warfare, no one has as yet established its principles.

Information warfare contains all intelligence-based warfare techniques, viz., diplomacy, negotiations, organising allies, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, 'hacker warfare', economic warfare, and 'cyber warfare'. Of these economic, 'hacker', and 'cyber' can be considered as new, others being extensions of existing practices.

Information warfare also has a purely military subset, 'command and control'. This rests primarily upon the aspects of operations and security. None of these elements, however, represent a particularly new aspect of warfare : these have been exercised in one form or the other for decades. Recently, three principal models were put forward to explain the role of information

and information systems in the modern day world. The first is a model proposed by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. In their view, information technologies are creating a "Third Wave" of warfare (the other two being 'agricultural' and 'industrial'), whose distinguishing characteristics are the "brain force", proliferation of technologies, non-lethal weapons and knowledge-based warfare.

A similar approach is the 'Fourth Generation' model proposed by William S Lind and others. According to it, warfare in the modern era has progressed through three generations - tactics of massed manpower (Line and Columns of the Napoleonic era), tactics of fire and movement (massed fire power), and non-linear (deep battle) battle of manoeuvre. The Lind model suggests that either technology or ideas create generational shifts, and not economic forces as professed by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Elements of continuity are likely to carry over into the Fourth Generation, particularly the goal of defeating an enemy from within instead of through physical destruction. The most significant shift, however, occurred because 'Fourth Generation' warfare accentuated the non-linear of the 'Third Generation' - that is, the distinction between war and peace will be further obscured and conflict will be dispersed over an even larger battlespace. An ideology-based low intensity surrogate conflict - terrorism - is a possible alternative to technology-based Fourth Generation.

While accepting that the Fourth Generation has indeed arrived, Thomas X Hamme discounts the role of technology and ideas in bringing that about. Instead, he argues that it is driven by political, social and economic changes. In place of Lind's vision of low intensity, terrorist wars spawned by ideas, Hamme foresees a future of 'Net Wars' - societal level conflicts waged in part through inter-netted modes of communication. The 'Net War' would primarily take economic, political and social forms. The distinguishing features would be the specific targeting of information, as well as of communication systems utilised to acquire, analyse and disseminate in 'real time'.

Technological changes in this field offer a number of enhancements. Firstly, improved information integration and speedy


decision-making. Secondly, information is a force multiplier since it improves target acquisition and allows efficient allocation of resources. Thirdly, it provides real time information (or near real time) for more rapid and effective offensive and defensive actions. Lastly, information warfare techniques exploit 'information' on political, economic and social structures. Hence, 'Information Warfare' will encompass the entire gamut of human activity.

CENTRE OF GRAVITY

Clausewitz has formulated the concept of 'Centre of Gravity' in his book *On War*. The 'Centre of Gravity' is the hub of all power and movement against which all energies must be directed to defeat and destroy at the earliest. Hitting at the 'Centre of Gravity' at the earliest by the shortest route has been the principle on which all conflicts have been managed to date. The Centre of Gravity could be anything economic viz., oil for Japan, public opinion in the United States etc... However, in the linear disposition existing today, no point is decisive and there could be a series of points of battle before final victory is achieved. The advent of air power brought forth a classic case of impact of technology upon centres of gravity. The issue arose almost immediately in the form of debates on the paper selection of targets for the new weapon. Air power model perceives twin roles for aviation: to attack the centre of gravity directly or, if the centre is not vulnerable then strike critical targets in the periphery. In the latter case, these 'peripheral' targets would assume strategic and operational significance leading to some form of strategic paralysis or disruption of the will to fight.

Colonel John A Warden, US Air Force, first formulated the 'five ring theory' which was tested during the Gulf War. Specifically, it suggests that any nation can be seen as a system having five concentric circles - command, essential production, transportation networks, population and military forces. Any of these could be targeted in a non-linear battlefield.

FIVE RING THEORY



John Arquilla, writing on "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance" (*Strategic Review* 1994), explains victory in terms of "information dominance". Changes in information processing and targeting have now converged to enable the achievement of overreaching effects in the realm of conflict. Greater information connectivity now permits the exploitation of elements not directly attacked. Exploitation of information has always been a part of warfare. No doubt, it would improve chances of victory, yet victory would be achieved only by defeating his armed forces or by isolating and laying siege, thus creating economic hardships and internal upheaval. The United States opened a dialogue with North Korea, fully aware of the economic hardships of that country. In Information warfare, the 'Centre of Gravity' is influenced by information availability, information systems and technology. The value still lies in information's ability to focus and assist planning efforts. The application of the concept of Information Warfare depends on one's capabilities. First, it should be aimed at the enemy's principal strength; second, each enemy or his allies should have only one centre of gravity and third, much depends upon the characteristics of the war and the strategy adopted.

Hence, information is a means, not an end to be pursued in war. Information can be a strength if one can dominate it. Exploitation of information improves the chances of victory. Certain features of information warfare are different from those of conventional conflicts. These are :

Blurred Traditional Boundaries. Traditional distinctions - public versus private interests, war-like versus criminal behaviour, and geographic boundaries between nations as historically defined, have been broken by the growing interaction within the information infrastructure. It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between external and internal sources of Information Warfare. This complicates the traditional role-distinction between diplomacy, domestic law enforcement, national security and intelligence activities.

Perception. New information-based techniques may substantially increase the power of deception and of image-manipulation activities, dramatically complicating governmental efforts to build political support. Today, the adversary can directly communicate with the masses through television, radio broadcast, etc., thus undermining individual and governmental efforts to mobilise opinion for a particular course of action. Pakistan Television keeps up a steady campaign on Kashmir. India's dilemma over Pakistan's trans-border terrorist activities are not adequately projected. In any case, there is no television worth the name in the Kashmir valley. The manner in which the Kashmir issue has been handled both externally and internally highlights the basic deficiencies in our perception of the issue of information. Hence, the perception has to change towards the need to exploit information channels. Leaders would have to be more sensitive to the communication media and information flowing in them.

Strategic Intelligence. The primary function of intelligence is to provide warning and assessment of threats. Intelligence involves collection of information by all means including electronic. Sensors will give real time continuous surveillance in all types of weather over large geographical areas. Fusing and processing information, making sense of the vast amount of information that has been

gathered will give dominant battle space knowledge. Modern technologies provide the ability to gather, sort, process, transfer and display information about highly complex events covering greater geographic expanses in a very short time. In the information warfare era intelligence would need to be gathered of the nodes and links of communication channels and other means by which an adversary can communicate directly or indirectly (viz., students studying abroad) to isolate or undermine own efforts.

Tactical Warning and Assessment. There is no method existing today to provide warning or distinction between strategic information warfare attacks and other kinds of cyberspace activities, including espionage or accidents. A new set of techniques need to be developed to overcome loss of information, threat to soft power, or trade. Hence, all the activities need to be coordinated at the highest level to prevent conflict escalation, provide protection and take the offensive including talks with allies and adversaries to attain national objectives.

Difficulty of Building and Sustaining Coalitions. Nations are today operating in an ambiguous world, a contest that is not entirely benign and soothing. The Cold War provided a cooperative structure, linking the nations in mutually beneficial ways to a wide range of friends, allies and neutral nations. Nuclear umbrella was a central issue during the Cold War. Now the central issue is ambiguity about the types and degrees of threats. All nations want to know more about what is happening and why before they could decide upon a course of action with precision and accuracy. The core of these capabilities is the dominant situational knowledge. Nations can share this knowledge with whomsoever they choose. The recipient nation would be in a position to make better decisions. In the event of war, the nation possessing more and effective information is likely to achieve military dominance. The sharing of information thus could form the foundation of mutually beneficial relationships. The beginnings of such relationships already exist. The United States provided the bulk of accurate real time information on the existing situation in both the Falklands and the Gulf War. Nations with technological base and the money to harness new capabilities would either dominate or be the senior partners in any coalition. Reliance on support from friendly countries

is likely to increase vulnerabilities of the security postures of all the partners of strategic information warfare attacks, giving opponents a disproportionate strategic advantage.

Vulnerability of Targets. Information-based techniques render geographical boundaries obsolete. Potential battlefields are those areas where networked systems allow access viz., banking, trade, etc. The vulnerability of these systems is at present poorly understood.

NATIONAL INFORMATION CONCEPTS

Policy

Information warfare (both Net and Cyber warfare) lends to an analytical framework and strategic calculus dominated by offensive and defensive models. It encompasses Net War, 'Hacker War', diplomacy, economic and psychological warfare, with non-linear boundaries and with no clearly identifiable Centre of Gravity. Till date, our security set up and management have been grossly neglected areas. Our national leaders have little inkling or desire to study or discuss the security of the country. They have not paid adequate attention to the structure and process of security management at the highest level. Jawaharlal Nehru handed over security matters to Lord Mountbatten after India achieved independence during the Kashmir Crisis in 1947-48. Mrs. Indira Gandhi handed over 90,000 prisoners of war to Pakistan with nothing in return. India is unable to convince the world of the Indian viewpoint on the Kashmir issue. The termination of the Cold War has brought Asia into focus. Due to her independent views and policies, India is fast emerging as the new centre of gravity of international politics. Hence, India now needs to evolve a clear policy.

Information, more than ever, is strategic power. Advantage would favour India if it is able to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information. Information advantage can help deter or defeat traditional military threats at relatively low costs. In a world in which the meaning of containment, the nuclear umbrella, and conventional deterrence have changed, an information advantage

can strengthen the intellectual links between foreign, domestic and military power. A more subtle advantage would be with India if it is able to integrate complex information systems involving communication and information technologies, direct broadcasting and high-speed computers. The information edge is equally important as a force multiplier of Indian diplomacy, including 'Soft Power'. 'Soft Power' is the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through interaction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or get them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behaviour. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others. With information, India can make its power legitimate in the perception of others, and establish its say in international institutions that encourage others to channelise or limit their activities. It may not need to expend military resources. Nation-states in the international system communicate a great deal. Nations talk, negotiate, signal and make threats, commitments and promises. Communication increases cooperation and reduces defection in international relations in which commitments are non-binding. Nation-states often do not, or cannot, trust each other. In an era in which power increasingly influences international affairs along with threats and the accompanying image of arrogance and belligerence, availability of information would enable India to cut an image of reason and open dialogue. Negotiators may use promises or threats to refer to their coercive power, thus maintaining the conflict at a manageable level. Emerging information acquisition capabilities - particularly those that provide more of real-time understanding of occurrences in a larger geographical area, can help India to take the initiative. It will enable a better understanding of crises, offer far greater pre-crisis transparency and thus enable a better reaction. Information could thus be used to engage China, Pakistan and other powerful states in a security dialogue to prevent hostility. This advantage is also important in efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and deal with prominent post-Cold War dangers, including international crimes, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, damage to global environment and prevent a defeat as suffered at the United Nations for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council. The United States and the erstwhile USSR could negotiate

the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) primarily because each was aware of the exact strength of the other and the precise location of weapons systems. The Cuban Missile Crisis was defused, with the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union agreeing to withdraw their missiles from Turkey and Cuba, respectively, because both had accurate information which resulted in negotiations and not conflict.

Two conceptual problems prevent India from realising its potential. The first is India's outmoded thinking which prevents her from accepting information as power. Traditional measures of military force, viz., gross national product, population, size, energy, land and minerals have continued to dominate discussions of the balance of power. These power resources still matter, but they failed to anticipate the demise of the Soviet Union. In assessing power in the information age, the importance of technology, educational and institutional flexibility has risen, whereas that of geography, population and raw materials have fallen. Japan adapted to these changes through growth in the 1980's far better than pursuing territorial conquests in the 1930s.

The second conceptual problem has been a failure to grasp the nature of information. It is easy to trace and forecast the development of the capabilities to process and exchange information. In the information revolution for example, one can see a convergence of key technologies, such as digitization, computers, telephones, televisions, and precise global positioning. Information power is hard to categorise as it cuts across all power resources - economic, social, military and political. National policy thus should involve opening up of communication channels, and allow flow of information since lack of information breeds distrust and rumours which, in turn, breed disbelief and distrust. India should adopt a policy of acquisition, analysis and dissemination of information as its highest priority. India should not talk or negotiate in ambiguity. India could start with providing information on Kashmir to the world.

(To be concluded)

The Fauji Memsahib

MAJOR ALI AHMED

The Army officer is bigamous. He marries the Army on commission, and, later, marries for love, if lucky. Both wives, he finds, have a greedy claim on his time, attention and energy. The first wife - the Army - demands optimum performance, as contribution towards enhancing combat efficiency. The second wife - the lady - is relegated to a junior partnership, for she too is expected to contribute to enhance the officer's optimum, and, thereby, to higher combat efficiency. In effect the Army is the more demanding spouse, its demands being ministered to by the couple - one member paid and the other unpaid. This throws up another interpretation of this triangle, it being that the lady weds not only the officer, but also the Army. In effect, each of the three has a bigamous relationship with the other two, albeit one mediated by the officer. However, the Army is prone more to behaving as a mother-in-law, than a jealous co-spouse.

The problem arises when the officer emphasises one relationship at the cost of the other. Neglect of the Army by the officer erodes combat efficiency. Neglect of the wife also eventually detracts from combat efficiency by creating dissonance in his mind and friction in the house. Thus, the Army, whose primary purpose of maintaining a relationship with the officer is the generation of combat efficiency, has to admit, if grudgingly, the demands of the junior spouse. The Army must recognise that these are getting acute and are multiplying. In fact it must facilitate their articulation and accommodation.

The Army has thus far managed to keep the junior wife happy in her asymmetric relationship. The community life on that island in

The contribution of Dr Reena Sachdeva, w/o Maj Sachdeva of the GARH RIF, to this article, is gratefully acknowledged.

Major Ali Ahmed is from Maratha Light Infantry.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999.

society - the cantonment - has been self contained. It has been fulfilling for the wife, in so far as her expectations on joining the fauji extended family were met and socialisation into military mores complete. Thus, her role was to keep the hearth warm, while the officer's first wife remained central to his existence.

This cocoon of existence is under the threat of change. The Army, being the custodian of security of society, has to manage the change, so that it furthers its social purpose. A prerequisite to controlling change is to recognise and understand these trends, channelise and direct them. In short, in military parlance, to 'seize the initiative'.

These trends are 'threats', in so far as they are directed at the status quo. But reinforcing and reproducing the status quo is not a considered reaction. Their inevitability demands that the Army make an ally of 'change'. For its part in this triple alliance, it must change itself, thereby making change benign - both desired and for the better. Reacting to change, on the other hand, would leave the Army with fewer options, less control, and more unstable; while rendering 'change' unpredictable in its eventual consequence on combat effectiveness.

What then are these trends? They emanate, firstly, in the changing character of the military as a profession, and, secondly, in the changing social milieu - of which the Army is but a part.

The Army is moving from being an 'institution' to acquiring 'occupational' characteristics. There is now a shift to it being 'just another job'. But the possibility of a call for laying down one's life in the line of duty will always ensure that the Army is 'more than just a job'.

The increasing horizontal identification of the Army officer with his peers in society has occasioned this shift. The narrowing of skill differential between the civil and military - a result of specialisation; change of locus in organisational authority from authoritarian to persuasion; cross-fertilisation; and self-definition of the officer from a 'war leader' to a technocrat-manager, are indica-

tors of the shift. This change in the Army will, of necessity, impact on the family. For instance, the officer is now more inclined to identify with a briefcase carrying executive, and, in his winter dress, even sports a tie. The image of such executives is completed not by 'sati-savitri' wives, but by forward 'bhartiya naris' of the X-generation. Therefore, the officer-executive will likewise prospect for such a wife - the 'new' wife.

But the impact on the family of the on-going social change is more dramatic. Society, particularly the middle class, in which officer recruitment is anchored, is in the vortex of this change. The spouses, and prospective army brides, are subject to this trend. They cannot be expected to be 'junior' wives, deriving fulfillment from a dependent identity - that of an army 'wife'. Individuality now finds self-expression in work. Satisfaction is no longer in being a 'wife' alone, but also in a career - in being a 'whole woman'. Feminism, now at an ascendent, precludes a unilateral supportive role of a husband, and expects mutuality in need-fulfillment. It is moot therefore, whether the Army's 'cocoon-model' can be hospitable to the 'new' wife.

The status quoist would prefer exclusion of the 'new' wife. Spouse recruitment would be required to confine itself to an 'adaptable' spouse. This is evident from the increasing incidence of marriage of officers to working women whose job is transferable - officer's commitments assuming precedence. While working wives are an economic imperative, stereotyping of the wives' job (eg., teaching at lower grades) makes for a narrow social base of bride hunting; disproportion between income levels and aspiration within the couple; and, possible saturation of the job/spouse market. Thus, it is likely that, increasingly, officers will marry women with a higher paying, career oriented and, therefore, static job. The influence of media visuals on choice cannot be underestimated. The lissome lasses, that media-enticed young officers aspire to, are unlikely to wish to be carted, with the luggage, from one duty station to another. Being a 'wife' is now only a part of an identity. The future Army will, therefore, no longer be the dominant source of emotional sustenance; need gratification; value orientation and identification. In short, the Army will lose its pre-eminence in a post-modern conjugal bond.

This would be a 'threat', should it impact adversely on combat effectiveness of individuals and of the officer fraternity. In order to assess the need for change, a look at the status quo is in order. Does it contribute to combat efficiency on a modern-day battlefield?

The 'cocoon-model' was relevant in isolated, cantonmented, communities. Transplantation from one to another did not then cause dissonance, for while the geography changed, the environment did not. But the model is obsolescent. No longer can the cantonment, itself under pressure from civil intrusion, provide the ambience of yore. The environs, and consequent standard of living, were themselves a result of troop labour, hardly conscienable in an egalitarian society. The patrimonial, possibly feudal, and the increasing perception of a patronising officer-man, and by extension the wife – or family relationship – is no longer tenable. Corruption of the system (eg., abuse of the 'sahayak' facility and pakora-eating binges of memsahibs at welfare centres) has further eroded its legitimacy. Thus, the status quo is vulnerable to a bottom-up change. Since such a denouement is unacceptable, it is best that the inevitable be ushered in piecemeal. For this the Army must take to the reuder.

Ingredients of the alternative model would include a less demanding Army, in so far as the personal life of the officers is concerned. Only the professional input of the officer need be sought. Even this has to be regulated - especially for the upwardly mobile; as the long hours, to keep up with a workaholic boss, has a corresponding impact on family life. The boss may be fighting mid-life blues, and his subordinate, to assure career progression, but for both it is at the cost of marital harmony. Absentee fatherhood, in an era of nuclear families and working mothers, is an unremarked fall out of the escalator syndrome – it's 'up or out'. Cohesion at the work place, through family interaction (as through the 'calling-on' procedure or parties), is at times counter-productive. Broad-basing of officer and spouse recruitment has made these procedures archaic, if not problematic. Furthermore, if the 'new' wife is to demonstrate her commitment to the force, as of now, to what extent would the Army be permissive of a reciprocal commitment

by the officer husband in the social demands of his spouse's job? After all, in a modern marital adventure both partners are equal.

This reduction of institutional demands on the spouse would permit her personal pursuit of self-actualisation in demanding careers. Thus, would the family unit be happier, and, thereby, the officer's professional involvement enhanced. A fall out would be increase in output, owing to the officer's ego-based need to keep up with his wife! This contribution to growth of the officer is the foremost advantage the 'new' wife confers on the Army.

Contrast this with the housewife of yore. While the officer 'grew' as a person and a professional all through his career, the wife often stagnated. Though these days they hold down low paying, minimally satisfying jobs, their attention to the job at the cost of the home is compensated by Army input in family regulation, in terms of diversion of military resources to 'family warfare'. This is both rationally and ethically untenable. In a liberalised marketplace, a double-income lifestyle is facilitated by consumer durables designed for the same. Besides, these are now affordable, owing to a higher income level, adjusted for inflation, and, middle-class enticing brand pricing. Therefore, the cantonments must be redesigned as self-sustaining cooperatives - models of which exist in Indian suburbia.

To attract such co-spouses for its officers, the Army would need to package them attractively. Today they are at the bottom of the groom-market. Monetary compensation for leading 'separated family' existence is a must. Competitive pay scale is a self-evident necessity that has been addressed to a limited extent in the recent Pay Commission. The likely reduction in spouse participation in institutional life can be balanced by the equally necessary (for other equally compelling reasons) reduction in Army support of the family (eg., through provisions of 'sahayaks'). Thus, the Army would be relying more on society for anchoring families. This in itself would erode the 'institution', for out of olive green, the officer will be more at ease with, absorptive, and linked to civil society.

This deepening connection with society is in keeping with a democratic military ethic. Isolation by the British of military commu-

nities was then a political necessity. Today it may even be dangerous, should the isolation from the society, of the military, lead it to view the social and political marketplace with a typically conservative military lens. Thus, it is not combat effectiveness alone that is a determinant of a military's competence, but also its permeation with the democratic military ethic - the latter being enhanced by the social anchoring provided by the 'new' wife.

The Army, just as any organism, has to adapt to its environment. It does so more readily to technological advance, but is a generation behind societal change. Whereas this may have been a prudent and professional requirement earlier, in an era of telescoped change, the Army may end up as a social anachronism.

That it is aware of the direction it must venture in is evident from its pre-Pay Commission campaign, which included allusions to the officer placement at the bottom of the groom-ladder. Its leadership's present emphasis on proper troop employment is another pointer. Clearly, we have an Army sensitive to the symbolic importance of the impending turn of the millennium. However, in its drive to modernise hardware and update software, it would be prescient for it to reappraise, as done here, a facet of its humanware - the change from 'Mrs' to 'Ms'.

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I

SERVICE OFFICERS RESORTING TO CIVIL COURTS

In his excellent article 'A Matter of Honour' (Jan-Mar '99 issue), Vice Admiral Arun Prakash laments the existing trend of Service officers resorting to a court of law for their redressal in matters of supersession and transfers. He goes on to say that this amounts to washing the Service family's dirty linen in public and, in the process, demeaning themselves and their Service further.

He is correct. However, in the first place, the question to be asked is, why does a Service officer resort to a court of law at all? The pertinent question to be answered is, why is it only in our country that members of the Armed Forces rush to civil courts at the drop of a hat for redressal of their personal problems. In no other country that I know of, do Servicemen resort to civil judiciary for redressal of their personal problems - they take it in their stride. To cite an example from the US Army, when General Colin Powell superseded 25 officers for nomination to the National War College, 20 officers for the command of a Division, 15 for a Corps and 15 more, not only for the 4th Star, but also for being nominated as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, not a murmur was heard, even in small whispers, in the entire US Army. It was business as usual, and no eyebrows were raised.

It is felt that in our context this may be due to the essential nature of the Indian psyche, wherein any loss of face, which supersession and transfer involves, is a mortal blow to his prestige, status and social standing. It may also be due to a faulty selection system, or a manipulation of the same, or a crisis in our higher military hierarchy. However, the main cause appears to be the exaggerated emphasis upon careerism, connected to the transformation of the Army from a cohesive corporate structure, based on traditional military values, into a largely careerist business type one.

Brigadier N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)

II

In his article 'A Matter of Honour' Vice Admiral Arun Prakash, has, indeed, highlighted his anguish and concern about the deteriorating morality in the Services at large. The remedies suggested by him cannot go without a debate.

Such Codes of Conduct have been handed down from generation to generation, from father to son, from school to student and from society to citizen. Some adhere to it and some do not.

As it is, human psychology is complex, manipulative and at times intriguing. Therefore, for a Cadet to have an adolescent's nature could be nothing but a figment of one's imagination. In fact, he is, insulated, secluded and exposed (perhaps for the first time he has come out of his home, leaving his kith and kin) to an environment where there is ragging by the seniors, rebuke from the Sahebs and he is scoffed at by the Divisional Officer (Div O). Taking cue from the society around, and finding no rescue from hardships, he steadily adopts a rigid stance and his psychological frame- work starts responding in the same manner as any human being so placed in his circumstances, making matters difficult even for the so-called Psychoanalyst in the Directing Staff to fathom the depth of a Cadet's real feelings and hence the truth in the matter. As a Commandant, the author would know better.

The solution does not lie in just issuing a Code of Conduct, but probably in dealing with him with due Adaptability and Flexibility, which I am constrained to say is the least our Institutions offer. Ours is the only country that can afford the luxury of running an Institution, which grooms the future officer cadre at such an unbearable and probably undesirable cost. Is it really necessary to impart military training for four (3 + 1 in IMA) years to train an Officer? True it also imparts graduate level training as well, but there is no dearth of eligible graduates in the country. So when you, day in and day out, demand a strict regimen, you get such response; as after all the Cadet too needs his freedom at all costs. There is a definite requirement for a relook not only at the curriculum but at the role and requirement of a National Defence Academy.

Unfortunately, we are passing through times, when every rule, dictat, statute is seen as a kind of restriction, an impediment in the smooth functioning, and is twisted, moulded and interpreted for a favourable dispensation for self. Sychophancy, favoritism, nepotism, self aggrandisement, exemplary punishments (more discretionary) and

appeasement-like traits are manifesting far too often in our training grounds as well – instead of getting rid of them, we seem to be getting enslaved by them. The Cadet sees it, the 'Ustad' sees it and so does the Directing Staff, but no one stands up to it to stem the wrought. This unfolds the thorny long patch treaded by the Cadet of today – an officer of tomorrow – and hence the attendant problems.

In the recent times, no senior officer has resigned on being superseded and instead even accepted serving under one's junior. Isn't it proof enough that the Services are becoming more of a livelihood and NOT a profession of Honour any more.

The author has condemned the large number of officers taking recourse to Court to settle their grievances. It is a debatable issue. It is the Seniors who adopt double standards as for them precept is better than practice most of the times. There are examples of certain senior officers who have been able to occupy higher posts either by hiding their medical conditions, getting their summary punishments, awarded to them earlier in their career, set aside through departmental channels or Courts by justifying (nay, using their clout) their case. This clearly shows that our system is not foolproof - it is, in fact, subjective, prone to manipulation and personality oriented. If there was any chance of a public interest litigation type recourse in the Armed Forces, one cannot be too surprised to see courts flooded with them. The Central Administrative Tribunal type system, as suggested by the Author is going to be no better than the present Complaints Advisory Board (CAB), as the same type of people are going to occupy it.

Do we realise how often under one pretext or other (status, privilege, and so on) some of us cross the thin line dividing use and misuse, abuse, misappropriation, morality and immorality. Indeed, it is this thin line that has to act as a constraint for the so called conscientious Service officers.

At times, the system itself seeks favours which apparently are debatable. Take the case of Cadre Review – two Lt Gens in a Command HQ, an Army Commander's status for a Training Command – an Army Commander who does not command any Field Formations. Such matters of Honour do give enough scope for the malaise we wish to ameliorate, but How and When remain elusive.

Therefore the issue of 'A Matter of Honour' is becoming a non issue by and large. It is a matter of how to grab whatever I can, by whatever means I can, and to whatever consequences – I do not bother.

Colonel Mahesh Chadha

National Security - Inheritance and Objectives*

LT GEN A M VOHRA, PVSM (RETD)**

Jaswant Singh raises the question whether strategic decision making is the function and responsibility of a small political military class alone. He states that today's warfare involves an entire society but the formulation and execution of the national will rests with a small decision making apparatus. In this core of the executive, the attributes of an appropriate strategic sense and the ability to plan and execute are vital. Did Indian political and administrative class demonstrate this attribute? He is of the view: "What characterised Kautilya's Bharat was true of British India... India's strategic culture got internalised, remained fixated upon curbing within rather than combating the external." "The ethos of the Indian state was crippled by another great failing... an excessive and at times erstaz pacifism, both internal and external, has twisted India's strategic culture into all kinds of absurdities. Many influences have contributed to this : an accommodative and forgiving Hindu milieu... and, much later in the twentieth century - ahimsa or non violence". He concedes that despite this, "much else about warfare as an instrument of policy, about craft of war, about valour and heroism remained... The Vijayanagar Empire flowered in the South; Maratha confederacy checked Aurangazeb... The Sikh Empire planted its standards in Kabul; the Dogras later, went deep into Tibet... achievements (of) a highly developed sense of military craft; but of strategic culture, alas, they remained largely innocent".

Strategic Culture

It is interesting that a paper presented at an IDSA Seminar on 6 March 1999 carries out a comparative analysis of Sun Tzu and Kautilya, "the two profound strategists of the ancient orient". Much of this paper deals with the craft of war; relative strengths, terrain, battle formations and the like, strategic issues such as management of external relations and alliances are also included. Be that as it may, one major assertion by Jaswant Singh is that India lacks strategic culture and since independence Nehru's legacy has provided a continuity of negative attributes like veneration of received wisdom; an absence of iconoclastic questioning; a still continuing lack of institutional framework for policy formulation; lack of a sense of

* **Defending India.** By Jaswant Singh (New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd, 1999), pp 338, Rs.395.00 ISBN 0-333-93210-2.

** Lt. Gen A M Vohra is a former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXIX, No. 536, April-June, 1999

history and geography; an absence of sufficient commitment to territorial impregnability; and a tendency to remain static in yesterday's doctrines, even form".

One must leave it to the reader to assess the validity of these assertions. The author returns to these repeatedly; first - on page 106 when he refers to absence of strategic culture, lack of commitment to territory and so on becoming the ethos of the Ministry of Defence. Then on page 145 in the preamble to "Surveying the higher direction of conflicts in independent India", he writes that "a proper historical sense, a sense of geography, indeed even of territory afflicts India's strategic thinking". He observes that India met challenges of 32 military operations of consequence in the last 50 years (including inter state wars, internal military operations, UN peace-keeping or peace-enforcing as well as counter insurgency operations) without compromising routine democratic process not on account of any able captaincy but just resilience and survivability : "bumbled its way through".

Survey of Operations

The chapter on Independent India's military operations makes a number of pertinent observations in the strategic field such as -

- An absence in India's thinking of a proper concept of Central Asia and of the Himalayan bastion - a delusive sense of protection;
- The geographic territorial boundaries and the strategic frontiers of India do not match;
- Given the strategic unity of Europe or the Americas, South Asia too is geographically delineated and is a distinctly separate strategic unity.

Nevertheless, however strategically unsound the exclusion of Tibet, Afghanistan or Myanmar may be, independent Tibet as a buffer between India and emerging China could hardly be implemented as a policy imperative. Similarly the observation that "to pulverize the adversary's capacity to strike again" was not spelt out as a military task has to be seen objectively in the light of the capability of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1947-48 operations in Jammu and Kashmir. The official history - *Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48* records that by the end of June 1948, the deployment of two divisions of Pakistan Army, resistance increased, troops of (Indian) Sri Div had to withdraw under pressure and General Thimayya decided to consolidate on the Chakothi - Tithwal line. Regular forces were evenly matched, and the Western command plans to liberate Mirpur, Kothi

and Muzzarffarbad were not pursued due to paucity of troops. Any further reinforcements into Jammu and Kashmir would have been at the cost of denuding the Punjab border with Pakistan.

Unfortunately, official histories of the 1965 and subsequent operations have not been published. Therefore, the author's observations that because the Indian Army's drive across the Punjab border achieved strategic surprise and Lahore lay undefended; it could have won a significant military victory, can only be refuted without any documentary evidence. All the same, it is fairly well known that the achievable objective of the Indian forces in 1965 was to fight a battle of attrition on the Ichhogil Canal and achieve limited ingress in the Shekargarh-Sialkot sector.

The Future

Jaswant Singh has carried out a detailed study of the early evolution of the armed forces, its developments in the 20th Century as also of the ethos and organisation after independence. In doing so he has made sound observations on the establishment of the MOD (Ministry of Defence) and the inter relationship between it and the Service Headquarters as also the approach of the new ruling class. He notes that a system got devised under which every possible need of the armed forces had to go to the MOD. "The Defence Ministry, in effect becomes the principal destroyer of the cutting edge of the military morale".

His observations on the apportionment of defence funds between the Services and between various arms and capabilities are very pertinent. All this led to the expectation that in his last chapter, "The Future", he would suggest concrete steps in all spheres : institutional, organisational, force structure and other important issues. Sound as his general observations regarding the 1989 melt down, altered concept, and nature of warfare and nuclear reality are, one wonders why he has not specifically expressed his views on the organisation, role and functioning of the National Security Council (NSC), as also the form integration of Service Headquarters into the MOD should take. All that he has come out with is principles: "The future (surely the present) political leadership in India must address itself to institutionalising decision making". He adds, "The unworkable separation between Service HQ and the MOD had to be undone". Fortunately, in this case he goes on to stress that, "the three services have to be given the responsibility of handling affairs of their organisations."

A book that deserves to be widely read. It would have been a better book had the author kept the earlier chapters somewhat shorter and put more substance in the last one.

Total War in Ancient Greece*

S KALYANARAMAN**

Ever since it was first translated in 1550,¹ Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War has remained a great English classic. Steven Lattimore's translation is a part of the growing literature over the last quarter century, which attempts to explore and understand Thucydides. In order to convey to the modern reader the spirit of Thucydides 'the artist', Lattimore has faithfully reproduced the original. However, his decision not to unduly simplify Thucydides' complex phraseology in the process means that the reader has to plod her/his way along. Despite this difficulty, the book has to be read for it conveys the enduring motivations that induce states into alliances and wars. Lattimore enriches the work with explanatory notes that draw upon the wealth of knowledge that has been unearthed recently. A glossary, maps and an index of speeches, topped up by eleven pages of sources cited make the book complete.

Thucydides' is the only contemporary account of this war which tore the ancient Greek world apart—between democracy and oligarchy, and between Athens and Sparta, very much akin to what we witnessed during the Cold War - for twenty seven long years between 431 and 404 BCE (Before the Common Era). To understand this phenomenon, one has to go back by a few years. There was a history of conflict between these two superpowers of the Hellenic world. Between 461 and 445 BCE, they had fought an intermittent war which modern scholars call the First Peloponnesian War. The thirty-year peace settlement, which ended this war, divided the Greek world into two spheres of influence, with Athens controlling the Aegean and Sparta the mainland.² Athenians generally welcomed the terms of the settlement, which recognised their empire. But Sparta, till then the unquestioned power among the Hellenes, accepted it only with the greatest of reluctance. Aware of this, the Athenian leadership considered a future war inevitable.

Thucydides traces the immediate origins of the present war to the conflict between Corcyra (a non-aligned state,) and Corinth (Sparta's chief naval ally) over ownership of the city of Epidamnus in the Ionian Gulf.

***The Peloponnesian War.** By Thucydides, Steven Lattimore, trans. (Indianapolis : Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1998), pp. 508, ISBN 0-87220-394-8. Price not indicated.

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When both sides sought an alliance, Athens chose Corcyra due to geopolitical calculations. With the resumption of war against the Peloponnesians inevitable, any additions to that side's naval strength through a Corinthian victory would not make military sense; and neither would foregoing the option of adding to own strength through the incorporation of the Corcyrean Navy. Moreover, Corcyra was favourably located on the coastal route to Sicily, which was to be eventually brought under Athenian control. Naval support to Corcyra, combined with other seemingly aggressive Athenian actions against Potidaia and Megara, angered and frightened Sparta, which now heeded the growing calls from its allies to lead a war against Athens. Here, Thucydides concludes that the real reason behind this Spartan decision was "increasing Athenian greatness and the resulting fear among the Lacedaemonians [which] made going to war inevitable."

With the coming of war, Pericles recommended a strategy which was aimed not at defeating Spartans in battle, but convincing them of the futility of a long-drawn and fruitless war with Athens. He advocated that Athenians reject a land battle, abandon their fields and properties in the country and retreat beyond the famous 'long walls' and launch a series of punitive naval raids and sieges on cities along the Peloponnesian coast. He hoped that the absence of a direct confrontation would soon frustrate and psychologically exhaust the enemy. This was to be in response to the expected Spartan strategy of invading Attica and forcing the weaker Athenian land forces into a decisive battle. What it led to was a classic stalemate - the inevitable result of a conflict between an elephant and a whale, the one supreme on land and the other at sea. The only way out of this impasse was for one side to attain mastery in the other's element - either Athens mobilised its resources to field a powerful army or the Peloponnesians built up a strong navy. Archidamos, the Spartan king, had pointed out this much in his pre-war speech, when he advocated the building up of naval resources before taking on the Athenians. The Peloponnesians were to eventually do this towards the end of the war and emerge triumphant.

The Athenians, for their part, never seemed to have understood this fundamental lacuna in their strategy and attempted something far more limited - a diversionary attack designed to, in one master stroke, change the entire course of the war. In 426 BCE, General Demosthenes attempted a pincer movement against Boiotia - one arm going overland from the Gulf of Corinth through Aitolia against its rear, while the other attacked its East coast. The objective was to block the overland route used by the Peloponnesian Army in its invasion of Attica. However, a variety of mishaps threw the plan into disarray leading to a disastrous campaign. In yet

another scheme the following year, Demosthenes captured Pylos on the Peloponnesian coast. His plan was to build a permanent base there to assist raids on enemy territory and stir up a helot rebellion in Sparta. Spartan efforts to retake Pylos failed miserably and the surrender of some soldiers in the process dealt a stunning blow to their confidence and military prestige. To further stretch Spartan resources, Demosthenes reverted to a modified version of his earlier scheme to block the overland route to Attica. However, his attempts to establish control over Megara was foiled by the timely arrival of a Peloponnesian force under Brasidas, while a secret bid to replace the oligarchic government with a democracy in Boiotia became known and consequently failed.

To break out of the shackles imposed by Athens, Sparta too tried an outflanking manoeuvre. It despatched an army under the command of Brasidas to the Thracian region which was to instigate Athenian allies there to revolt. Brasidas' spectacular successes forced the overextended Athenians to the negotiating table and sign a fifty-year peace on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*. The main drawback of the settlement was the non-participation of major Spartan allies, including Corinth and Megara, who consequently worked towards pushing Sparta into resuming the war against Athens. Combined with domestic opposition to the settlement, both parties found it extremely difficult to fulfill the terms. Despite this, peace prevailed for seven years as neither party saw a chance for victory. The situation changed, however, when Athens became mired in Sicily, to gain control over which it had sent a large naval expedition. Sparta despatched one of its generals to co-ordinate Sicily's defence along with some ships from its allies. The major contribution, however, came from the Sicilians themselves under the leadership of Syracuse. The Athenian naval force was decisively defeated and the fleeing army mercilessly cut down. Now the decisive theatre of the war shifted to the Aegean, with Sparta finally putting together a strong naval force. Revolts by allies and the entry of the Persian Empire into the fray [to substitute Athenian control over Ionia and the Aegean with its own] on the Spartan side completely robbed Athens of any chance of victory. The war dragged on for another six years before the Athenian navy's final defeat at Aegospotami.

Thucydides' single greatest contribution to the study of international relations, i.e. of war and peace, is the distinction he drew between immediate and fundamental causes of wars. In the process, according to one scholar, he uncovered the fundamental idea that the uneven growth of power among states is the central dynamic driving international relations.³ In essence, what he has conveyed to us over the centuries is the enduring and unalterable nature of human motivations. A book of this nature is

bound to be a classic for all time and a source of education for scholars, soldiers and statesmen.

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2. Donald Kagan, "Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War", in Williamson Murray et al., *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge, 1994), p.30.
3. Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", in Robert I Rotberg and Theodore K Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 15.

ERRATA

In the Short Reviews section of the USI Journal, July-September 1998, on page 536 – review of the book 'Beyond Boundaries : A Report on the State of Non-Official Dialogues on Peace, Security & Co-operation in South Asia' has been published. Names of Paul M Evans and Gowher Rizvi should be added as authors.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Soldiers, Citizens & The Symbols of War : From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-167 BC. By Antonio Santosuosso (*Colorado : Westview Press, 1997*), pp.277, \$ 25.00, ISBN 0-8133-3277-X.

Exploring the depths of history of warfare to seek symbols of war which have promoted societal values of infinite influence is a challenging intellectual assignment. Taking this plunge is Antonio Santosuosso, Professor of History at University of Western Ontario, who attempts to relate weapons, tactics and organisations of nations at war with their politico-social values. The hypothesis is elucidated with three models from the ancient World: Greece versus Persia, Macedonia versus Persia and Rome versus Carthage. In the first model, hoplites representing an egalitarian Greek society, with philosophical linkages between war and religion and emphasis on citizens' responsibility towards the state, succeeded in defeating the more numerous Persian army, a polyglot of mercenaries motivated purely by the lucre of plunder. Santosuosso claims that the overall cohesiveness of Greek society with inbred values of freedom and democracy contributed to their success rather than purely military factors of terrain, logistics, speed, power and combined operations.

The Macedonian warlord's, (Alexander's) dominance of the Persians is said to have emanated from exploitation of mobility, combined arms and logistics, though no less due to servility of the Persian soldier, who excessively relied on the king to provide the lead on the battlefield. Ironically, vicariously imbibing elitism bred by the Persian regent, Alexander encouraged proskynesis or obeisance in his Army, which led to the downfall of his successors. In the better known rivalry of the old between Rome and Carthage, the larger pool of manpower, the will to survive successive defeats, sense of sacrifice and the perception of state as an extension of the family are identified as the roots of Roman mastery over Hannibal. The classic battles of the old: Marathon, Thermopylae, Issus, Gaugamela, Cannae and Zama are meticulously analysed to draw military and political lessons from the clash of the Titans: Darius, Xerxes, Alexander, Scipio and Hannibal.

While complex tactical, organisational and logistical factors contributed to success of the West, the author claims that underlying this was Western values of freedom, frugality, collectivity, god fearing attitude, honesty and trustworthiness. How far this hypothesis is holistically sustainable is open to question, for the code of values stated is universal rather than West specific, fostered by all socio-religious systems. It is innovation, adaptation and aggressive proselytisation of faith – all uniquely occidental traits – which have enabled dominance by the West of somnolent, assimilative cultures of the East. Greater correlation to contemporary military and political trends would have enhanced the value of this work for the layman. The military leader would however revel in this veritable feast of ancient warfare where battles are lucidly narrated and cogently analysed with cross references ranging from Herodotus to Fuller.

Colonel R K Bhonsle

The Sociology of the Military. Ed by Giuseppe Caforio (Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998), pp.667, £ 15.00, ISBN 1 85898 619 2.

Generally, military sociology is rarely read and quoted. Oblique references to military sociology have often been made by military historians, political scientists and strategists. The book, edited by paratrooper Colonel Giuseppe Caforio of the Italian Army has given a fresh impetus to one of the 'vitals' of any society on civil-military relationship. It was the 19th Century French sociologist, Alexis de Tocqueville, who could be called a pioneer in this field, followed by Frenchman Raymond Aron this century. Tocqueville's penetrating anticipations of the slow change from the noble to the burgeoise officer, bureaucratisation, careerism, social mobility and deterioration of the elitist aspect of officer corps are universally relevant even today. Two Americans developed two schools of Military Sociology, the first emphasising the separation of civil from the military, or objective control as propounded by Samuel P Huntington in his seminal *The Soldier and the State* (1957). The second school emphasised subjective control or the convergence of civil and military as in Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* (1960). In recent times, Charles Moskas propounded the dichotomous Institutional / Occupational (I/O) trends in the armed forces. Keeping these authors and classics besides others as the background, a set of 37 essays covering the period from 1920's till 1997, have been compiled in this seminal volume. Part I gives the antecedents, Part II the American schools mentioned above and Part III has comparative models, the military profession, armed forces and society, and the new mission of the armed forces. Civil-military relationships and their trends in a 'warless' society have been covered with statistical data of important European countries. These findings, together with the perceived and desired image of the officer class are relevant in our context also, more so when one hears that "the right material is not joining the profession of arms"!

This is one good compendium of military sociology, though sadly lacking inputs from Asian countries. This book would be very useful for the committee members of the next pay commission, besides those interested in a psychological and militaristic analysis of the vast subject of military sociology—from the human to the economic and market trends.

Colonel P K Gautam

The Race to the Intelligent State : Charting the Global Information Economy into the 21st Century. By Michael Connors (Oxford : Capstone Publishing Ltd., 1997), pp.242, \$ 18.99, ISBN 1-900961-06-7

The technological apogee of the information age, it is predicted, will be achieved by 2005. How would this revolution, which hyperlinks men across the globe, transgressing barriers of race, religion and creed, affect humanity – socially, culturally and politically – is however ambiguous. Michael Connors, a practicing corporate leader and a former security analyst, attempts to clear this haze. Some of Connors' prophecies made in 1993 have been vindicated by the time of publication of the second edition in 1997. The central theme of the book is to denote the challenge posed by potential information tigers as India, Thailand and Israel, to developed countries and the need

to establish new look policies and structures, to extract maximum benefit from Information Technology (IT) to realise this potential.

To support the hypothesis, the author goes to the very roots of information relatedness in human consciousness, examining how man abstracts information from observation and raw data and establishes the relationship between information and power and information and socio-economic progress. Going on to briefly cover the basic technologies that fuel the information revolution, the author articulates the manner in which these will contribute to a new way of thinking in individuals. From impact on individuals to influence on nations, two variant models of developed and developing nations – the USA and Japan and Thailand and India – are covered in detail. His prognostication on growth of informational connectivity through urban pockets in India, against a greater even spread in more developed countries as Thailand is, however, validated with the growth of centres of information excellence as Hyderabad, Chennai, Bangalore and Pune.

Evolution of homogenous cultures contributing to holistic socio-cultural emancipation of mankind as a result of IT and higher level of decision making through expert systems and man-machine intelligence are the author's predictions for the information age beyond 2005. While the technological dimension of IT has been assimilated in theory and structures, the impact of the same on socio-cultural patterns have been clearly enunciated by Connors through lucid models supported by comprehensive data, which makes this book a must read for the information age leaders of tomorrow.

The info-structure index developed by the author, however, reflects an index of development rather than information. Information flow intangibles as freedom of speech, societal propensities for information proliferation and cultural assimilation, and the large base of educated populace despite lower overall literacy percentage as in India need to be factored in to evolve a realistic index of information connectivity. For if these factors bring with it an increment in technology, the information age could propel countries as India towards greater economic prosperity and social cohesion much faster than what is envisaged by Connors.

Colonel R K Bhonsle

Strategic Coercion : Concepts and Cases. Ed by Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.400, ISBN 0-19-829349-6. (Price not indicated)

Arm twisting and coercion, in one form or the other, including threats and economic sanctions have been practised by countries to alter the strategic options of other countries. Strategic coercion has been defined as deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another country's strategic choices.

For a long time, analysis of strategic coercion has been influenced by two outstanding books on the subject - *Arms and Influence* by Tom Schelling and *Strategic Diplomacy* by Alex George, both relevant to requirements of American foreign policy during the cold war. Freedman disagrees with the conclusions of these two books and argues for a fresh look on the role of strategic coercion. He emphasises the importance

of learning from the experiences of other countries and from the new circumstances of post cold war era. A team of scholars headed by Freedman, have provided case studies of most of the regions which are victims of coercion. The case study of South Asia by Syed Ali is of special interest to us. Many of the observations are controversial and one may not agree with them, especially on Kashmir in late 1940s, Tibet in 1950 and Sri Lanka in 1980s.

This book will be a useful addition to any library.

Major General Ram Nath

India's Defence Budget and Expenditure Management : In a Wider Context.

By Amiya Kumar Ghosh (New Delhi : Lancer Publishers, 1996), pp.403, Rs. 695.00, ISBN 1 897829 26 4.

The book on a subject that has been, unfortunately, one of the holy cows in India, is indeed timely and sheds light on a subject of immense topical interest to any thinking individual in the country. The fact that now there is more than just talk on the restructuring of the Indian defence decision making apparatus, makes this book even more compelling. Mr Ghosh is eminently suited for this task. An officer of the Indian Defence Accounts Service, he has had a long tenure in the Ministry of Defence and retired as its Financial Advisor. There is, therefore, no doubt on his competence and knowledge about the complex issues involved in the management of defence finance. Unfortunately that also makes him more culpable.

What comes out strikingly on reading the book is an endless tale of failed opportunities and an incredibly blinkered attitude towards critically needed reforms in the budgeting and expenditure management process. India is nowhere as well endowed as the developed countries, but faces some extraordinarily complex national security problems coupled with severe financial strain. Its response has been one lacking strategic logic, long term planning and characterised by ad hoc decision making.

There were half hearted attempts at reforms following the work of the Administrative Reforms Committee in India. Deficiencies in the expenditure management system were pointed out repeatedly. The absence of an effective linkage between financial outlays and fiscal targets, the inadequacies of outdated budgeting systems as management tools, and recommendations for the introduction of performance budgeting systems were highlighted. But, as Mr Ghosh states, the impetus had petered out by 1972, so that the process of budget formulation has virtually remained unchanged with financial horizons limited to the following year only. The old expenditure heads and sub heads continue to reflect objects of expenditure not programmes or schemes. The whole process caters for greater and greater financial control over expenditure rather than meaningful financial advice. This ensures supremacy of civilian control over the Services ! How much this much misunderstood principle has cost the nation !

The book contains very useful information for anyone interested in knowing the

basics of defence budgeting and its relation with the national economy – brought out in sufficient, if at times, repetitive detail. There are also separate chapters on the budgets of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force as well as the Ordnance factories – all sufficiently detailed for the layman and expert alike. It is a welcome addition to the growing serious military writing in the country.

Brigadier J S Oberoi

Rogue Regimes : Terrorism and Proliferation. By Raymond Tanter (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp.331, \$ 29.95, ISBN 0-312-17300-8.

This book offers a treatise on certain world leaders whom the US administration considers to be unfriendly and, therefore, "rogues" as far as the American interests are concerned. The author goes through the chronology of those events that identified these rulers as members of the American "Rogue's Gallery". The author has gone through the events that changed American perception with the change in the political situation, particularly the collapse of communism. He has also given an insight into American thinking, which seems to have been totally influenced by the various Middle East wars and their impact on the stability and continuance of Israel. In this, the American approach towards the governments and the concerned rulers seems to have been guided by the "Jewish lobby" back home.

There is an overview of various 'Presidential Doctrines' on the subject and criteria for considering a regime as "rogue". This enlightens the reader as to why the US government always finds it necessary to interfere in the affairs of others. It is also evident from the book that neither multinationals nor certain members of NATO support the American government's perceptions and its guidelines. Hence 'sanctions' and embargoes have not affected these regimes to an extent where they could have been forced to toe the American line. Another reason for this failure could be the divergent views within the American establishment itself. The author raises a very relevant point as to how can Washington justify sanctions on Cuba to America's European allies when international communism is dead? As a superpower, the United States has a strategic interest in making sure that it remains unchallenged. Rulers (particularly from the third world) who show signs of independent thinking and place their country's interests ahead of the American demands are "rogues".

That about sums up this very educative and insightful book which should be of interest to serious students of "national policy making" and to those 'lay' readers who have always wondered why the Americans get involved in other's affairs with a regularity that often defies logic.

Brigadier P Sarin

The Evolution of the Artillery in India : From the Battle of Plassey (1757) to the Revolt of 1857. By Brig RC Butalia (New Delhi : Allied Publishers Ltd., 1998), pp.388, Rs. 350.00 ISBN 81-7023-872-2.

Unfortunately this well researched book could not be published in the Author's

life-time. He left it as a manuscript that was published by his wife and family. It is a pity that this excellent history of the Artillery in India covers only the period from 1757 – the Battle of Plassey – to the Revolt of 1857. The author had planned a second volume to bring the evolution of the Indian Artillery right upto modern times. That he did not live to complete this work is a loss to the students of military history.

In his book, Brigadier Butalia not only traces the development of the gun and the organisation and tactics of artillery in India but he also very forcefully brings out how its neglect cost the Indian rulers their independence. The artillery gave the British their victories in their battles in India – from Plassey till the Battle of Goojrat in 1849. India had been using guns long before the arrival of the British. Babar won his victory in 1526 at the Battle of Panipat due to the use of his artillery. Yet the Indian rulers never got to appreciate the importance of this weapon nor did they get to master the technicalities of its use in war. The author explains in some detail the reasons for this deficiency. The British on the other hand not only mastered the technicalities and tactics for the proper use of artillery, they also gave tremendous importance to having these weapons properly manned. The truth is that the British wrested control purely by military means rather than their proclivity for deceit, intrigue and ability to buy over Indian commanders, and in this their correct use of artillery in battle undoubtedly played a major part.

In his preface to this book General SF Rodrigues mentions the dearth of artillery historians. Brigadier Butalia's well researched book certainly makes up for this deficiency of especially covering a vital period in our history. It is for others now to take up the good work from where the author has unfortunately left off.

Major General SC Sinha

The King's Army : Warfare, Soldiers, and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562-1576. *By James B. Wood (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.349, £ 45.00, ISBN 0-521-55003-3.*

Over one million people died in the religious strife that raged in France between the King's Catholic Army and the Protestant Huguenots during the period 1560-1580. Amongst the dead were 20,000 Catholic clergy and 30,000 nobles. France was embroiled in five civil wars but the King's Army could not defeat the Huguenots. This book analyses the operations of the Royal Army and explains the reasons for the initial failure of the monarchy. The main reason was the fusion of religious rebellion and incompetent military revolutions. This book has in fact reinforced the oft-repeated cause of war – religion.

An engrossing book.

Lieutenant Colonel Daljit Singh

The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Volume 1 : The Colonial Era. *Ed by Stanley L Engerman and Robert E Gallman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.481, £ 55.00, ISBN 0-521-39442-2.*

This volume surveys the economic history of British North America including

Canada and the Caribbean, and of the United States, from early settlement of the Europeans to the end of the Eighteenth Century. The original American Indians had three economic themes: Indian community represented a collection of kin groups rather than of individual citizens and the norms, roles, and obligations underscored economic, social and political life. Secondly, economic life consisted largely of activities relating to subsistence and to the exchange of gifts. Thirdly, religious beliefs and rituals generally underscored these economic activities. Europeans not only brought in economic changes but also small pox and other epidemic disorders. Maps are a very useful additive to the study of this book.

A very interesting read.

Lieutenant Colonel Daljit Singh

Documents of the Emerging Nation : US Foreign Relations 1775-1789. *Ed by Mary A Giunta (Wilington : A Scholarly Resources Inc., 1998), pp.311, £19.95, ISBN 0-8420-2664-9.*

The editors have gone through the diplomatic despatches, private letters and other documents from the archives, libraries, British and French sources and compiled documents that bring out the fundamental relationship between American nationalisation and foreign relations. The book describes in detail the efforts of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson and many others to establish the United States of America as a new nation. One of the aspects of immense interest is the finesse, politeness and immense professionalism inherent in the diplomatic despatches and letters brought to the notice of the readers. Complete information about the treaties and conventions and definition of some technical words and phrases, given at the end of the book, are educative. Of particular interest are the details of the first voyage of an American merchant vessel *The Empress of China* contained in Chapter VIII, which provides food for thought to the owners and ship masters. This voyage opened the trade between USA and China.

A good reference book for the research scholars engaged in the study of American foreign relations.

Commodore R.P. Khanna

A New Alliance for the Next Century : The Future of US - Korean Security Cooperation. *By Jonathan D Pollack and Young Koo Cha (Santa Monica : Rand, 1995), pp.75, ISBN 0-8330-2350-0. (Price not indicated)*

This is yet another research project undertaken by Rand of the USA jointly with the Korea Institute of Defence Analyses in which 12 scholars have carried out an assessment whether and how the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) can maintain and invigorate their security relationship should North Korea no longer pose a major threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The report analyses the need for institutional and alternative security arrangements which will be of mutual advantage both to the US and ROK. The team believes that ROK must continue its alliance with the USA even if unification of the two Koreas does take place. The other

factors considered are: China's advancement and Russia's problematic transition to a market oriented economy. As far as Japan is concerned, although the study supports long term alliance with Japan, some voices are calling for a shift towards an Asia based foreign policy.

A well researched informative book with updated facts and figures, and graphs. Of much interest to the research scholars and politicians who could learn a few lessons regarding security and alliance between countries.

Commodore R P Khanna

Trade and Gun Boats : The United States and Brazil in the Age of Empire. By Steven C Topik (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1996), pp.301, \$ 37.50, ISBN 0-8047-2602-7.

A hundred years ago, Brazil ended 67 years of monarchical regime and struggled to define its relationship with world economy. This was also the time when the USA first started to project its influence on the international scene. When the interests of these two unequal economic giants collided, their interaction revealed much about the international economic and political affairs of that time, which has a bearing on debates concerning today's new world order. This book begins by examining the first commercial pact between the USA and Brazil in 1891 (The Blaine - Mendonca Accord), which started a special relationship between the two countries that lasted upto the Seventies. It also analyses the internal dynamics, political and economic, of both countries and the international regime in existence at that time. The private agenda of American businessmen who worked for good relations between the two countries, for their own narrow economic interests, is well written.

An interesting study of historical events, which once again highlights how state policies are dictated by matters economic.

Major General Ram Nath

Beyond Beijing : Liberalization and the Regions in China. By Dali L Yang (London : Routledge, 1997), pp.199, £ 50.00, ISBN 0-415-14501-5.

Chinese economic growth since liberalisation has indeed been spectacular with her GDP almost doubling every six to eight years. The regional impact of this development, however, has witnessed a radical shift from the Maoist dictum of giving preference to the interior, which was traditionally underdeveloped over the more prosperous coastal region – so as to have a balanced and even economic development in the entire country.

The classical economic tenet that "development spatially not only tends to concentrate under some sub group while backwardness retains its hold elsewhere", has its expressions in China as well. Deng's common prosperity thesis that regional competitive advantage would enable growth along the coastal region to diffuse into the rest of the country has indeed raised nagging questions about the trickle - down effect.

The reforms have undoubtedly benefited most people in most provinces, but the absolute gaps between the rich and less developed regions have widened rapidly since 1989-90. The Chinese hierarchy has been conscious of this disparity and Li Peng attempted to redress this imbalance. But these assertions, according to the author, were "better at enunciating policies than providing tools for implementation". The disparate development has also created problems of absorption of workers by rural enterprises; and of the present surplus of almost 200 million, 6 per cent comprise those in the interior regions. This is seen as a factor that could affect political stability.

The author's contention is that there is no economic explanation as to why a large geographical size should lead to increase in regional disparities. A process of economic diffusion through governmental intervention can promote economic mobilisation into less developed areas but to achieve this the Chinese people will need political empowerment – somewhat different to what they have today.

An extremely revealing book, replete with statistics, which could be of immense value to scholars of social sciences and developmental studies.

Air Marshal K D Chadha

Hornets Over Kuwait. By Jay A Stout (Annapolis MD. : Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp.244, \$ 28.95, ISBN 1-55750-835-6.

This is not a story about heroic deeds in the face of daunting odds. There was hardly any need because the Iraqis, though having the means and the wherewithal, did not display the will for any serious fight. Instead this is only a record of a serving Marine Corps Aviator - Major Jay A Stout's experiences in the 'Desert Storm/Shield'. Stout was the S-4, the Logistics Officer that is. His experiences have been recounted without any embellishments, except perhaps the earthy humour.

The book describes in detail what flying the Warlords of VMFA (Fixed-wing Marine Fighter Attack) of F/A-18s (Hornets), was like in the Gulf War. It was the 'Taste of Fear'. Also the fear of flying in the dark despite the state-of-the-art avionics. Stout disapproves of night-flying. Elsewhere in the narrative, he is also critical of the performance of women in the US Forces in the Gulf. He does not think much of the Harrier either. He is critical of much of what he saw, at the same time appreciative of the overwhelming success of the US Forces, and very proud of the performance of the Hornet pilots who flew over a thousand strike missions out of Sheikh Isa including the onslaught on the "Highway of Death" and those over Kuwait and Southern Iraq. To that extent, it is a deep insight into combat flying in a hi-tech environment.

An enjoyable and fascinating book for those in uniform, in particular, and those keen on reading more on the Gulf War.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma

The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet. By Norman Polmar (Maryland : United States Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp.580, \$ 79.95, ISBN 1-55750-686-8.

Norman Polmar, an internationally respected analyst and consultant in strategic

and naval issues has brought out the sixteenth edition on the ships and aircraft of the US fleet.

The author has given a comprehensive picture of the state of the US Navy, Defence and Navy departments, Fleet Organisation along with details of military sea-lift command, naval personnel, the naval reserve, the Coast Guard and the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration. The author is to be congratulated for putting together excellent photographs too. Each chapter on different types of ships includes information on the builders, design, and the modernisation and replacement programmes. Of much interest are the details of nuclear powered ships.

On the state of the Navy, the author has opined that the naval forces are well suited for coalition operations, a hallmark of future US military operations. Navies easily carry out joint exercises, practicing 'interoperability' with minimal political impact. The author has also dealt with the US Navy's numerous personnel problems; main ones being sexual harassment, cheating and drug scandals. The chapter on weapon systems and electrical systems has a wealth of information on the latest equipment being introduced for fitting on the ships.

An excellent reference book of much interest to all naval officers, in particular the planning staff, the designers, the weapon evaluating officers and the research scholars.

A must for all libraries, ashore and afloat.

Commodore R. P. Khanna

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Volume 21 : 1996. (New York : UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs, 1997), pp.367, ISBN 92-1-42222-1. (Price not indicated)

The United Nations Center for Disarmament Affairs publishes developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament and arms regulations every year. The present volume covers its activities in 1996, during which time the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a benchmark in nuclear disarmament, was successfully negotiated. The CTBT thus opens the summations followed by measures for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. Entry Into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the second major disarmament milestone of 1996. Ironically, both USA and Russia continue to be defaulters in ratifying the CWC. The effectiveness of the Register of Conventional Arms, for conventional arms control and catalysing regional and international co-operation, is highlighted.

The report also summarises other activities carried out in the field of science and technology and development, reviews functioning of institutions, disarmament programmes, information and training. A number of appendices factualise the principal declarations, texts of resolutions and voting patterns to provide a comprehensive source of information to the discerning reader and research scholar alike.

A survey of the data provided in this year book against the backdrop of current

events would denote that the United Nations acts as a catalyst for disarmament in many ways. The UN provides a common ground for all powers to congregate, it formulates resolutions and treaties, it coerces nations through peer pressure to abide by conventions, documents principal achievements and monitors disarmament through bodies as the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). While the function of legislation is progressing satisfactorily, that of monitoring and supervising remains mired in controversy due to lack of transparency, divergent aims of protagonists, perpetual inequity and political sagacity on one part and technical teeth to ferret out information on the other. Therefore, defiance rather than compliance as seen in the US - Iraq imbroglio is the order of the day. Evolving concepts to resolve these dichotomies is the greatest challenge faced by UN Center for Disarmament Affairs towards which it should squarely face in addition to producing summarised accounts of its yearly achievements.

Colonel R K Bhonsle

Verification 1997 : The Vertic Yearbook. Ed by Richard Guthrie (Colorado : Westview Press, 1997), pp.342, \$ 45.00, ISBN 0-8133-9987-4.

In the post-Cold War era, there has been a growing number of new treaties and strengthening of the provisions of older treaties in the fields of arms control, disarmament and environment. The success of such treaties is the extent of its membership and how universally its provisions can be applied to all states.

In the field of arms control and disarmament there are four treaties, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ((BTWC) and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Of the 194 states, only 23 per cent are party to all four treaties. Another example of lack of universal application is that of CWC, which has been signed by only 49 states. The benefits of universality are obvious. There are linkages with verification of provisions of the treaties, if universal application is to be achieved in the future.

In 1986, VERTIC was established as a non profit organisation of scientists to provide reliable information on verification, a process which establishes beyond doubt whether all parties are complying with their obligations under an agreement. The first VERTIC year book was published in 1991. This volume of 1997 consists of two parts: the first part contains twelve original essays, analysing the arms control, peace-keeping and environmental issues. The second-half contains collections of twenty one primary documents pertaining to treaties and agreements; from the Cairo Declaration to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

For historians and students of arms control and disarmament, this volume is a good reference book.

Major General Ram Nath

The New UN Peacekeeping : Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War. By Steven R Ratner (New York : St Martin's Press, 1996), pp.322, \$18.95, ISBN 0-312-16448-3.

Peace-keeping, post-Cold War, has become a means to implement agreed

upon political solutions to conflicts between antagonists. In this study, Steven R Ratner offers a comprehensive framework for scholars and policy makers and it is by far the best in-depth study available on UN peace-keeping. The author perceives the UN as an administrator, mediator and guarantor of political settlements. He reveals many striking precedents long before the 1990s, in an historical review beginning with the League of Nations. The United Nations is trying to grapple with situations not foreseen by its founders. Ratner's study combines an analytical dissection of the UN Cambodian experiment and a bold prescription for dealing with likely future interstate conflicts.

Brigadier R P S Malhan

A Policymaker's Guide to Accrual Funding of Military Retirement. *By William M Hix and William W Taylor (Santa Monica : Rand, 1997), pp.67, ISBN 0-8330-2464-7. (Price not indicated)*

The book is a condensed version of the report produced by Rand Corporation, on the request of Department of the US Army, for educating the Congressmen. In simple language, in 70 pages, it covers all aspects of earlier and present policies on pension fundings, as part of the Department of Defense and the US Army. Till 1984, the pension budget of the Army as well as other Services was included in the overall budget of US's Department of Defense, pensions being given on a pay-as-you-go method. Thus, the Treasury, the Department of Defense and the Services had no incentive or control in saving manpower or using the funds saved from this head. From 1985 onwards, each of the Services has been given an Accrual Fund for anticipated pensions on the expected strength of the Force, with the incentive that any money saved by reducing manpower can be used by the Services for their modernisation or welfare projects.

The book is laid out in two parts : a summary for those interested in a bird's eye view and a detailed analysis for those undertaking research. As a similar policy is being advocated in our Armed Forces also, those dealing with finance and budget planning could read this book.

Lieutenant General Y M Bammi

Across Boundaries : The Journey of a South African Woman Leader. *By Mamphela Ramphele (New York : The Feminist Press, 1997), pp.244, \$ 19.95, ISBN 1-55861-165-7.*

From humble beginnings, in a poverty and tradition-bound subservient Black society of South Transvaal - in the stranglehold of apartheid during studenthood - to the status of becoming a leading educationist heading the University of Cape Town, the author's life story reads like a classic. Making her own decisions, she opted for a doctorate in medicine against teaching or nursing professions - the traditional outlets for educated Black women. She was also an activist in the Black resurgence movement.

Through her autobiography - *Across Boundaries* - one gets an interesting insight

into the ferment within the Black African society through the 1960s, till the end of White domination culminating in the birth of the new South African Republic. Essentially, it is the story of a keen, dedicated and non-conformist intellect, and a fighter against social injustice, who has ultimately made her place in the literary world.

The autobiography makes a very useful contribution to the socio-political history of South Africa.

Major General S K Talwar

The Road to Number 10 : From Bonar Law to Tony Blair. *By Alan Watkins*
(London : Gerald Duckworth, 1998), pp.314, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-7156-2815-1.

Alan Watkins, in his book, presents a run-up of each incumbent to the top executive post as well as to their status within their political party. He has narrated, at great length, the intense politicking, controversies, dialogues, discussions, preferences or prejudices amongst their contemporaries. However the proliferation of names and comments makes the narrative heavy reading for the reader.

The essential theme of the book is an account of the political process of three party democracy in Britain, its conventional face in the 1960s and its subtle transformation since 1963. The formulation of electoral colleges by 1984 are discussed separately – for the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. The author has also highlighted the consequent diminution of the customary prerogative exercised by the British Sovereign (vis-a-vis choice of the Prime Minister).

The crucial matter of dissolution of the Parliament by the King or the occasion for a Prime Minister to recommend the same, discussed in Chapter 8, throws up some very poignant issues for consideration. The author herein quotes Sir Winston Churchill "... a new House of Commons has a right to live if it can and should not be destroyed, until some firm issue or situation has arisen to place before the electors."

The book offers an interesting and thought-provoking treatise on the British democratic process.

Major General S K Talwar

Additions to the USI Library for the quarter-ending June 1999

(The books reviewed in January - March 1999 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list.)

| S.No. | Author's Name | Title | Year |
|------------------------------|------------------|--|------|
| Afghanistan | | | |
| 1. | Bakshi, GD (Col) | Afghanistan : The First Faultline War, 1999 New Delhi : Lancer Publishers, pp.194, Rs.395.00 ISBN 1 897829 49 3 | |
| Bhutan | | | |
| 2. | Sinha, AC | Bhutan : Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma, New Delhi : Reliance Publishing House, pp.266, Rs.325.00 ISBN 81-7510-059-1 | 1998 |
| Border Security Force | | | |
| 3. | Singh, Surinder | Growth and Functional Dynamics of Border Security Force, Jammu : Trikuta Radiant Publications, pp.304, Rs.230.00 | 1998 |
| China - Sikkim | | | |
| 4. | Bajpai, GS | China's Shadow Over Sikkim : The Politics of Intimidation, New Delhi : Lancer Publishers, pp.243, Rs.450.00 ISBN 1 897829 52 3 | 1999 |
| East Asia - Security | | | |
| 5. | Moller, Bjorn | Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia, Aldershot : Ashgate, pp.286, £42.50 ISBN 1-84014-006-2 | 1998 |

Elocution

6. Sharma, HD 100 Best Pre-Independence Speeches 1870-1947, 1998
Harper Collins Publishers India,
pp.480, Rs.395.00
ISBN 81-7223-324-8

Environment

7. Agarwal, SK Perspectives in Environment, 1998
et al, (eds) *New Delhi : APH Publishing Corporation*
pp.381, Rs.1,000.00
ISBN 81-7024-972-4

India - Hindus

8. Singh, Jagdev (Brig) Hindus of India 1998
New Delhi : Gyan Publishing House,
pp.460, Rs.540.00
ISBN 81-212-0599-9

Indo - Bangladesh

9. Dixit, JN Liberation and Beyond : 1999
Indo-Bangladesh Relations,
New Delhi : Konark Publishers,
pp.317, Rs. 395.00
ISBN 81-220-0545-4

Indo-Pak Relations

10. Grover, Verinder World Community and Indo-Pak 1999
Arora, Ranjana, (eds) Relations : Also Includes Indo-Pak
Relations and Efforts Towards Lasting Peace,
New Delhi : Deep &
Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd.,
pp.653, Rs.1,300.00
ISBN 81-7629-058-0

Japan - China

11. Narsimhan, Sushila Japanese Perceptions of China in 1999
the Nineteenth Century : Influence
of Fukuzawa Yukichi, *New Delhi :*
Phoenix Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.,
pp.306, Rs.550.00
ISBN 81-7484-017-6

Light Weapons - India

12. Kartha, Tara Tools of Terror : Light Weapons 1999
and India's Security,
New Delhi : Knowledge World,
pp.357, Rs.360.00
13. **Management**
Harvard Business Review on 1998
Knowledge Management, *Boston :*
Harvard Business School Press,
pp.223, Rs.1005.00
ISBN 0-87584-881-8
14. Zbar, Vic Key Management Concepts : 1996
Unlocking 10 of the Best Management
Books, *Hyderabad : Universities Press,*
pp.190, Rs. 125.00
ISBN 81 7371 151 8
15. Drucker, Peter F Managing in a Time of Great Change, 1995
New York : Truman Talley Books/Plume,
pp.371, \$12.75
ISBN 0-452-27837-6
16. Sundara Raju, SM Total Quality Management : 1997
A Primer, *New Delhi : Tata McGraw-Hill*
Publishing Company Limited
pp.185, Rs.165.00
ISBN 0-07-462452-0
17. Sjöstrand, Sven-Erik The Two Faces of Management, 1997
London : International Thomson
Business Press,
pp.237, Rs.525.00
ISBN 1-86152-183-9
18. Khanna, SK **Nuclear India**
India : A Nuclear Power, 1998
New Delhi : Commonwealth Publishers,
pp.213, Rs.450.00
ISBN 81-7169-526-4
19. Nanda, Ravi Strategic Compulsions of Nuclear 1998
(Col) *India, New Delhi : Lancers Books,*
pp.333, Rs.495.00
ISBN 81-7095-069-4

Reference Books

20. Bharathi, KS Encyclopaedia of Eminent Thinkers, 1998
New Delhi : Concept Publishing Company
pp.133, Rs.250.00 (Set of Ten Vols.)
ISBN 81-7022-684-8

21. India 1999 : A Reference Annual, 1999
New Delhi : Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting,
pp.773, Rs.250.00
ISBN 81-230-0712-4

State Politics – India

22. Bose, Sugata Nationalism, Democracy & 1997
Jalal, Ayesha, (eds) Development : State and Politics in India,
Delhi : Oxford University Press,
pp.206, Rs.175.00
ISBN 019564442-5

Terrorism

23. Kaushal, Rachana Terrorisim and Militancy : A Case 1999
Study of Political Development in Punjab,
Delhi : Kalinga Publications,
pp. 118, Rs. 295.00
ISBN 81-85163-14-6

Tibet - India and China

24. Kadian, Rajesh Tibet, India and China : 1999
Critical Choices, Uncertain Future,
New Delhi : Vision Books,
pp.232 Rs. 325.00
ISBN 81-7094-332-9

War - Strategy

26. Michaelson, Sun Tzu : The Art of War 1999
Gerald A for Managers, US : Pressmark International
pp.160, \$ 14.95
ISBN 8-883999-09-6

Y2K

26. Fletcher, Michael Computer Crisis 2000, 1999
New Delhi : Jaico Publishing House,
pp.232, Rs. 775.00
ISBN 81-7224-748-6

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USI Journal

The USI Journal is the oldest surviving defence journal in the country and in Asia, having first appeared in 1871. It is supplied free to all members, and in an era when there is a feeling that free expression of views by Defence personnel is not looked upon kindly by the establishment, the Journal in fact

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